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Abstract 
 
The fundamental aim of this doctoral thesis is to appraise the protection model critically 
against unfair contract terms in Kuwait and propose solutions for its reform. The thesis 
examines the Kuwaiti Civil Code (KCC) provisions that regulate unfair terms in the 
context of the standard form of contracts (i.e., adhesion) and relevant case law. It primarily 
seeks to address two main issues: (i) why the Kuwaiti control model for the protection 
against unfair terms has failed and (ii)  how it can be reformed. 
It argues that the existing control model has failed considerably in providing 
adhering parties with an adequate level of protection for two reasons. First, the regulation 
of unfair terms in the context of adhesion contracts is fraught with ambiguities and legal 
lacunae that render it flawed and ineffective. Second, the courts’ restrictive interpretation 
of what constitutes an adhesion has limited the protection to only a few types of contracts. 
The thesis explores how the protection model can be overhauled and, where 
relevant, uses European Union Council Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts as a normative framework to offer proposals for law reform. 
To achieve this end, the thesis is divided into an introduction, five chapters, and a 
conclusion. It starts with a brief introduction, focusing mainly on the statement of the 
problem, motivation for the research, research objectives and methodology. Chapter one 
seeks to explore whether, in the light of the statutory deficiency, the general principles of 
contract law can be employed to counter unfair terms. The aim is to confirm the main 
hypothesis of the thesis and explain why legislative intervention is needed. Chapter two 
deals with the scope of protection and discusses the notion of adhesion contracts, their 
regulation in the KCC and how they have been interpreted by the courts. Chapter three 
explores the connotations of the concept of unfair terms and seeks to determine whether 
the ambiguous concept of contractual unfairness can be explained with reference to the 
theory of abuse of rights. Chapter four assesses the court’s role in disputes involving unfair 
iv 
 
terms. Chapter five highlights the need to introduce a parallel enforcement mechanism and 
suggests the establishment of a public body entrusted with the task of eliminating unfair 
terms from the market. The final segment of the study presents concluding remarks and 
suggests recommendations for law reform. 
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Introduction 
 
The phenomenon of standard contracts and unfair terms has attracted the attention of 
legislators, courts and scholars since the beginning of the twentieth century. Many 
jurisdictions recognized the need to interfere in contractual relationships to protect the 
weaker party and rebalance the contract in that party’s favour. The 1970s in particular 
witnessed an influx of legislative initiatives, primarily in Europe, to regulate and control 
unfair terms in standard consumer contracts.1 In recognition of the seriousness of the 
problem, the Kuwaiti legislator, too, sought to regulate unfair terms in the context of 
adhesion contracts in articles 80–81 of the Kuwaiti Civil Code (KCC).2 However, it is the 
author’s view that the regulatory approach is far from satisfactory, and requires urgent and 
drastic reform. Therefore, the purpose of this research is primarily to investigate why the 
Kuwaiti regulatory framework failed to provide an adequate level of protection against 
unfair terms, and what statutory overhaul is required to correct the ineffectiveness and 
inadequacy of the law. 
 
1. Statement of the problem 
 
The proliferation of unfair terms in the Kuwaiti market can be ascribed to the prevalence of 
adhesion contracts as a contracting paradigm. This kind of contract contains standardized 
terms pre-drafted and offered by big businesses supplying goods or services  to any 
potential consumer in the general public. The distinctive feature of this type of contract is 
the dominance of the business party in the contracting process and his refusal to negotiate 
the terms of his offer, which is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Since individual 
 
1 In Germany Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeiner Geschäftsbedingungen (AGB-Gesetz) of 19 
December 1976; in the UK The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA); in France Loi n° 78-23 du 10 
Janvier 1978 (loi Scrivener). 
2 Law No. 67/1980 published in the official gazette Kuwait Today vol. 1335 on 5 January 1981 and entered 
into force 25 February 1981. 
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members of the public who wish to deal with the business lack the power to influence the 
terms of the contract as proposed by the business, they have no choice but to accept them. 
It goes without saying that this contracting model leaves substantial room for abuse by 
businesses if the law does not offer a mechanism to counterbalance the powerful position 
of the proffering party. Therefore, the dominant position of the business allows it to insert 
unfair terms in these standardized contracts to its advantage in order to enhance its 
contractual position at the expense of the weak party. 
So, how has the KCC responded to this problem? It should be pointed out first 
that the drafters of the code in their regulation of the concept of adhesion contracts sought 
to achieve two goals. The first was to assert the contractual nature of adhesion contracts in 
order to avoid any possible dispute about this fact. The wording of Art. 80 leads to this 
conclusion as it emphasizes that the dominance of the will of one party and absence of 
negotiations do not prevent the formation of the contract. This position is reiterated in the 
Explanatory Notes to the Civil Code, which state that even though the adhering party 
submits to the drafting party’s will, his consent still exists and is sufficient for the 
formation of the contract.  
The second goal is to protect the weaker party against unfair terms that the offeror 
may insert in the contract. The fact that the adhesion contract is a product of a unilateral 
will may induce the offeror to act opportunistically and insert terms favourable to him. 
Absence of negotiations, coupled with the unfamiliarity of most adhering parties with the 
complex legal terminology, makes it too easy for the offeror to succumb to the temptation 
of imposing unfair terms. For this reason, Art. 81 of KCC gives the court the power to 
protect the interests of the weaker party and intervene in the contractual relationship to 
remedy the unbalanced contract by amending the unfair terms or eliminating them 
altogether from the contract. 
However, this regulatory approach has not been very successful in controlling 
unfair terms due to procedural and substantive problems inherent in it.  
3 
 
                                                           
As for the procedural aspect of the problem, the adopted approach does not take 
into account the weak contractual position of the adhering party prior to the formation of 
the contract. The existence and sufficiency of the adhering party’s consent to the formation 
of the contract from a legal point of view do not necessarily mean that his consent is 
always obtained freely in real life. If the contract includes unfair terms and is presented to 
the adhering party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, then questioning the validity of his consent 
seems legitimate. It is unfortunate that the code does not address this point. From the 
researcher’s perspective, the effects of this problem can be mitigated through enhancing 
the consent of the adhering party before the contract is concluded. This can be achieved by 
introducing the duty to inform on the part of the offeror and require him to disclose all 
information relating to the good or service supplied, and by making the terms more 
transparent to avoid abuse of language. Additionally, the law should recognize the right of 
withdrawal and allow the adhering party to walk away from the contract within a 
reasonable period.3 
On the substantive aspect of the problem, the code does not provide a definition of 
what might constitute an unfair term or when a contractual term becomes unfair.4 It seems 
that the logic behind this omission is that the drafters of the code did not want to give the 
notion of contractual unfairness a narrow meaning and preferred to leave the courts ample 
room to deliver justice according to the merits of each individual case. However, the case 
law shows that Kuwaiti courts have not attempted even in one case to clarify the meaning 
of the concept unfair terms. In fact, an examination of the courts’ treatment of adhesion 
contracts reveals that they have limited the scope of protection, thus depriving most 
adhering parties of the protection they deserve. In the course of their interpretation of the 
concept adhesion contract, the Kuwaiti courts introduced additional conditions that must 
be satisfied in order for any contract to be admitted as an adhesion contract. So, if an 
 
3 See below at sections 2.3.4.1, 2.34.2, and 2.3.4.3  
4 On the definition of unfair terms see chapter three. 
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adhering party wants to invoke protection against unfair terms, he must first show that the 
contract falls under the umbrella of this narrow definition. This restrictive, or rather 
deformed, interpretation of the legal text narrowed the scope of adhesion contracts and led 
to the limitation of the protection against unfair terms to a very specific group of contract, 
namely utility contracts, such as electricity, telephone and transportation.  
Besides these procedural and substantive problems relating to the formation of the 
adhesion contract and the definition of unfair terms, the remedies set out in the code and 
the process through which they are sought are ineffective and call for reconsideration. The 
code provides amendment and elimination as two possible remedies against unfair terms 
which application falls within the sole discretion of the trial court. However, in order for 
the adhering party to enjoy protection, he must expressly request the court to intervene to 
rebalance the contract. This approach is not consistent with the modern legislative trends 
where the law not only allows, but also sometimes requires, the court to raise the 
unfairness issue on its own motion.5 This is because the ordinary adhering party out of 
ignorance or lack of legal knowledge might not be able to raise the unfairness issue or 
legally articulate his argument. Therefore, since the main function of the courts is to 
deliver justice, they should be empowered to play a more active role and examine the 
unfair terms of their own accord. Additionally, the remedy of amendment should be re-
evaluated because it does not serve a dissuasive function and may actually encourage 
businesses to continue to insert unfair terms in their contracts as the original terms might 
ultimately be preserved by the court. 
A final drawback in the Kuwaiti regulatory approach to unfair terms is that it does 
not provide an active mechanism that seeks to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in 
the market. The enforcement mechanism prescribed by the KCC is characterized by its 
dependence on individual litigation. The adhering party has to initiate legal proceedings 
 
5 See the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘ECJ’) interpretations of the Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 
5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L95/29 (the Directive) in Cofidis, Mostaza 
Claro, and Pannon cases, discussed in chapter four. 
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against the offeror in order challenge the unfair terms. The cost, length and complexity of 
the judicial procedure discourage the vast majority of adhering parties from seeking legal 
redress. This course, besides being cumbersome for the individual consumer, does not 
fulfil a preventative function because the effects of the judgment is limited to the parties to 
the dispute. Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether a parallel enforcement 
mechanism should be implemented. This work proposes the establishment of a public law 
enforcement mechanism whereby a governmental body assumes the responsibility for 
clearing the market of unfair terms, and is authorized to monitor the market on behalf of 
consumers and actively seeks to prohibit the continued use of such terms.  
 
2. Motivation for the research 
 
The driving motivation for this thesis is to enhance the adhering party’s (the consumer) 
position vis-à-vis the offeror (the professional). There is an urgent need to revise the legal 
rules regulating unfair terms to redress the contractual balance in favour of the weaker 
party. It is only theoretically that the consumer possesses freedom of contract but in reality 
he is unable to bargain or improve his position. Because of the superiority of the offeror’s 
position, the freedom to contract has become a unilateral privilege and, more or less, a 
license to abuse the weakness of the consumer by imposing unfair terms.6 Therefore, the 
deficiency of the statutory rules in offering an adequate level of protection for the weaker 
party should be highlighted and solutions to address this deficiency should be proposed. 
 
3. Research objectives and methodology  
 
The purpose of the research presented in this thesis is to assess two main and interrelated 
questions: the first is to find out to what extent the control system of unfair terms in the 
 
6 See below for further discussion at section 2.2. 
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KCC has failed in providing protection against unfair terms, and the second is how it can 
be reformed. More specifically, this work seeks to achieve the following: 
 
i. To present a critical assessment of the statutory provisions relating to adhesion 
contracts and unfair terms in order to identify weaknesses, gaps, ambiguities and 
inconsistencies. 
ii. To examine and challenge the prevalent doctrinal and judicial interpretations of 
the notions of adhesion contracts and unfair terms in order to unravel factors and 
reasons that are responsible for making the law deficient in countering unfair 
terms. 
iii. To discover and understand how the problem of unfair terms has been dealt with 
in other jurisdictions. 
iv. To make recommendations for the improvement of the control of unfair terms in 
three main areas. First, the development of a definition and general standard of 
contractual unfairness; second, a reconsideration of the judicial enforcement of 
unfair terms; and third, the establishment of an active administrative mechanism 
for the elimination of unfair terms from the market. 
 
The methodology adopted in this thesis is refers mainly to black letter law, drawing 
on theoretical and doctrinal scholarly debate. At the theoretical level, the thesis reviews the 
problems of the law and the philosophy for protection against unfair terms. At the doctrinal 
level, it discusses the predominant scholarly and judicial interpretations of adhesion 
contracts and unfair terms. Therefore, the inquiry involves exposition and critical 
evaluation of the content of the statutory provisions of the Kuwaiti Civil Code, in 
particular articles 80 and 81 and their interpretation and application by the courts. In 
addition, it examines academic research relevant to the issue.  
7 
 
                                                           
The thesis refers to comparative law, specifically Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 
5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (hereinafter ‘the Directive’) and the 
law in some EU Member States to learn how this common problem has been approached 
and resolved in other jurisdictions. The examination of the Kuwaiti law in the light of more 
advanced legal systems assisted the researcher in gaining a better understanding of the 
problem in order to identify the shortcomings in the Kuwaiti law and formulate reform 
proposals. Therefore, the purpose of this work is not to compare the Kuwaiti law with its 
EU counterpart, but rather to use the EU regulation as a framework to improve 
understanding of the problem, and to formulate suggestions and develop recommendations 
for law reform.7 However, there will be occasional limited comparative discussion 
primarily to acquire more knowledge about the nature of the problem and the approach 
adopted in the Kuwaiti law. 
 
4. Practical implication of the research 
 
The regulation of unfair contract terms has not been subject to serious scrutiny since the 
inception of the KCC in 1980. The law has been in force for some 34 years and it has 
become necessary to analyse the effectiveness of the control model of unfair terms in 
practice. The lack of legal research in this field highlights the importance of this study as 
being the first doctoral thesis to offer a systematic investigation into the issue. It is hoped 
that the analysis and discussion contained in this thesis will assist lawmakers when 
considering reform of the existing law. Additionally, the doctrinal analysis and findings in 
 
7 In his review of the functions of comparative law, De Cruz highlights law reform as one of the main 
purposes of comparative law research, Peter De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (Cavendish 
1999), pp. 18–20. Zweigert and Kotz have also stated that "legislators all over the world have found that on 
many matters good laws cannot be produced without the assistance of comparative law", Konrad  Zweigert 
and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Clarendon 1998), pp. 15–16. Örücü asserts that one of 
the main functions of comparative law is "to provide a pool of models for use in law reform", Esin Örücü, 
The Enigma of Comparative Law: Variations On A Theme For The Twenty-first Century (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2004), p. 76. 
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this thesis may prove instructive to academics, lawyers, government bodies, students and 
any stakeholder that has an interest in contract law and consumer protection law reform. 
 
5. Structure of the research 
 
In order to accomplish the above objectives, the research is separated into five chapters 
each of which is concerned with discussion of a specific aspect of the problem. 
Chapter one considers whether the main hypothesis of the thesis pertaining to the 
deficiency of the Kuwaiti regulatory model of unfair terms and the need for legislative 
intervention is correct. The discussion in this chapter is divided into two sections. Each 
section seeks to explore alternatives that can be used in lieu of the current deficient 
statutory provisions. In section one an attempt is made to ascertain whether the theory of 
defects of consent can be employed to control unfair terms. Consent is the cornerstone of 
the contract and the market practice has been that unfair terms are imposed on the weaker 
party through a standard contract against his will. Thus, it can be argued that the adhering 
party’s acceptance is not a true representation of his contractual will and unfair terms can 
be challenged on the basis of deformed consent. Section two of this chapter focuses on the 
overarching principle of good faith and ascertains whether it can be employed to tackle 
unfair terms in so far as their imposition contradicts the duty of good faith that should 
prevail in contracts. 
Chapter two is an analyses of the regulation of adhesion contracts and the current scope of 
protection against unfair terms. It highlights two issues relating to the regulation of the 
adhesion contract in the KCC: (i) lack of protection prior to the conclusion of the contract, 
and (ii) the discrepancy between the word of the law and the way it is applied. 
The objective of this chapter is to review the protection approach and reconstruct 
the meaning of the adhesion contract by identifying the shortcomings of their statutory 
regulation and judicial interpretation. It starts by providing an historical account of the 
9 
 
adhesion contract as an exceptional contracting paradigm, why it has emerged and why 
protection of the weaker party is warranted. The rationale for this historical review is to 
show the inconsistency of the narrow interpretation of the Kuwaiti courts’ of the notion of 
adhesion contracts with the modern concept of adhesion contracts. The chapter also 
discusses the procedural problems associated with the regulation of adhesion contracts and 
shows that the reason for this is that the code does not take into account the vulnerability of 
the adhering party prior to the conclusion of the contract. In order to overcome this pre-
contractual vulnerability, suggestions are made for the enhancement of the weak 
contractual position of the adhering party prior to contract formation. The last issue the 
chapter deals with is the restrictive judicial interpretation of the notion of adhesion 
contracts and its impact on the scope of protection. It provides a critical analysis of the 
courts’ attitude towards the definition and scope of adhesion contracts, and calls for the 
adoption of a more modern concept. 
Chapter three is concerned with the meaning of the notion of contractual unfairness and 
attempts to find a basis for it in the Kuwaiti Civil Code. The code lacks any definition or 
standard for the meaning of the concept of unfair terms. Therefore, it is surrounded with 
ambiguity and uncertainty in both its meaning and application. The chapter begins with an 
investigation of the different types of contractual terms and classifies them into three main 
groups: (i) valid, (ii) invalid and (iii) unfair. The reason for this taxonomy is to discern the 
nature and connotation of unfair terms to distinguish them from other types of contractual 
terms. The discussion then proceeds to examine the rationale within the Civil Code for the 
protection against unfair terms. Lastly, the chapter attempts to resolve the ambiguity of the 
concept of unfair terms by arguing that the theory of abuse of rights can be used as a basis 
for the notion of unfair terms. 
In chapter four the effectiveness of the judicial procedure in disputes involving unfair 
terms is assessed. The discussion revises the powers of the courts and the remedies 
available to them under Art. 81 KCC. Further, it argues for the need for an active judicial 
10 
 
involvement in unfair terms disputes by giving the courts the power to raise contractual 
unfairness on their own motion.  
Chapter five complements the enforcement discussion presented in the previous chapter. It 
highlights the need to establish a public enforcement mechanism to control unfair terms at 
a market level to prevent their continued use. It argues that the individual litigation-based 
enforcement approach is not only insufficient to control businesses’ unfair contractual 
practices in the market, but also indirectly contributes to their proliferation. Therefore, in 
order to overcome this shortcoming, proposals are made for the creation of a public body 
entrusted with the task of taking preventative measures against the use of unfair terms in 
the market on behalf of consumers. 
In the end the research is concluded by a summary of the thesis findings and propose 
recommendations for law reform. 
 
6. Editorial note 
 
For the sake of consistency and consideration for the reader, this thesis was 
referenced using Oxford Standard for the Citation of Legal Authorities (OSCOLA). The 
computer software EndNote X7 was used to insert footnotes and generate the bibliography. 
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Chapter One: Deficiency in the General Principles of Contract Law in 
Controlling Unfair Terms 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Before discussing how the present regulatory model of unfair terms in the KCC can be 
reformed, it might be beneficial to explore whether the general principles of contract law 
can play a role in countering unfair terms. The phenomenon of unfair terms is a pure 
contract law problem as these terms are imposed on the adhering party against his 
contractual will by a superior party who dominates the contract formation. It could be 
argued that the imposition of such terms conflicts with the free will of the adhering party 
and their acceptance does not mean he consented to them. Similarly, their imposition is 
inconsistent with the principle of good faith that should prevail in transactions. Therefore, 
is it possible to have recourse to the classical principles and theories in the Civil Code, 
such as defects of consent and the principle of good faith, to request elimination or relief 
the adhering party from unfair terms? This chapter will attempt to answer this question and 
examine whether these principles can compensate for gaps in the law.   
The objective of this chapter is twofold: (i) to discuss whether the classical legal 
principles in the KCC can be applied to protect consumers against unfair terms and (ii) to 
determine whether it is feasible to use the notion of good faith in the KCC to assess the 
fairness of contractual terms. Although the principle of good faith is an overarching 
principle in the Kuwaiti code, its connotations remain unclear and merit further research. 
Therefore, the discussion will involve reference to comparative law, in particular German, 
English, and French laws, to understand how the notion of good faith was employed to 
determine unfair terms and, consequently, to eliminate them. 
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1.2 Control of unfair terms through the theory of defects of consent 
 
Central to the theory of the law of contract is the concept of consent. It implies that 
contracts cannot be deemed legal if the consent does not come from an informed and 
conscious will.8 Therefore, acceptance is crucial to the formation of the contract because it 
manifests the offeree’s assent to adhere to a legal relationship; hence, it gives birth to the 
contract.9 One of the characteristics of the KCC is that it relies heavily on the autonomy of 
the will theory as a source for the binding force of the contract, and requires a subjective 
agreement and a true meeting of two wills in order for a contract to exist.10 Individuals are 
considered the best judges of their own interests and are able to decide what is appropriate 
and fair for them. However, the classical method of contract formation has gradually 
changed over the past century following the development of mass production and mass 
distribution, which gave rise to novel contractual mechanisms that were not known in the 
past. If one looks at the contracting mechanism in today’s market one will notice that 
agreements are no longer a meeting of two minds; rather they are concluded by means of 
pre-drafted standard forms in which effective negotiation is absent and contracts are 
presented on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis. Contracting by means of a standard form of 
contracts (i.e., adhesion) has become the norm in the modern age in which effective 
negotiation between professionals and consumers is absent in almost all consumer 
contracts.11 Consumers’ options are limited to either signing on the dotted line or rejecting 
the agreement as a whole. The contract is no longer a meeting of two wills, rather, it is an 
 
8 In the KCC three essential requisites must be satisfied in order for a valid agreement to come into existence: 
(i) consent, (ii) object and (iii) cause (Art. 122).  
9 Ibrahim Abu Allail, Contract and Unilateral Will (2nd edn, Kuwait, Dar Alkotob 1998) (in Arabic), p. 115.  
10 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, Middle Commentary on the New Civil Code, vol 1 (3rd edn, Cairo, Dar 
Annahdha 1981) (in Arabic), pp. 103–108. Al-Sanhuri was the draftsman maker and the commentator on the 
Egyptian Civil Code and that was the model for the KCC and therefore Al-Sanhuri is an authoritative source 
for the Kuwaiti law. 
11Geraint Howells and Stephen Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law (Ashgate 2005), p. 19; Hans- W 
Micklitz, Jules Stuyck and Evelyne Terryn, Cases, Materials and Text on Consumer Law (Hart 2010), p. 171. 
David Slawson estimated already in 1971, although with some exaggeration, that standard form contracts 
became the prevalent contractual instrument in the marketplace amounting approximately to 99% of all 
contracts, David Slawson, ‘Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power’ 84 
HarvLRev 529, p. 529.  
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imposition of the stronger party’s terms upon the weak. If the contract is concluded in this 
way and contains unfair terms, then it is doubtful that consent was given in a free manner 
and the presumption is that mere acceptance of the offer does not suffice to establish 
mutual assent. If a consumer accepts unfair terms, then his consent might, one would 
argue, be deformed. Moreover, standard form contracts are characterized by their 
complexity of structure and sophistication of language. The average person can easily 
make mistakes as to the meaning of terms or the scope of the agreement. In this case, can 
error be invoked because the consumer misapprehended certain terms? Furthermore, if a 
professional misrepresents the terms, can fraud or exploitation be invoked to exclude or 
invalidate the unfair terms? Can unfair terms be annulled because the professional 
exploited the consumer’s weakness in terms of lack of knowledge?12  
 
1.2.1 Error 
 
Standard form contracts are often complex and prepared using sophisticated language that 
is sometimes difficult even for lawyers to comprehend let alone laypeople.13 The 
complexity of contracts is ascribed to the sophisticated structure of certain transactions and 
also to their legalese.14 It is likely that consumers make mistakes about essential qualities 
of the agreement object or err in understanding certain aspects of the subject matter of the 
agreement ‘by virtue of their bounded rationality and lack of information’.15 They may 
well fail to grasp the meaning of some clauses whether relating to, inter alia, substance, 
value, specifications of the product or service, contract duration or their rights and 
 
12 This is discussed in section 1.2.3. 
13 Hassan Gemei, The Effect of Inequality between Contractors on the Contract Terms (Cairo, Dar Annahdha 
Alarabia 1991) (in Arabic), p. 63; Hélène Bricks, Les Clauses Abusives (Librairie générale de droit et de 
jurisprudence 1982), p. 183. 
14 John Burke, ‘Reinventing Contract’ 10 Murdoch U Elec JL 2, available at: 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n2/burke102_text.html 
15 Russell Korobkin, ‘Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability’ 70 UChiLRev 
1203, pp. 1203–95. 
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obligations. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that many individuals will fail to 
determine the scope of the agreement and the meaning of its terms. 
Credit agreements could be used as an example. An agreement between a bank 
and a customer may not set out the terms accurately to a customer who enters into the 
agreement under the impression that the total sum he must repay to the bank is X instead of 
Y. The reason for this might be that the interest rate clause is not written in plain language 
or is buried in fine print, with the effect that his debt towards the bank is increased. It is 
then likely that he will fail to determine the scope of his liability towards the bank.16 
Additionally, it is a common contractual technique, especially in contracts involving large 
corporations, that terms are contained in more than one document and are then 
incorporated by reference into one agreement. The external clauses may not be readily 
accessible at the time of the conclusion of the contract, leaving consumers unaware of 
certain issues that might affect their desire to enter into a binding agreement had they 
known about such terms beforehand. A question can be raised here relating to the validity 
of the consent of the consumer; can a contract including unfair terms written in a complex 
language be challenged on the basis of error because the consumer misunderstood their 
meaning? In other words, does misapprehension of complex legal clauses amount to error? 
The question becomes more difficult to answer if one takes into account the absence in the 
KCC of an express pre-contractual duty to draft contracts in plain and intelligible language.  
To answer the question one needs to review the legal provisions relating to the 
notion of error then assess whether it can be used to eliminate unfair terms. 
Art. 147(1) KCC provides: ‘If a party to a contract errs in such a way as to prompt 
him to accept a contract, i.e. had he not erred he would not have consented to the contract, 
 
16 This issue sparked many legal disputes and was much debated in Kuwait. The banks used to unilaterally 
adjust the interest rate in consumer loan agreements, allegedly on the grounds of the announced discount rate 
by the Central Bank, hence increasing debtors total debt. The result was the banks received twice the original 
value of loan. Several law suits were filed against the banks. The Cassation Court (2nd Commercial Circuit) 
in a recent decision (No. 1208/2006 on 1/6/2008) invalidated such clause on the grounds of arts. 111 and 115 
of the Commercial Code that determine the interest rates and the principle of public order. The researcher is 
of the opinion that such a clause could also have been invalidated on the basis of error because customers’ 
consent was deformed from the outset and they did not know how much their total debt would be.  
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then he may demand annulment of the contract if the other party has made the same error, 
had knowledge thereof, or could have easily discerned that an error was made.’ 
Error is a false perception occurring in at least one party’s mind relating to any of 
the requisites of the contract (e.g., consent, object and cause). Naturally, in consumer 
contracts it is the professional who prepares the contract and all related documents, and it 
is his responsibility to take all necessary measures to prevent the consumer from falling 
into error. Obviously, if the former executes his duties in good faith, then it would be 
unjust and unreasonable to hold him liable for the latter’s own carelessness.  
The wording of the above provision shows that the code embraces the subjective 
approach of error in which consent could be vitiated by any type of error as long as it was 
substantive, that is, without which consent would not have been given at all. The 
Explanatory Note to the code provides examples of error that vitiate consent: it can be 
made as to the object of the agreement or its qualities, identity of the other party, motive 
for contracting, or to the value of the object.17 However, in order to avoid systematic 
recession of contracts, the code stipulates two conditions that must be met for an error to 
vitiate consent:  
 
i. Error should induce the mistaken party to enter into the contract, that is, the 
subject matter of error is the determining factor in contracting. 
ii. Error is communicated to the other party either by making the same error,18 
knowing that the other party had made an error, or it was feasible for him to 
discern it.  
Communication of error means that the other party is aware of the error. The 
Code provides three cases in which the contracting party's awareness is deemed to be 
 
17 The Explanatory Notes to the Civil Code (4th edn, Council of Ministers 2004), pp. 137–138; Al-Sanhuri, p. 
393 et seq.; Ibrahim Abu Allail, pp. 364–365.  
18 This is unlikely in standardised contracts as they are the creation of the professional who drafts the terms 
of the agreement without participation from the other party.  
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established. First, if the party makes the same error as his counterpart, i.e. there is a shared 
error between the two contractors, such as when a fake painting is sold and both parties 
concluded the contract under the believe that it was genuine.  
Secondly, if one party knows that his counterpart had unilaterally made an error 
but did not attempt to correct it, such as when the seller knows that the buyer purchased a 
defective product believing that it was fit for use.  
Thirdly, if it was at least feasible for one party to know that his counterpart had 
made an error. Here, it is not necessary to show that seller knew that the buyer has actually 
made an error, rather it is sufficient to show that he was able to discern that his counterpart 
made an error. 
In all three cases the remedy for error is the annulment of the contract however its 
basis differs in each case. In the first case both parties acted in good faith therefore neither 
party should contest his counterpart's request for the avoidance of the contract. In the 
second case, the other party knew an error had been made by his counterpart and despite 
that he acted in bad faith by failing to notify his counterpart of the error, therefore 
annulment in this case is the punishment for his bad faith. In the third case, the party was 
negligent in discovering the error and should bear the liability for overlooking the error.19 
Thus, if the consumer misapprehends a contractual clause in a standard form 
contract due to its complexity, can the contract be rescinded on this basis?  
Some writers have submitted, although with some caution,20 that error can be 
invoked to eliminate unfair terms, provided two conditions are met: (i) the error must not 
be gross and inexcusable, that is, the average person cannot make it, and (ii) the error must 
relate to an essential element in the contract. It has been held in other jurisdictions that if a 
person makes mistake as to the meaning of the contract terms, then the court can rescind 
the contract on the basis of the error. In France, for instance, years before the promulgation 
 
19 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 413 
20 Hassan Gemei, p. 63 et seq., asserted that the absolute application of error to combat unfair terms might 
lead to instability in transactions 
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of the legislation of 10 January 1978 on unfair terms, the courts rescinded a loan contract 
on the basis of error because the borrower had misunderstood the terms and thought the 
loan was to be immediate, whereas, in fact, it was deferred.21 In addition, after France had 
adopted reforms to its currency system and introduced the new franc, several contracts 
were annulled on the grounds that there was dissent in understanding the contractual terms 
relating to the monetary unit used to measure the price.22 Although Art. 1110 of the French 
Civil Code limits error to (i) the actual substance of the thing that is the object of the 
contract, or (ii) to the identity of the other party, the French courts, nevertheless, did not 
hesitate to give the article a broad interpretation to annul the contract because there was 
error in the substance of the performance.23 
A similar approach can be applied by the Kuwaiti courts, especially with the 
knowledge that the broad wording of Art. 147 KCC allows nullification of the contract on 
the basis of any substantive error, as long as it was the determining factor for contracting 
without which there would not have been a contract. The subject matter of the error is 
irrelevant, what is relevant is the impact of the error on the will. Therefore, if the 
misapprehended terms were the determining factor for contracting then, this researcher 
believes that the contract could be rescinded on the basis of error, provided that the court is 
willing to interpret Art. 147 widely.24  
It is not impossible for consumers to err as to the meaning of standard agreement 
clauses. They can, in fact, do so in two instances: (i) when the terms are complex and 
difficult for the average person to understand and (ii) when the professional omits certain 
terms or conceals their true meaning to gain an advantage over the consumer. As 
 
21 Lyon, 15.7.1952, D 1952, 753; also see Barry Nicholas, The French Law of Contract (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press 1992), pp. 99–100.  
22 Ibid., p. 100; Cass Com. 14.1.1969, for a discussion of the case, see Hugh Beale and others, Cases, 
Materials and Text on Contract Law (2nd edn, Oxford, Hart 2010), pp. 56–57; Hassan Gemei, p. 69; Hélène 
Bricks, pp. 182 et seq.  
23 Hugh Beale and others, p. 56; Barry Nicholas, p. 100.  
24 Although the text of the KCC is flexible, the courts were reluctant to give articles pertaining to the theory 
of contract a wider interpretation, see Jamal Al-Nakkas, ‘The Expansive Direction of Judicial Interpretation 
of Contracts and Actions: A Study of the Decisions of Kuwaiti Court of Cassation and Comparative Law (in 
Arabic)’ 23 JouroL 13, pp. 52–55.  
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mentioned earlier, the code uses the principle of good faith as an indication for the 
unfairness of the terms as explained in the Explanatory Notes to the Code.25 If the 
professional prepares the terms contrary to the principle of good faith, then the terms can, 
in theory, be deemed unfair. In addition, the party has a contractual obligation to execute 
the contract and carry out its duties in good faith as is required by the Civil Code.26 The 
duty of good faith entails that the professional fulfils his pre-contractual duty of providing 
information by giving all factual details about the transaction and its scope. In case of 
complex agreements, the professional must prepare the terms in comprehensible and lucid 
language so that the consumers’ consent can be informed and represents free will. 
However, unlike the situation in other countries,27 a general obligation to disclose 
information is unfortunately not yet recognized in the Kuwaiti legal system; neither by 
statutes nor by courts as a standalone pre-contractual duty that should be applied in all 
contractual relations.28 In addition, there is no express duty on professionals to draft 
contracts in a comprehensible and clear language. Some jurisdictions have engaged 
actively in this regard, and codified the requirement of plain and intelligible language to 
make agreements readable to the average consumer to protect him from the abuse of 
language by professionals.29 
 
25 , The Explanatory Notes to the Civil Code, p. 95. 
26 Art. 197 KCC provides that "the contract must be executed in pursuant to its provisions and in a manner 
consistent with good faith and honourable dealing". 
27 In France the pre-contractual duty to provide information is well established and has been developed 
incrementally mainly by the courts and scholastic research from 1945 onwards; see Jacques Ghestin, ‘The 
Pre-Contractual Obligation to Disclose Information’ in Donald Harris and Denis Tallon (eds), Contract Law 
Today, Anglo-French Comparisons (Oxford University Press 1989), p. 152 et seq. There is disagreement as 
to whether a similar duty exists in common law; for discussion and evaluation in English law, see Pierre Jr. 
Legrand, ‘Pre-contractual disclosure and information: English and French law compared’ 6 OJLS 322; Barry 
Nicholas, ‘The Obligation to Disclose Information: English Report’ in Donald Harris and Denis Tallon (eds), 
Contract law today: Anglo-French comparisons (Clarendon Press 1998), p. 166 et seq.; cf. Sjef Van Erp, 
‘The Pre-Contractual Stage’ in Arthur Hartkamp and others (eds), Towards a European Civil Code (3rd edn, 
Kluwer Law International 2004), pp. 363–280.  
28 Instances of obligation to disclose information can be found in provisions relating to insurance agreements 
(articles 790 and 791) and in the contract for the sale of goods where the seller is obliged to provide the 
purchaser with all necessary information pertaining to the sold object (Art. 467). This obligation can also be 
implicitly inferred from Art. 152 where the code prohibits fraudulent silence which indirectly constitutes an 
obligation of disclosure. In the same vein, see Hassan Gemei, Consumer Protection: the Special Protection 
of the Consumer's Consent in Consumer Contracts (Dar Annahdha Alarabiyah 1996) (in Arabic), p. 15.  
29 Art. 5 of the Directive provides that "In the case of contracts where all or certain terms offered to the 
consumer are in writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language". The requirement 
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Although the theory of error can be an important vehicle for protecting the 
consumer’s consent against contractual unfairness, it, nonetheless, might not always be 
favourable to allow relief because of its legal effect. The effect of error is to void the entire 
contract ab initio. Therefore, if a consumer manages to prove and convince the court that 
there was error as to the terms, the court will have to annul the entire agreement pursuant 
to Art. 147 stated above. It cannot annul the unfair terms alone or amend them in the 
consumer’s favour because error is an obstacle to the formation of the contract and 
precludes the meeting of wills in the first place.30 This solution is only desirable when the 
consumer wants to annul the entire agreement such as when the error is made as to the 
terms determining the nature of the agreement (error in negotio) or the object thereof 
(error in substantia). However, the consumer’s interest does not always lie in the 
annulment of the whole agreement, especially when products or services are provided 
along the same terms and conditions in the market.31 Therefore, if the consumer wants to 
invalidate only certain clause(s), his quest will certainly not succeed.  
The question of whether the concept of fraud provides the desired outcome for 
consumers will be answered in the next section. 
 
1.2.2 Fraud 
 
The other defect of consent that vitiates the contract is fraud. Fraud is regulated in articles 
151–155. Art. 151 provides that "A contract may be annulled on the grounds of fraud when 
one party consented due to artifices practiced against him to induce contracting, provided 
that it is proven that he would not have accepted the contract without such artifices".  
 
is also known as the principle of transparency. This article has been incorporated into the national laws of 
most EU Member States; see Hans Schulte-Nölke, Christian Twigg-Flesner and Martin Ebers, EC Consumer 
Law Compendium: The Consumer Acquis and its Transposition in the Member States (Sellier. European Law 
Publishers 2008), p. 246. The UK, for instance, transposed (Art. 5) into domestic legislation via (regulation 
7.1) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 1999 (hereinafter ‘UTCCR’).  
30 The court is able to amend the contractual terms in certain contracts, notably in contracts of adhesion. 
However, the courts do not regard consumer contracts per se as contracts of adhesion. 
31 Hélène Bricks, p. 187; Hassan Gemei, The Effect of Inequality between Contractors on the Contract 
Terms, p. 70.  
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Fraud is very much akin to error because both engender false perception but they 
diverge in the way consent is obtained. While error can be made without external 
influence, consent in fraud is always expressed only after deceptive means had been used 
to mislead a person into contracting  fraudulently.32 Mere lies and usual business 
exaggerations (dolus bonus) do not amount to fraud unless they exceed the normal limit 
and contravene the duties of honesty and good faith.33 Therefore, artifices must be 
unlawful to void the contract. They may consist of forged documents, false statements or 
deliberate concealment of important information.34 Negative behaviour such as silence 
equals artifices if one party has an obligation to speak but decides to withhold vital 
information from the other.35 An obligation to disclose information can be imposed on 
both parties either by agreement36 or by law
Art. 151 sets out three conditions in order for a contract to be annulled on the 
basis of fraud: (i) artifices were used to obtain consent, (ii) fraud is the determining factor 
for consent and (iii) fraud is committed by a contracting party or he is at least aware of it.  
Disagreement exists as to whether the victim of fraud can avoid the contract if the 
contract includes onerous (unfair) terms. Some scholars38 rejected the idea of rescinding 
the contract if artifices were created to influence a person into accepting burdensome 
obligations, arguing that fraud must relate to the substance of the agreement. They make a 
 
32 Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 370; Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 422 et seq.; Barry Nicholas, The French Law of 
Contract, pp. 100–102.  
33 Ibrahim Abu Allail, pp. 372–373.  
34 Ibid, p. 374; Hassan Gemei, The Effect of Inequality between Contractors on the Contract Terms, p. 72; 
Hélène Bricks, p 188.  
35 Art. 152 of the Kuwaiti Civil Code.  
36 In insurance contracts, for example, the insuree has a duty to disclose all information relevant to the 
formation of the contract Art. 790(1), such as his medical condition in life insurance and if he is suffering 
from any illness.  
37 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 427. The imposition of such a duty is based on a duty of co-operation owed 
by the parties to the contract; see Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker, Good Faith in European 
Contract Law (Cambridge University Press 2000), pp. 216–219. It has also been established in the French 
courts that silence may constitute fraud if one party fails to correct a known misunderstanding in other 
party’s mind; see Muriel Fabre-Magnan and Ruth Sefton-Green, ‘Defects on Consent in Contract Law’ in 
Arthur Hartkamp and others (eds), Towards a European Civil Code (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 
2004), p. 403; Barry Nicholas, The French Law of Contract, p. 102; Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 427.  
38 For a review of this opinion, see Solaiman Murkus, An Adequate Commentary on Civil Law, vol 1 (4th 
edn, Cairo, Dar Alkotob 1987) (in Arabic), pp. 387–388; see also Barry Nicholas, The French Law of 
Contract, p. 111 for the difference between both types of fraud.  
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distinction between two types of fraud: (i) determinant fraud and (ii) incidental fraud, and 
argue that onerous terms are one example of the latter because the contract would have 
been concluded in any case, regardless of the nature of the terms, and that the courts should 
deny the claim for avoidance and only award damages. This view was, however, criticized 
by other scholars.39 In the opinion of Al-Sanhuri it is irrelevant whether fraud was 
perpetrated as to the object of the agreement or the terms of the agreement because one 
cannot separate the contractual will that accepted the agreement from the terms that 
prompted consent in the first place. Other writers support this view and regard the 
distinction between a contract and its terms as being unworkable40 and the courts rarely 
refuse to rescind on the grounds of incidental fraud.41 
If consumer contracts in today’s market are examined, one will find in many 
agreements that professionals fraudulently attempt to insert unfair terms to disturb the 
equilibrium of the contract. This includes the intentional misrepresentation of the meaning 
of terms and omission of certain crucial terms. In other, less extreme, cases, the reader may 
not be able to read the terms because they were written in very small print. In this regard, a 
French court held that if a company disguises a term that provides that a loan cannot be 
benefited from unless a few years have elapsed and fails to place this important term in a 
noticeable part in the contract, then the company has induced its customer to make an error 
relating to an essential element of the contract. In the case in question, the contract also 
included a term that confirmed that the customer had thoroughly read and completely 
understood the terms despite its small print. The court concluded that it was hard for the 
customer to read a document with such a small font and understand the meaning of the 
clauses. The court therefore decided to rescind the contract on the grounds of fraud 
 
39 Solaiman Murkus, pp. 387-388.; Al Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, pp. 431-433; Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 375; 
Abdulrasol Abudlredha and Jamal Al-Nakkas, A Concise Commentary on the General Theory of Obligations, 
vol 1 (Kuwait, Dar Alkutub 2006) (in Arabic), p. 101.  
40 Barry Nicholas, The French Law of Contract, p. 111.   
41 Hugh Beale and others, p. 436.  
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because the company’s act constituted fraudulent non-disclosure (dol par reticence) and 
failed to fulfil its contractual duty to inform the other party.42  
Some commentators have submitted that it is appropriate to invoke the theory of 
fraud to challenge unfair terms when the professional fails to fulfil his pre-contractual 
obligation of providing information.43 However, as with error, this theory is limited and 
partial in scope in that it is applicable in fraud cases and will fall short in providing 
comprehensive treatment of the problem, especially when one takes into account that there 
is no statutory obligation on the parties to perform a pre-contractual duty of providing 
information, as well as the absence of the principle of transparency.44 In addition, the 
burden of proof is placed on the consumer who has to prove the existence of the deceitful 
intent of the professional to defraud him. Similar to the situation in error, if the court 
accepts the consumer’s claim, then it cannot eliminate the unfair terms alone but must 
annul the entire agreement in accordance with Art. 151; an outcome the consumer may not 
prefer in all instances.  
Moreover, the application of the theory lies in the discretionary power of the 
court, which might lead to conflicting judicial decisions in this regard. 
 
 
 
 
42 Aix 15.2.1950, JCP, 1950, I, 5548, mentioned in Hélène Bricks, p. 195. Although the obligation to inform 
is not expressly mentioned in the French Civil Code, the French courts deduced it from Art. 1134(3) which 
requires contracts to be performed in good faith and Art. L 111-1 of Code de la Consommation: "Every 
professional seller of goods shall, before concluding the contract, put the consumer in a position to know all 
essential characteristics of the good." The researcher believes that this obligation can be inferred from Art. 
197 KCC which provides: "Contracts must be executed according to its terms and in a manner consistent 
with good faith and honest dealing".  
43 Hassan Gemei, Consumer Protection: the Special Protection of the Consumer's Consent in Consumer 
Contracts, p. 74–75. Gemei criticized the confined notion of fraud, and called on the courts to follow in the 
footsteps of the French courts and adopt a wider concept of fraud that allowed for invalidating unfair 
contractual terms on the grounds of fraud, p. 77; see also Omar Abdulbaqi, The Contractual Protection of the 
Consumer (Alexandria, Monshat Al-Maaref 2008) (in Arabic), p. 347.  
44 Hassan Gemei, The Effect of Inequality between Contractors on the Contract Terms, ibid.; see also Omar 
Abdulbaqi, pp. 344–345.  
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1.2.3 Exploitation 
 
Exploitation occurs when one party abuses a weakness in another and influences him to 
enter into a contract that results in a gross disparity between the performances of the 
parties.45 In this regard, Art. 159 KCC provides as follows:   
 
"If a person exploits in another a compelling need, obvious recklessness, apparent 
weakness, inordinate affection, or if he exploits his moral influence to make him enter 
into contract for his own interest or the interest of a third party that results in a gross 
imbalance between the performance to be executed and the economic or moral profit to 
be received, such that conclusion of the contract was in conspicuous denial of the honour 
of dealing and the requirement of good faith, then the judge is entitled, upon request from 
the victim of exploitation and in accordance with justice and in consideration of the 
circumstances of the case, to reduce the undertakings of the victim, increase the 
undertakings of the other party, or annul the contract".46  
 
Exploitation, according to this article, consists of two elements. The first element 
is subjective (i.e., mental) and concerns the existence of a weakness in the exploited party, 
as enumerated above, which led him to accept an unbalanced contract. The second is 
objective (i.e., material) and relates to the gross disproportion of the rights and obligations 
of the parties where the victim of exploitation enters into a contract that imposes greater 
obligations or stricter terms on him.47 Normal disproportion of performances is not 
enough; it must be gross and unusual. Disproportion cannot be measured in terms of 
monetary value but rather in terms of the effect of the exploitation on the victim and should 
be examined on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, the court must employ a material test and 
 
45 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 476; Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 385.   
46 It is worth noting that the KCC was influenced by section 138.2 of the German Civil Code (BGB) but does 
not confine it to pecuniary advantage; see The Explanatory Notes to the Civil Code p. 137. 
47 Cass. Civ. Case No. 156/2002, 30.9.2002; Cass. Comm (3). Case No. 934/2004, 4.3.2006; see also Ibrahim 
Abu Allail, pp. 386–387; Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 484 et seq.; Hassan Gemei, The Effect of Inequality 
between Contractors on the Contract Terms, p. 86.  
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make comparison between what each party received or undertook versus the other. If the 
disparity is insignificant then the contract will remain effective because complete balance 
between the performances of the parties is not required and is not feasible all the time.48 
Unlike the previous defect of consent, the doctrine of exploitation is characterized 
by its flexibility and applicability in various contexts and can, albeit to a limited extent, 
contribute indirectly to the control of unfair terms in consumer contracts. The requirement 
of apparent weakness is already present in consumers because they are always the inferior 
contractual party by virtue of their lack of information and inequality of bargaining 
power.49 Professionals’ superiority in terms of knowledge and bargaining power enables 
them to exploit consumers’ bounded rationality and inexperience to impose unfair terms 
that better reflect their interests. This view can be substantiated by the example of 
exclusion clauses which professionals frequently incorporate into contracts to oust liability 
owed to their consumers. Therefore, the comparison between the parties’ obligations 
should not only be limited to the object of the agreement, but should also extend to 
comprise comparison between the terms of the contract and what they entail. Some 
commentators champion this view and argue that the comparison of undertakings 
necessarily involves assessment of the terms.50 In addition, the court may at the request of 
the exploited party reduce his undertakings, which can include elimination of the unfair 
terms.51  
However, it is uncertain whether the theory of exploitation will succeed in 
offering the protection that consumers seek against all unfair terms, for two reasons. First, 
its scope of applicability is limited because the degree of disproportion between the 
obligations the article requires is a major impediment and precludes its application to cover 
 
48 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri ibid., p. 485. 
49 Abu Allail argues that the five instances mentioned in Art. 159 are only examples and regards "apparent 
weakness" as a general criterion to encompass all cases of weaknesses including inexperience in contractual 
matters, p. 390.  
50 Mohammad Abd Al-Aal, The Concept of the Weak Party in the Contractual Relationship (Cairo: Dar 
Annahdha Al-Arabiya 2007) (in Arabic), pp. 32–33.  
51 Ibid. 
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all types of unfair terms. The contract equilibrium may well be upset in the sense that it 
imposes stricter obligations on the consumer or relieves the professional from liability but 
the disparity does not necessarily amount to gross disproportion. Second, the burden of 
proof will fall on the consumer who must show that the professional took advantage of his 
weakness. This is a very heavy burden and is unlikely to be discharged in most cases 
because the professional does not necessarily want to exploit a weakness in the consumer 
but to maximize his wealth.52  
 
1.2.4 Conclusion 
 
In sum, the theory of defects of consent can play a role, albeit limited, in 
controlling unfair terms because the consumer’s consent cannot be regarded as free if 
unfair terms were imposed against his will. However, success of the application of the 
theory will always depend on the judicial desire to embrace a broad interpretation of the 
law to cover unfair terms. In addition, it is useful only if the consumer wishes to walk 
away from the agreement and not to eliminate the unfair terms alone. 
  
1.3 Can the principle of good faith be used to determine contractual unfairness? 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Explanatory Notes to the KCC establishes the concept of 
contractual fairness on the principles of good faith and honorable dealing.53 It is clear that 
the code establishes a connection between good faith and fairness. If an unfair term exists, 
then it is because the duty of good faith has been breached. However, it is unfortunate that 
the Kuwaiti courts have not thoroughly considered good faith and that the application of 
the relatively recent code (31 years old) did not develop any specific connotations of good 
faith. The entire notion of good faith is not clear and requires investigation, firstly, to 
 
52 Hassan Gemei, The Effect of Inequality between Contractors on the Contract Terms, p. 87. 
53 , The Explanatory Notes to the Civil Code, p. 95. 
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understand its meaning and nature, and, secondly to understand its relationship with the 
notion of unfairness.  
In the following pages, I will attempt to clarify the meaning of the principle of 
good faith in the context of the Kuwaiti code and its relationship to unfair terms to assess 
whether it is a sufficient foundation for contractual fairness. Owing to scarce resources, it 
would be helpful to examine the concept of good faith in other jurisdictions to understand 
its meaning and assess whether it should form the basis of contractual fairness.  
The discussion will begin by considering the notion of good faith in comparative 
law and will then move on to analyse it from a Kuwaiti perspective.  
 
1.3.1 Good faith in comparative law 
 
Good faith is a universal concept that is recognized as one of the general principles of 
contract law in many legal systems around the world. The Principles of the European 
Contract Law54 and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (French: 
Institut international pour l’unification du droit privé) (UNIDROIT) Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts55 acknowledge the importance of good faith and fair 
dealing in contractual relations. Its meaning, however, is not one that is recognized in the 
legal systems. In each legal system good faith is embedded in a particular arrangement of 
doctrine in which it plays its own distinctive role. 
 
1.3.1.1 Good faith in German law  
 
According to Zimmermann and Whittaker, there are two types of good faith in the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) or the German Civil Code: (i) subjective good faith (guter 
 
54 Art. 1.201(1) provides: "Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing" 
55 Under the heading good faith and fair dealing, Art. 1.7(1) states: "Each party must act in accordance with 
good faith and fair dealing in international trade". 
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Glaube) and, more importantly, (ii) objective good faith (Treu und Glauben). Subjective 
good faith relates more to the personal knowledge, psychological condition or perception 
of the party. By contrast, objective good faith constitutes a standard of conduct to which 
the parties’ behaviour has to conform and by which it may be judged.56  
The concept of good faith in its objective sense has been of significant importance 
in Germany where the principle of Treu und Glauben is found under the heading of 
‘performance in good faith’ in section 242 of the BGB. This section reads: ‘The debtor 
must perform his obligation in accordance with the requirements of good faith taking into 
account the prevailing practice’.57 The literal wording of the text suggests that good faith 
regulates only performance of the obligation but the courts and legal writers have given its 
meaning a broader scope.58 In case law a fundamental principle of contract law has been 
derived from this article requiring the parties to the contract – the debtor and the creditor – 
to effectuate their rights and perform their obligations in accordance with good faith. The 
German courts have also relied on section 242, and section 15759 which relates to the 
interpretation of contracts, to create new causes of action where the statute has not 
provided a cause of action60 such as liability for breach of pre-contractual duties. The 
theory of fault in contracting (culpa in contrahendo) is a judicial creation, which finds its 
roots in section 242, entitles the injured party to claim for damages if the pre-contractual 
duty has been breached.61  
 
56 Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker, p. 30.  
57 An English translation of the article is provided in Hugh Beale and others, p. 775. The original German 
text reads: "Der Schuldner ist verpflichtet, die Leistung so zu bewirken, wie Treu und Glauben mit Rücksicht 
auf die Verkehrssitte es erfordern", available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ 
bgb/BJNR001950896.html. 
58 Chantal Mak, Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law: A Comparison of the Impact of 
Fundamental Rights on Contractual Relationships in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and England (Kluwer 
Law International 2008), p. 34 
59 "Contracts are to be interpreted in accordance with the dictates of good faith taking into account normal 
commercial practice" (Verträge sind so auszulegen, wie Treu und Glauben mit Rücksicht auf die 
Verkehrssitte es erfordern). 
60 Werner Ebke and Bettina Steinhauer, ‘The Doctrine of Good Faith in German Contract Law’ in Jack 
Beatson and Daniel Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford University Press 1997), 
p. 171. 
61 Ibid., p. 172.  
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Because the BGB does not define good faith and for purposes of the 
concretisation (or domestication)62 of the concept of good faith, there have been scholarly 
efforts63 to analyse the decisions of the courts to render the application of good faith as 
rational and objective as possible instead of leaving it to the subjective interpretation of 
each judge.64 The functions of good faith have been identified and systematically arranged 
in groups according to the cases that applied good faith. The process of concretisation has 
made the concept of good faith more understandable and sensible. In general, the German 
approach distinguishes three functions of section 242: (i) supplementary function as a basis 
for secondary or ancillary obligations, such as duty of information, co-operation and 
disclosure, as well as filling gaps in the law, (ii) limitation function to set limits to the 
rights and prevent their abuse, and (iii) corrective function that allows for adaptations to a 
contract in cases of changed circumstances.65 In addition to these three functions, section 
157 of the BGB refers to good faith as a tool for interpretation and provides that contracts 
must be interpreted as required by good faith. The wide wording of section 157 enabled the 
German courts to intervene in contractual relations and provide for supplementary 
interpretation.66  
Some commentators67  have asserted that the most significant doctrinal 
development based on section 242 was the judicial formulation of an appropriate and 
distinct body of rules for the control of the standard form of contracts.68 The courts 
reviewed and invalidated standard contract terms because they violated the principle of 
 
62 Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker (n 37), p. 23. 
63 Franz Wieacker was the first to specify the theoretical status of Art. 242 and articulates the functions of 
good faith in his seminal work Zur rechtstheoretischen Prazisierung des § 242 BGB (1956).  
64 Martijn Hesselink, ‘The Concept of Good Faith’ in Arthur Hartkamp and others (eds), Towards a 
European Civil Code (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2004), p. 474.  
65 Chantal Mak, p. 34; Martijn Hesselink, pp. 475–478; Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker (n 37), 
pp. 24–25 
66 Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker, p. 30.  
67 Ibid., p. 27; Arthur Von Mehren, ‘A General View of Contract’ in Arthur  Von Mehren (ed), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol VII (Tlibingen 1982), p. 70.  
68 Some lawyers described the judicial intervention when the contract did not translate the parties’ true will as 
a "page of glory" in the records of the German judiciary; see Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker, p. 
27. For a historical overview of the judicial review of standard contracts in Germany, see Arthur Von 
Mehren, pp. 70–72. It should be noted that the German courts also invoked section 138.1, which prohibits 
legal transactions contrary to good morals (guten Sitten), to review and control standard terms.  
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good faith.69 The resulting case law formed the foundation for new legislation on standard 
contract terms, and good faith was subsequently channelled and codified in section 9 (now 
section 307 of the BGB) of the Standard Contract Terms Act, 1976 (Gesetz zur Regelung 
des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen) (AGB-Gesetz). According to section 
9(1): 
  
"Provisions in standard contract terms are void if they unreasonably disadvantage 
the contractual partner of the user contrary to the requirements of good faith.  
1. In case of doubt, a provision is unreasonably disadvantageous if this 
provision is irreconcilable with essential basic principles of the 
statutory provisions from which the terms deviate, or 
2. Essential rights or duties arising from the nature of the contract are 
restricted to a degree which jeopardizes the purpose of the contract 
being attained".70 
 
The legislative inclusion of good faith as a test for fairness bears out the 
importance of good faith as an underlying principle in German contract law. The code uses 
it as a criterion to qualify a clause as unfair. However, the Act adds another requirement of 
a substantive nature for an unfair term to be invalidated and that is the term has to put the 
adhering party at an unreasonable disadvantage (unangemessen benachteiligen). The 
German approach seems to have strongly influenced the European conceptual framework 
of the notion of unfairness in consumer contracts, and the great similarity between the test 
of fairness in the AGB-Gesetz and the test of fairness in the Directive cannot be 
overlooked. The Directive refers to good faith at Art. 3(1), besides significant imbalance, 
 
69 Martijn Hesselink, p. 479.  
70 A translated version of AGB-Gesetz can be found at: http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/AGBG.htm. 
30 
 
                                                           
as a criterion to determine the fairness of the terms.71 In fact, the Directive inserted the 
requirement of good faith among the criteria due to its significance in German law and 
other continental systems.72 
 
1.3.1.2  Good faith in English law 
 
In contrast to Germany, English law does not recognize a general principle of good faith 
and takes a different approach, relying on a number of specific doctrines aimed at securing 
fair dealing to achieve the same outcome. The situation is not the same in other common 
law countries. In the United States, for example, good faith plays a comprehensive role and 
section 205 of the Restatement of Contracts (Second) states that: ‘Every contract imposes 
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and 
enforcement’.73 Furthermore, in Australia both courts and lawyers are open to the use of 
good faith in contracting and regard it as an enforceable duty.74  
However, the concept of good faith is not totally absent in the English legal 
system. It appeared for the first time in 1766 in the historical landmark case of Carter v 
Boehm75 in which Lord Mansfield established the principle of  utmost good faith 
(uberrimae fidei) in insurance transactions where the parties are bound to disclose all 
important facts relating to the risk before and in the course of the contract. Lord Mansfield 
described ‘of good faith’ as ‘the governing principle . . . applicable to all contracts and 
dealings’.76 However, despite the significance of this case, English courts have always 
opposed the recognition of a general principle of good faith on the grounds that it would 
 
71 Art. 3.1 provides: "a contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as 
unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer". 
72 Paolisa Nebbia, Unfair Contract Terms in European Law: A Study in Comparative and EC Law (Hart 
2007), p. 143.  
73 The Uniform Commercial Code, too, makes reference to good faith and defines it in section 1-201(19) to 
mean "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned".  
74 Joseph  Chitty and Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts (29 edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2004), para 1-022.  
75 (1766) 3 Burr 1905.  
76 At 1910. 
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run counter to the parties’ respective positions during contract negotiations and over the 
duration of the contract and was impracticable.77 The subject remained of marginal interest 
to English lawyers for many years until its transformation in modern history. The 
transformation was signalled by Banque Financière de la Cité SA v Westgate Insurance Co 
Ltd78 and Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd.79 A few years 
later, a legislative intervention by the European community took place, firstly, with the 
issuing of the Directive on Commercial Agents (86/653/EC) and, most significantly, with 
the EU Council Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (93/13/EC) which used 
good faith as a test for fairness. This prompted a substantial body of writing.80 
The transposition of the Directive, through the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1994 (now 1999) (hereinafter ‘UTCCR’), introduced to English law 
the requirement of good faith in a significant number of consumer contracts, leading to 
concerns whether the influence of good faith in consumer contracts would extend beyond 
the scope of the regulations and percolate through to other areas of contract law 
(particularly commercial contracts). In the absence of a general doctrine, how would the 
English courts interpret the good faith requirement in the UTCCR?  
The courts do not seem to have experienced any particular difficulty in giving 
effect to the good faith requirement. Indeed, they have recognized its European origins and 
 
77 Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (Kluwer Law International 1999), p. 
167. 
78 [1989] 2 All ER 952.   
79 [1989] QB 433. Lord Bingham was one of the early judges to shed light on the concept of good faith, 
articulating its meaning in a comprehensive manner as follows:  
 
In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside the common law world, the law of obligations 
recognises and enforces an overriding principle that in making and carrying out contracts parties should act in good 
faith. This does not simply mean that they should not deceive each other, a principle which any legal system must 
recognise; its effect is perhaps most aptly conveyed by such metaphorical colloquialisms as "playing fair, coming 
clean or putting one’s cards face upwards on the table. It is in essence a principle of fair and open dealing". (At 
439.)  
 
80 See, for example, Hugh Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ 14 OJLS 229; Ewoud Hondius, 
‘EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Towards a European Law of Contract’ 7 JCL 34; 
Chris Willett, Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (Ashgate 2007); Daniel 
Friedmann and Jack Beatson, Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Clarendon Press 1995); Gunther 
Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergencies’ 
61 MLR 11.  
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have not sought to interpret it from a national perspective. In Director General of Fair 
Trading v First National Bank, Evans-Lombe J, after noting that the origin of the UTCCR  
was a Council Directive, stated that good faith should not be construed in the English sense 
of absence of dishonesty, but rather in the continental civil law sense. In the Court of 
Appeal81 Peter Gibson LJ stated that good faith had a special meaning in the UTCCR , 
having had its conceptual roots in civil law systems. In the House of Lords82 both Lord 
Bingham and Lord Steyn recognized that good faith was an ‘objective criterion’ that 
imported the ‘notion of fair and open dealing’. Therefore, the concept of good faith as 
enacted in the UTCCR  should not pose any problems in the English law. However, some83 
have rejected the existence of good faith and expressed a negative view, mainly because 
they fear that the recognition of the concept of good faith in consumer contracts would 
extend to commercial contracts. This concern is not justified because the recognition of 
good faith in the UTCCR does not entail recognition of a general doctrine of good faith, 
and the concept of good faith in the Regulation is of specific application and only applies 
to contracts between consumers and suppliers. However, the influence of the UTCCR on 
the development of good faith in English law cannot be ruled out. A growing number of 
lawyers, support the recognition of a doctrine of good faith and believe that good faith 
should play a role in English contract law.84 However, the decision of the House of Lords 
in Walford v Miles85 constitutes an obstacle to the full recognition of a doctrine of good 
faith in English law. In this case it was held that English law did not recognize the validity 
 
81 [2000] QB 672, at 686. 
82 [2001] UKHL 52 
83 See, for example, Mark Snyderman, 'What's So Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith Performance 
Obligation in Commercial Lending', 55 UChiLR 1335; Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of 
Good Faith' (1981) Duke LJ 619; Michael G. Bridge, 'Does Anglo-Canadian Contract Law Need A Doctrine 
of Good Faith?' (1984) 98 Can Bus LJ 385. 
84 See sub-section (iii) below on the positive view. 
85 [1992] 2 A.C. 128 
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of an obligation to negotiate in good faith, therefore, such an obligation was not 
enforceable.86 
Roger Brownsword has identified three distinct views on good faith in English 
legal doctrine, the (i) negative, the (ii) neutral and the (iii) positive.87 In the following I 
will introduce these three vie
 
i. The negative view 
The arguments against the adoption of a general standard of good faith in English law can 
be summarised as follows:  
i. Good faith requires each party to take into account the legitimate interests or 
expectations of one another and this cuts against the essentially individualistic ethic 
of English contact law. As Lord Ackner asserted in Walford v Miles the adoption of 
a requirement of good faith would be incompatible with the adversarial ethic 
underpinning English contract law: "The concept of a duty to carry on negotiations 
in good faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when 
involved in negotiation". He concludes "a duty to negotiate in good faith is as 
unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the position of a 
negotiating party".88  
ii. It is said, mainly by sceptical North American lawyers, that good faith is a ‘loose 
cannon’ in commercial contracts in the sense that it is an uncontrollable standard 
and might well lead to unintended results. While it is accepted that good faith 
imposes restrictions on the individual’s pursuit of self-interest, it is not clear, 
however, what the limitations of good faith are. In the words of Brownsword: 
‘good faith presupposes a set of moral standards against which contractors are to be 
 
86 Lord Ackner at 138 stated: "A duty to negotiate in good faith is as unworkable in practice as it is inherently 
inconsistent with the position of a negotiating party".  
87 Roger Brownsword, ‘Positive, Negative, Neutral: The Reception of Good Faith in English Contract Law’ 
in Roger Brownsword, Norma Hird and Geraint Howells (eds), Good Faith in Contract: Concept and 
Context (Ashgate 1999), pp. 15–32.  
88 At 138 
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judges, but it is not clear whose (or which) morality this is. Without a clear moral 
reference point, there is endless uncertainty about a number of critical questions’. 
The following questions, inter alia, arise: Should good faith be interpreted in the 
subjective sense or the objective sense? Should it regulate all phases of contracting, 
including pre-contractual conduct? Should it regulate matters of procedure only or 
matters of contractual substance as well? Proponents of the negative view hold that 
without answering their critical questions, the idea of good faith will remain vague 
and uncertain.89 
iii. The third concern is that good faith would call for difficult inquiry into the 
contractors’ state of mind. This would involve speculating about the contractors’ 
reasons for action.  
iv. If good faith were to regulate matters of substance, then it would violate the 
autonomy of the parties and would become inconsistent with the philosophy of 
freedom of contract.  
v. The final argument of the negative view is that a general doctrine of good faith fails 
to recognize that contracting contexts are not all alike.  
In summary, the opponents to the adoption of a general doctrine of good faith 
premise their rejection on the fact the English contract law is based on adversarial, self-
interested dealing, and that good faith is a vague and uncertain notion and would call for 
difficult inquiries into the parties’ reasons for contracting. In addition, the implementation 
of good faith goes against the notion of the autonomy of contracting parties, and that a 
general doctrine would be inappropriate in certain contracting contexts where individuals 
tolerate opportunism.90 
 
 
 
89 Brownsword, ‘Positive, Negative, Neutral: The Reception of Good Faith in English Contract Law’, pp. 16–
17 (n 87). 
90 Ibid. , p. 21 
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ii. The neutral view 
The neutral view91 is held by many lawyers who see there is nothing ‘intrinsically 
objectionable’ about a good faith doctrine and, at the same time, point out that English law 
developed its own concepts and doctrinal tools that achieve the same results that are 
achieved through good faith in other legal systems, such the doctrines of frustration, 
misrepresentation, economic duress, promissory estoppels and mistake.92 It is apparent that 
this view coincides with and echoes Bingham’s statements in the Interfoto case. Lord 
Bingham noted that English law had characteristically committed itself to no such 
overriding principle, but had developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated 
problems of unfairness.93 Accordingly, the adoption of a general doctrine of good faith in 
English law is neither a good nor bad thing as there is a ‘strict equivalence’ between a 
general doctrine of good faith and the piecemeal solutions of the English law, on the one 
hand, and it makes no difference whether the English law operates with good faith or 
piecemeal provisions, on the other.94  
The neutral view leans strongly in the direction of the negative view, simply 
because it suggests that nothing will be gained by replacing the existing approach with 
another that achieves the same outcome and, therefore, if a choice is to be made between 
introducing a new doctrine or maintaining the piecemeal provisions then, from an English 
lawyer standpoint, the choice would be to maintain the status quo.  
 
iii. The positive view 
In 1956 Raphael Powell published a seminal article setting out his view on good faith and 
whether it should be recognized in English law.95 He maintained that although no 
overriding general positive duty of good faith was imposed on the parties to a contract, 
 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 At 439.  
94 Brownsword calls this argument the "equivalence thesis" or the "indifferent thesis", p. 22. 
95 Raphael Powell, ‘Good Faith in Contracts’ 9 CLP 1616.  
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there were a number of individual cases in which the law contained an element of objective 
or subjective good faith.96 Powell also indirectly criticized the English piecemeal approach 
and suggested that common law may be improved if an explicit rule of good faith were 
adopted.97 In his opinion, the courts could reach similar results in certain cases if a doctrine 
of good faith was implemented instead of resorting "to contortions or subterfuges in order 
to give effect to their sense of the justice of the case".98 Powell's view was unpopular 
among English contract lawyers and only a few accepted his view.99  
One of the most prominent proponents of the introduction of a general doctrine of 
good faith in English contract law is Brownsword, who gives the several reasons for the 
adoption of good faith. 100 His argument can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. As English law already tries to regulate bad faith dealing, it would be more 
rational to address the problem directly (rather than indirectly) and openly 
(rather than covertly) by adopting a general principle of good faith.  
2. In the absence of a doctrine of good faith the law of contract is ill-equipped 
to achieve fair result, on occasion leaving judges "unable to do justice at 
all".  
3. With the adoption of a doctrine of good faith the courts will be equipped 
with a better mechanism that will enable them to respond to the varying 
expectations encountered in the many different contracting contexts and, in 
particular, it might be argued that the courts are better able to detect co-
operative dealing where it is taking place.  
 
96 Ibid., pp. 23–25. 
97 In support of his argument, Powell cited L’Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394 in which the court 
enforced the agreement even though the plaintiff could not read an exclusion clause that was printed on 
brown paper and buried in small print, ibid., p. 27  
98 Ibid., p. 26 
99 Brownsword, p. 25. 
100 Brownsword, ‘Positive, Negative, Neutral: The Reception of Good Faith in English Contract Law’, p. 25 
(n 87). 
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4. The beneficial effects of a good faith doctrine go beyond (reactive) dispute-
settlement, for a good faith contractual environment has the potential to give 
contracting parties greater security and, thus, greater flexibility about the 
ways in which they are prepared to do business.101 
 
It seems that the judicial opposition to good faith has faded over the years and the 
courts have on several occasions demonstrated some leniency towards the existence of a 
general doctrine in English contract law. This shift in the courts’ attitude may suggest that 
English contract law will eventually come to accept the existence of a general duty of good 
faith in contracting especially with the influence of international restatements of contract 
law.102 Some commentators go as far as pointing out that the question of the desirability of 
good faith in English law will be replaced with other questions relating to its meaning, 
impact on existing rules and scope, and whether it should also be applied to cover pre-
contractual dealings?103  
While the courts were reluctant to recognize such a general principle, important 
changes took place as a result of the EU Council’s legislative intervention which saw good 
faith becoming part of United Kingdom  law with the transposition of the Directive. The 
Directive was implemented through the UTCCR which established the test of unfairness, 
inter alia, on good faith.104 According to Regulation 5(1), a contractual term is unfair if it 
is "contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer". 
 
101 Roger Brownsword., pp. 26–32. Some authors add another reason for the adoption of a doctrine of good 
faith, namely that it is a mandatory part of international conventions on contract law, such as the Vienna 
Convention for the International Sale of Goods and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, which expressly refers to good faith and fair dealing; Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law: Text, 
Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press 2005), p. 561 
102 Ewan McKendrick, p. 563. In addition, see, for example, the decisions in the following cases, Timeload 
Ltd v British Telecommunications plc [1995] EMLR 459; Philips Electronique Grand Publique SA v British 
Sky Broadcasting Ltd [1995] EMLR 472; Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering Ltd v Docklands Light Railway 
Ltd (1996) 78 Build LR 42; Re Debtors (Nos 4449 and 4450 of 1998) [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 149; Haines v 
Carter [2002] UKPC 49.  
103 Mckendrick, ibid. 
104 The Regulations of 1994 were revoked and replaced with the UTCCR. 
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Interestingly, there is no reference in English law prior to the implementation of the 
Directive as to the meaning of the requirement of good faith in the context of consumer 
contracts. The inclusion of good faith in the UTCCR raised conceptual problems and 
stirred debate in English law because it introduced an alien concept of a civil law system 
nature into English law.105 The Directive has been immensely influenced by the German 
AGB-Gesetz which used the judicially developed concept of good faith as a foundation to 
control unfair contract terms.106 This led some writers to describe the reference to good 
faith in the Directive as "no more than a bow in the direction of these origins".107 
Therefore, while the concept of good faith is clear in German law, what does it 
mean in the context of consumer contracts in English law?  
The most significant interpretation of the requirement of good faith comes from 
Lord Bingham in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank who equated 
good faith with the notion of fair and open dealing: 
 
"The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open 
dealing. Openness [emphasis added] requires that the terms should be expressed 
fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate 
prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to 
the customer. Fair dealing requires that a supplier should not, whether deliberately 
or unconsciously, take advantage of the consumer’s necessity, indigence, lack of 
experience, unfamiliarity with the subject matter of the contract, weak bargaining 
position or any other factor listed in or analogous to those listed in Schedule 2 of 
the regulations".108 
 
 
105 Joseph  Chitty and Hugh Beale, para 15–045. 
106 Chris Willett, p. 79; Paolisa Nebbia, pp. 143–144.  
107 Joseph  Chitty and Hugh Beale, para 15–045 
108 Para 17.  
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Lord Bingham made two additional important remarks relating to good faith: first, 
he pointed out that good faith was not a homogeneous concept in the Member States of the 
EU. Therefore, the differences between common law and civil law systems were 
sometimes overstated. Second, he noted that good faith was not a concept that was wholly 
unfamiliar to British lawyers, describing Lord Mansfield as its champion. Therefore, it 
should not pose any particular challenges when articulating its connotations.109 Another 
important statement was made by Lord Steyn who referred to good faith as an "objective 
criterion" which imports open and fair dealing,110 and declined to confine good faith to 
procedural defects in negotiating procedures: "Any purely procedural or even 
predominantly procedural interpretation of the requirement of good faith must be 
rejected".111 In contrast, good faith should also be interpreted in a substantive sense that 
involves the "overall evaluation of interests involved".112 Lord Hope, in his speech, 
acknowledged that the Directive "provides all the guidance that is needed as to its 
application".113 Therefore, the Directive explains in recital 16 that in making an assessment 
of good faith, the legitimate interests of the consumer should be taken into 
consideration.114 Good faith in this sense imposes positive obligations on the seller to 
respect the "legitimate interests" of the consumer.115 
The debate between the opponents and proponents remains unresolved but it 
seems that it is only a matter of time until a general principle of good faith becomes part of 
English law due to legislative developments at the EU level, especially in the Principles of 
European Contract Law (PECL) which contain a general principle of good faith and fair 
 
109 Ibid. 
110 Para 36. 
111 Ibid.  
112 Recital 16 of the Directive.  
113 Para 45. 
114 "In making an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be had to the strength of the bargaining 
positions of the parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the term and whether the goods 
or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer; whereas the requirement of good faith 
may be satisfied by the seller or supplier where he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose 
legitimate interests he has to take into account". 
115 Also see Hugh Beale, ‘Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts’ in Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford University Press 1995), p. 245. 
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dealing in Art. 1:201(1)116 and will form the basis of a Common Frame of Reference on 
European Contract Law.117  
 
1.3.1.3  Good faith in French law 
 
Unfair terms in France were regulated for the first time in 1978 in law nos 78–23 of 10 
January 1978 on the protection and consumer information of products and services,118 
commonly referred to as la loi Scrivener. Prior to the introduction of the law, the courts 
resorted to general notions in contract law mechanisms to control unfair terms such as 
d’order public119 and contra proferentem.120 The control system as established by the 1978 
law was slow in its assessment process, ineffective and futile. It created an administrative 
body (i.e., Commission des Clauses Abusives) with the advisory task to make non-
compulsory recommendations to the government that could subsequently issue decrees to 
forbid, limit or regulate the use of certain contractual terms that the commission found 
unreasonable in contracts concluded between professionals and non-professionals or 
consumers.121 The commission made 20 recommendations in nine years, with only one 
recommendation becoming an enforceable decree. However, its most significant part was 
annulled when the Conseil d’État reviewed it.122 
 
116 " Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing", available at:  
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/eu.contract.principles.parts.1.to.3.2002/ 
117 Christian Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanisation of Contract Law: Current Controversis in Law 
(Routledge-Cavendish 2008), p. 137 
118 Loi no 78-23 du 10 janvier 1978 Sur la protection et l’information des consommateurs de produits et de 
services.  
119 Simon Whittaker, ‘Assessing the Fairness of Contract Terms : the parties' "essential bargain", its 
regulatory context and the significance of the requirement of good faith’ 12 Z Eu P 75, p. 87.  
120 Martin Vranken, Fundamentals of European civil law and impact of the European Community 
(Blackstone 1997), p. 117. Some French legal scholars suggested that even in the absence of a direct control 
system, the civil code contained legal concepts that could be used as basis to restore the contractual 
equilibrium, such as obligation without a cause Art. 1131(1), laesio enormis Art. 1118; execution of contract 
in good faith Art. 1134; and the judicially developed theory of abus de droit, Jean Calais-Auloy and Henri 
Temple, Droit de la Consommation (8 edn, Dalloz 2010), p. 208 et seq.  
121 Hugh Beale and others, p. 790; Hans Schulte-Nölke, Christian Twigg-Flesner and Martin Ebers, p. 209. 
122 E. H. Hondius, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (Molengraaff Instituut voor Privaatrecht 1987), p. 
175. 
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One of the main characteristics of the law is that it used dual threshold criteria to 
determine the unfairness of a contractual term: (i) abuse of an economic power by a 
professional (abus de la puissance économique) and (ii) receipt of an excessive advantage 
(avantage excessif).123 
Some have suggested that the loi Scrivener 1978 is rooted in, and derived from, 
the theory of abuse of rights (abus de droit) and the terminology of the French term, les 
clauses abusives, in itself demonstrates this inspiration clearly.124 The aim of the loi 
Scrivener was to protect consumers from the abusive contractual behaviour of 
professionals by means of the contract of adhesion. French legislators conceived that 
professionals were abusing their factual position through the imposition of lengthy 
standard contracts on consumers who typically did not read what they accepted as terms of 
an agreement. Therefore, these professionals were abusing their contractual rights.  
The definition of unfairness as laid down by the loi Scrivener took a subjective 
approach and focused on the professional since the term must have been imposed on the 
consumer by an abuse of the professional’s economic power with the intention to receive 
an excessive advantage. The legislators witnessed a development in 1993 where the 
provisions of the loi Scrivener were transferred to a fresh consumer code, the Code de la 
Consommation, which consolidated all consumer protection legislation into one code. The 
new code did not alter the French approach to unfairness and the provisions on unfair 
terms remained as constituting articles L-132.1 to L-132.5 of the new code. However, a 
major turning point occurred in 1995 with the transposition of the Directive.125 The criteria 
for assessment of unfairness as laid down by the loi Scrivener changed with the 
amendment of the consumer code to implement the Directive and its definition of 
 
123 Art. 35 of the law of 10 January 1978 provides that a contractual terms becomes unfair "when such terms 
seem to be imposed on non-professionals or consumers by an abuse of the other party’s economic power and 
give him an excessive advantage".  
124 Abbas Karimi, Les Clauses Abusives et la Théorie de L'abus de Droit (Librairie Générale de Droit et de 
Jurisprudence 2001), p. 196; Simon Whittaker, p. 87 note 59; Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker, 
p. 36 
125 Loi no 95–96 of 1 February 1995. 
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unfairness whereby two requirements must be met in order for a term to be qualified as 
unfair: (i) it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising 
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer, and (ii) it was imposed on the 
consumer in a manner contrary to the requirement of good faith.126 Although the 
transposition of the Directive into the French national law aims to reflect the terminology 
of the Directive and its notion of unfairness, the code did not fully embrace the European 
definition of unfairness verbatim and the French legislature preferred to abandon the 
reference in the Directive to the principle of good faith.127 Art. L132-1 of the Code de la 
Consommation provides as follows:  
 
"Any clause in a contract concluded between a seller or a supplier and a person 
who is not acting in the course of his trade, business or profession or a consumer 
shall be regarded as unfair if its object or effect is to create, to the detriment of 
that person or consumer, a significant imbalance [emphasis added] in the rights 
and obligations of the parties to the contract". 
 
The present wording of this provision suggests that the test to assess contractual 
fairness in French law is now based exclusively on the notion of significant imbalance 
(déséquilibre significatif) between the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract. 
The new wording of the test is far better than the old one because a significant contractual 
imbalance does not always imply an excessive advantage to the professional. Thus, it is in 
more accord with the position of the consumer.  
 
126 Art. 3(1) of the Directive reads : "A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be 
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer".  
127 France was not the only state to implement the Directive without reference to the criterion of good faith. 
Belgium, Austria, Luxembourg, Finland, Greece and the Netherlands limited their unfairness test to the 
notion of significant imbalance, Jules Stuyck, ‘Unfair Terms’ in Geraint Howells and Reiner Schulze (eds), 
Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (Sellier 2009), pp. 123–124.  
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However, the removal of the requirement of abuse of economic power is 
relatively insignificant, as the French notion of fairness still depends on the theory of abuse 
of right. A decision from the Cour de cassation expressly confirmed the relationship 
between abuse of rights and standard contracts (contrat d’adhésion), and held that the use 
of standard form contracts itself constitutes an abuse of economic power.128 Therefore, 
despite the legislative changes, it seems that the theory of abuse of rights still constitutes 
the foundation of unfairness in French contract law as supported by Art. 1134(3) of the 
Code Civil, which provides that contracts must be performed in good faith.129  
It can be said that the new definition as imposed by the Directive influenced the 
French approach to define unfairness at least in one respect. It moved away from a concept 
focusing on the professional who abuses his economic position to a concept focusing on 
the impact of the term on the contractual position of the weak party – the consumer – and 
whether it had a detrimental effect on his rights arising from the contract.  
A further observation that can be made is that the present notion of contractual 
fairness in French law is unique, and falls somewhat between the fairness notions in 
Germany and the UK. Although Art. 3(1) of the Directive uses good faith as one of the 
criteria to assess the fairness of a term, interestingly, the French legislature reduced the 
assessment criteria and deliberately opted to abandon reference to good faith, even though 
the principle of good faith is an overriding concept in the Code Civil that obliges all parties 
to perform their contractual obligations in accordance with it. In contrast, the German law, 
in section 307(1) of the BGB, places significant emphasis on good faith as a test for 
reasonableness of content and regards a standard term to be ineffective if it unreasonably 
disadvantages the other party contrary to the requirement of good faith.130 In the UK the 
 
128 Cass civ (1), 6 January 1994. 
129 Art. 1134(3) of the French Civil Code states: ‘Elles doivent être exécutées de bonne foi’; see also 
Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker, p. 35. 
130 "Provisions in standard business terms are ineffective if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, they 
unreasonably disadvantage the other party to the contract with the user. An unreasonable disadvantage may 
also arise from the provision not being clear and comprehensible". The translation of this provision is 
available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb  
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requirement of good faith was enacted for the first time and Art. 3(1) of the Directive was 
incorporated into English law word for word into the UTCC 1994,131 despite the fact that 
the concept of good faith is almost alien to English contract law. 
So what could possibly be the reason for omitting good faith from the transposed 
French legislation?  
The removal of good faith in the French text can be explained on the basis of the 
existing general requirement to perform contracts in good faith found in Art. 1134(3). The 
requirement has already been satisfied and there is no need to repeat it. In addition, it is 
generally accepted in French law that the professional cannot be acting in good faith if he 
seeks to achieve significant imbalance.132 It is also said that good faith is a vague concept 
and does not provide any additional value to the text.133 Some French scholars point out 
that the lack of reference to good faith in the Code de la Consommation is perfectly 
understandable because it would add an element of uncertainty to the definition of 
unfairness and also has been said to be unnecessary because disproportionate advantage is 
always achieved when acting contrary to good faith.134 A similar view is put forward by 
Calais-Auloy who suggests that the requirement of good faith exists in the background of 
various rules of the consumer code and argues that it is a too vague a concept to be applied 
alone by the judges.135 He holds that Art. 3(1) of the Directive can be interpreted in two 
ways. First, the article contains two criteria that have to be fulfilled in order to qualify a 
term as unfair: (i)  an objective criterion concerned with the significant imbalance the term 
creates and (ii) a subjective criterion in which a duty of good faith is breached. The second 
 
131 Repealed and replaced with the UTCCR. In most respects, the 1999 regulations are the same as their 1994 
predecessors; the main changes are related to the wording of the regulations, which are now closer to the 
wording of the Directive on unfair terms and other institutions can enforce the law beside the Office of Fair 
Trading (hereinafter OFT).  
132 Joseph  Chitty and Hugh Beale, para 15045. 
133 Hugh Beale and others, p. 817. 
134 Gilles Paisant, ‘Les Clauses Abusives et la Présentation des Contrats dans la Loi n° 95-96 du. 1er Février 
1995’ D Chron. p. 100; François Terré, Philippe Simler and Yves Lequette, Droit civil: Les obligations (9th 
edn, Dalloz 2005), No. 324 p. 332 
135 Jean Calais-Auloy, ‘Le Devoir de se Comporter de Bonne Foi dans les Contrats de Consommation’ in 
Stefan Grundmann and Denis Mazeaud (eds), General Clauses and Standards in European Contract Law: 
Comparative Law (Kluwer Law International 2006), pp. 192–193.  
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interpretation focuses solely on the significant imbalance and regards reference to good 
faith as a mere redundancy and not as an additional condition.136  
All in all, French contract law is impregnated with the principle of good faith 
which must be observed throughout the contractual process despite the fact that the 
wording of Art. 1134(3) of the French Civil Code confines its application to the 
performance of agreements. The French courts gave this provision a generous 
interpretation and distilled sub-duties from the principle of good faith, such as the duty to 
disclose information, the duty of loyalty and the duty to co-operate.137 It is also regarded as 
a standard of proper contractual behaviour in the course of negotiations and could give rise 
to liability if one party suddenly decides to break off the negotiations.138 Several years ago 
the French courts noticed the connection between good faith and the wrongful use of 
rights, and expanded the former to create the theory of abuse of rights to sanction the use 
of rights with an intention to harm others and when the exercise of the right was contrary 
to its social or economic purpose.139 Therefore, unfair terms are considered a sub-category 
of abuse of rights. 
 
1.3.2 The principle of good faith in contracts in the KCC: Notion and role 
 
Under the contract theory in Kuwait, good faith occupies a central position, and seems to 
be an overriding principle in the formation and performance of contracts and tantamount to 
a very strong general rule that governs every contractual relationship.140 Reference to good 
faith appears 32 times in the code, making it one of the fundamental concepts in the civil 
 
136 Ibid., p. 192 
137 François Terré, Philippe Simler and Yves Lequette, p. 442; Martijn Hesselink, p. 475, Clarisse Girot, User 
Protection in IT Contracts: A Comparative Study of the Protection of the User Against Defective 
Performance in Information Technology (Kluwer Law International 2001), p. 29 
138 John Bell, Sophie Boyron and Simon Whittaker, Principles of French Law (Oxford University Press 
2008), pp. 305–306; Bénédicte  Fauvarque-Cosson, Denis Mazeaud and Jean-Baptiste Racine, European 
Contract Law: Materials for a Common Frame of Reference (Sellier 2008), p. 525 
139 Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker, p. 34.   
140 Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 293; Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 848. It seems that good faith affects the entire 
area of private law, whether directly or indirectly, and touches on many areas such as, property law, 
contracts, tort, obligations, bankruptcy law and company law.  
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law of Kuwait. However, the difficulty with good faith is that its exact meaning is 
amorphous and too abstract. A closer examination of the code text reveals that the code 
seems to distinguish between two types of good faith, namely (i) subjective good faith and 
(ii) objective good faith. Subjective good faith is concerned with the contracting party’s 
inner state of mind or knowledge and belongs to property law where the law protects the 
good faith possessor or good faith purchaser of property.141 Objective good faith, however, 
is mainly relevant to contract law. It is an external norm that imposes a standard of 
behaviour to which all contractual conduct must conform.142 However, the distinction is 
not sound and the two meanings tend to overlap in the code. 
 
1.3.2.1 The notion of good faith in the KCC 
 
It is unfortunate that the code does not provide a definition of the principle of good faith. 
Its meaning is surrounded by ambiguity and uncertainty due to its flexibility to serve the 
function for which it is assigned. Nonetheless, good faith can be analysed into two 
elements, (i) a negative element and (ii) a positive element. While the negative aspect of 
good faith requires each party to respect the interests of his counterpart and abstain from 
attempting any activity contrary to his reasonable expectation, positive good faith seems to 
impose a duty on each party to act and pursue their mutual benefit. The positive aspect sets 
good faith as a rule of conduct and ties it, although not very clearly, to notions such as of 
loyalty and co-operation where each party has to protect the interests of the other.143 In 
 
141 Art. 914. 
142 It is worthwhile mentioning that some jurisdictions, such as in Germany and Italy, make a distinction 
between the two meanings, while in other, such as France, the distinction is not usually made. In the English 
legal tradition the concept of objective good faith is not recognised and was introduced after the 
implementation of the Directive. For further details, see Martijn Hesselinkp. 471 et seq.  
143 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 849, Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 394. Arab jurists seem to have been influenced 
by the French notion of good faith where it has become generally accepted in French case law that good faith 
in performance engenders two sub-obligations: duty of loyalty and duty of cooperation. For the similarities 
between the two positions, see Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, ibid., and John Bell, Sophie Boyron and Simon 
Whittaker p. 333. Good faith in the KCC even relaxes the notion of privity of contract and extends it in some 
cases to protect persons outside the contractual relationship such as a third party who acts in good faith, (e.g. 
Art. 519).  
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some instances the code recognizes the significance of good faith through its antonym: bad 
faith, to measure the extent of the parties’ compliance with, and respect for, the 
agreement.144 In addition, the duty of good faith is sometimes required even prior to 
contract formation, even though it is not distinctively articulated in the code. In an 
insurance contract, for instance, the insured person has a duty to disclose all factual 
information about the risk he is insuring against and refrain from holding any vital 
information necessary to the conclusion of the contract145. Failure to comply with this 
obligation will result in the termination of the insurance contract and holding the insurer 
liable for any loss it causes. Some authors suggest that the pre-contractual duty to negotiate 
in good faith is not limited to insurance contracts and is applicable in all contracts. 
Therefore, if a party breaks off the negotiations without a valid reason, then he will be 
delictually liable to compensate the other party for the loss or expenses incurred as such 
conduct violates the trust and honesty that should prevail in relations, and hinders the legal 
and economic function of negotiations.146  
 
 
 
 
 
144 For instance, Art. 159 pertaining to exploitation as a defect of consent assumes that whenever a party 
exploits a weakness in another to induce him into a contract then it is always done so in bad faith. Similarly, 
if a party employs deceptive means or artifices to obtain consent then he always acts in bad faith (articles 
151–152). Moreover, the debtor might be liable even for unexpected damages arising from his bad faith 
behaviour if he committed deceit or his action amounts to gross misconduct (Art. 300). The same goes with 
the doctrine of abuse of right in the case when someone abuses his right to inflict damage upon another 
person then it is assumed that his use of right was performed in bad faith (Art. 30.2).  
145 The articulation of the obligation to negotiate in good faith is attributed to the German jurist Rudolf von 
Jhering who wrote a paper in 1861 entitled ‘Culpa in Contrahendo oder Schadensersatz bei Nichtigen oder 
Nicht zur Perfection Gelangten Verträgen’. His paper had far-reaching impact well beyond his intentions, 
and influenced many legal systems such as, France, Italy, Austria and Switzerland, for further details, see 
Friedrich Kessler and Edith Fine, ‘Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith and Freedom of 
Contract: A Comparative Study",(1964)’ 77 HarvLRev 401, p. 401 et seq. Jhering’s ideas influenced many 
Arab jurists, see infra.  
146 Abdulhay Hejazi, The General Theory of Obligations According to the Kuwaiti Law: A Comparative 
Study, vol 1 (Kuwait Universiry Press 1982) (in Arabic), p. 595. Hejazi describes the loss incurred due to 
broken negotiations when a party violates his pre-contractual duty of good faith as "negative loss" and the 
injured party has the right to claim compensation on the grounds of what Hajazi calls a "negative contractual 
interest" as opposed to "positive contractual interest" which entitles a contractual party to seek damages in 
case of non-performance or defective performance, pp. 595–596.  
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1.3.2.2  The role of good faith 
 
The central role of good faith in the contract theory under the KCC is set out in Art. 193 
concerning Contract Interpretation (construction), Art. 195 concerning the Content of the 
Contract (determination) and Art. 197 concerning Contract Performance (implementation). 
 
i. Good faith as a rule of construction 
 
Good faith appears in the context of contract interpretation in Art. 193(2) and functions as 
a criterion to facilitate interpretation when the contract terms are unclear. Art. 193(2) 
provides that if there is room for interpretation of the contract, the court must seek to 
determine the common intention of the parties rather than adhering to the literal meanings 
of the words, taking into account the nature of dealing, current customs, and good faith and 
honourable dealing. Accordingly, the court will have to adopt a subjective interpretation 
where intention prevails over expression to ascertain the meaning of the contract words 
and the purpose of the agreement to reveal the contractual content through the use of, inter 
alia, good faith to see how a reasonable person would understand the terms. In addition, 
good faith could play a completive function. The courts may exercise their discretionary 
power and apply a "suppletive" interpretation to fill the gaps and create new obligations 
not initially included in the contract but that can be implicitly deduced from the nature of 
the contract, such as the transporter obligation of the safety of his passengers.147 
 
 
 
 
147 Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 251. It is worthwhile mentioning that ambiguous unfair terms should always be 
construed in favour of the adhering party in contracts of adhesion under the Kuwaiti Civil Code. The code 
here deviates from the general rule in contract interpretation in which ambiguous terms should be interpreted 
in favour of the debtor, see articles 194 and 82.  
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ii. Good faith as a criterion for contract scope determination 
 
Good faith can play an important role in determining the scope of the contract and dictates 
certain obligations that are not included in the contract. Art. 195 states that determination 
of the subject matter of the contract shall not only be limited to the stipulations contained 
therein or the legal provisions governing the contract, but also what is deemed to be a 
requirement of the contract. To assess what can be a requirement of the contract, the code 
specifies four criteria that can be taken into account: (i)  custom prevailing, (ii) rules of 
equity, (iii) nature of dealing, and (iv) good faith and fair dealing. Therefore, if the contract 
is a contract for construction, the contractor has to act in good faith and use the 
construction materials sparingly even if the contract does not expressly refer to this 
obligation. Good faith here plays a supplementary role, and extends the duties of the 
parties and obliges them to execute the contract in a loyal and co-operative way in order to 
bring the execution of the contract to a good end. The rationale behind the inclusion of 
these four criteria is that they allow the court to find and enforce implied obligations that 
were not initially included in the contract.148  
 
iii. Good faith as a rule of implementation 
 
 Art. 197 reads: "The contract must be performed in accordance with the stipulations 
contained therein and in a manner which is consistent with the requirement of good faith 
and honourable dealing". This article is important because it explains how each party 
should perform its contractual obligations and dictates that they have to execute their 
obligations as prescribed by the terms of the contract and in accordance with the principle 
of good faith. It reinforces the principle of pacta sunt servanda as declared by Art. 196 and 
imposes a moral obligation on the parties to act in good faith in accordance with 
 
148 Compare, Egyptian Civil Code Art. 148.2 and the French Civil Code Art. 1135 
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reasonable standards of fair dealing. The text indicates that each party has to take into 
consideration the welfare of the other when executing his obligations, and maintain the 
trust and expectations arising out of the contractual relationship.149 Therefore, if the 
contract is a contract of transport, then the transporter must perform his obligation in good 
faith, and take the shortest and safest route. Similarly, good faith entails that the creditor 
does not abuse his right to enforcement if an honest debtor is unable to fulfil his 
undertaking on time and award him an additional period for performance until an 
acceptable date in exceptional circumstances.150 Good faith in this sense imposes a 
standard of behaviour that has to be maintained by the parties throughout the life of the 
contract.  
However, it should be noted that although the wording of Art. 197 confines the 
performance of obligations in good faith to the post-conclusion phase of the contract, it 
does not necessarily mean that acting in good faith is not required in the pre-contractual 
stage because lack of good faith (bad faith) is always wrongful behaviour and 
automatically gives rise to liability. The Commercial Circuit of the Court of Cassation151 in 
Kuwait held:  
 
"The rule that provides that deceit (in the sense of acting in bad faith) invalidates 
all acts is a well-founded rule even if it has not been embodied in the code. This is 
because it is based on moral and social considerations aiming at fighting 
deception, fraud and any deviation from the requirement of good faith that must 
exist in all sorts of conduct for the benefit of individuals and society . . . and if the 
 
149 Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 293. 
150 Ibid., p. 294.  
151 The Court of Cassation, which acts and is considered as a Supreme Court, is the third and final stage of 
litigation. However, this court acts as a supervisory body. 
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trial court concludes that deceit exists, it is entitled to invalidate any act found to 
be contrary to the requirement of good faith".152  
 
1.3.2.3  The relation between good faith and unfair terms in the KCC 
 
It seems the reason behind the inclusion of the principle of good faith in the code is to 
moralize agreements, and to ensure that they fulfil a social function and not merely serve 
the needs of one party at the expense of the other. In addition, good faith can be seen as a 
judicial instrument that enables the courts to justify intervention to sanction dishonest 
conduct and to amend agreements according to their view. However, although it is 
theoretically conceivable that the principle of good faith as articulated in the code can be 
broadened to control all sorts of contractual unfairness, it is doubtful that it could play such 
a far-reaching role and be realistically applied to sanction unfair terms in consumer 
contracts. This is due to the fact that the notion of good faith in the KCC remains vague, 
which requires further development and concretization. In other jurisdictions such as 
Germany, France and Belgium, the courts have successfully given clarity to the notion of 
good faith, and cumulatively established rules and precedents relating to its meaning and 
function, particularly in Germany, over several decades.153 It is unlikely that the same will 
be replicated in Kuwait as the courts view the law in terms of provisions and articles, and 
place less emphasis on general principles and abstract notions. Moreover, some scholars 
have noticed that the Kuwaiti courts have a strong inclination to apply the rules and 
interpret them in a strict manner.154 Thus, this would suggest that they reject the notion of 
extending the application and interpretation of the principle of good faith in favour of the 
doctrine of sanctity of contract as articulated in Art. 196.  
 
152 Cass. Comm. 95/1995. 
153 See the discussion in Martijn Hesselink (n 64). 
154 Jamal Al-Nakkas, pp. 62-68. 
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Furthermore, good faith in its present form is not an independent or autonomous 
legal concept that can be used on its own to achieve contractual balance. Indeed, a look at 
the laws of other jurisdictions indicates that they use a combination of criteria to determine 
unfairness. In Germany, for instance, section 307 of the BGB provides that a term would 
be unfair if it breaches good faith and places the weak party at an "unreasonable 
disadvantage". In the UK Regulation 5.1 of the UTCCR  provides that a term shall be 
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a "significant 
imbalance" in the parties’ rights and obligations. The French Code de la Consommation 
uses a similar criterion and regards a contractual clause to be unfair if it causes a 
"significant imbalance" between the rights and obligations of parties to the contract (Art. 
132-1). Therefore, good faith alone is not a sufficient ground to assess fairness and the 
courts will need to employ another element of a substantive nature besides good faith to 
determine and measure contractual fairness because "good faith remains a hazy notion, 
which is expressed effectively only when it runs into the legal mould of other concepts 
with more precise contents".155 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 
The discussion in this chapter shows that although the general principles of contract theory 
and defects of consent can, from a pure theoretical perspective, be used to avoid unfair 
terms in consumer contracts, their outcome might not always satisfy the consumer as the 
result would normally be not only to eliminate the unfair term, but to dissolve the whole 
contractual relationship; a result that might not be in the consumer’s best interest. That 
would be the case, on the one hand. On the other hand, given the restrictive interpretation 
approach that the Kuwait courts adopt, it is highly unlikely that the courts will relax the 
interpretation of the text of the general contract law principles in favour of consumers. 
 
155 Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker, p. 38. 
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The discussion also sought to determine whether an overarching contract law 
principle such as good faith can be used to eliminate unfair terms. Although good faith has 
been used alone effectively in some jurisdictions (e.g., Germany and Portugal) to eliminate 
unfair terms, it is doubtful that the same can be replicated in Kuwait for two reasons. First, 
good faith remains an undeveloped moral principle and is not yet an autonomous criterion 
that can be employed on its own to control the content of a contract. Second, as the above 
discussion shows, the main function of good faith is to play a role in the performance stage 
of the contract rather than in the formation stage where the unfair terms are inserted. This 
supports the researcher’s argument for the need for law reform on two particular fronts: (i) 
the introduction of a general concept of contractual unfairness in the KCC that covers all 
contractual relations, and (ii) the creation of a new set of rules that are aimed at 
strengthening the consumer’s weak contractual position in relation to the professional.  
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Chapter Two: Adhesion Contracts and Unfair Terms: Review of the 
Current Scope of Protection 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Contractual unfairness is closely tied to contracts of adhesion because they are the vehicle 
of choice for imposing unfair terms on weak and vulnerable parties. Any treatment of the 
control system of unfair terms in Kuwait requires an assessment of the regulation of 
adhesion contracts in the KCC as regulated in articles 80–82 relating to contract of 
adhesion. The researcher believes the existing control regime of unfair terms has failed 
considerably in providing an acceptable level of protection against unfair terms. The 
reasons for this failure can be attributed to several factors, including the restrictive scope of 
protection the courts have consistently given to adhesion contracts, the insufficiency of 
rules in providing adequate protection to the adhering party prior to the conclusion of the 
contract, the vagueness of the test of unfairness in the code, and the inefficiency of the 
judicial control rules. The aim of this chapter is to examine the first two. Discussion of the 
third and fourth factors will be dealt with in later chapters.  
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section one is this introduction. Section 
two provides an historical background to the development of adhesion contracts to 
understand the context in which they evolved. The third section discusses the procedural 
aspect of adhesion contracts to explain its associated problems, specifically that of 
informed consent, and an attempt is made to propose solutions to enhance the consumer’s 
consent and his contractual position prior to the conclusion of the contract. The fourth 
section deals with the prevailing concept of adhesion contracts as adopted by the courts 
and legal scholars, and explains why the researcher believes that the present concept of 
adhesion contracts needs to be reconceptualized. The chapter ends with a conclusion. 
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2.2 Origin and concept of the contract of adhesion  
 
In the heydays of laissez-faire the doctrines of autonomy of the will and freedom of 
contract were paramount and dominated classical legal belief. The two concepts presume 
that the contracting parties stand on equal footing and possess similar bargaining power. 
The principle of freedom of contract implies that individuals are free not merely to choose 
the other party of the contract, but are also able to determine the content and terms of their 
agreement by making choices that are consistent with their preferences.156 What was 
agreed between two free individuals was deemed just and fair according to the principles 
of private autonomy and free consent.157 
Therefore, the contract is the law of the parties within the framework of statutory 
and case law and its binding force is derived from their mutual, common contracting will. 
The will theory asserts that the wills of the parties become one common will once the 
contract is formed. Hence, their contractual obligations are self-imposed. It is for this 
reason that no party can unilaterally modify the terms of a contract without the acceptance 
of the other because this would simply undermine their contracting will. The will theory 
also implies that it is inconceivable, in theory at least, for a party to conclude a contract 
contrary to his interests and against his will.158  
The legal ideology of contract law was determined by the prevalent contracting 
pattern of society. The spirit of the doctrine of laissez-faire was predominant in the 
nineteenth century and interference with the results of the market forces was strenuously 
opposed by the courts. Sir George Jessel MR, who defended the institution of private 
contract, described the prevailing judicial attitude and stated:  
 
 
156 Vera Bolgar, ‘The Contract of Adhesion: A Comparison of Theory and Practice’ 20 AmJCompL 53, 56. 
157 Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 50 
158 See Atiyah’s discussion of the will theory, pp. 405–408; Michael Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and 
Furmston's Law of Contract (Oxford University Press 2007), p. 15. 
56 
 
                                                           
"If there is one thing more than another public policy requires it is that men of full 
age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and 
that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred 
and shall be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount 
public policy to consider – that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom 
of contract".159  
 
Contracts were viewed as an exclusive private matter between individuals and the courts 
were not allowed to interfere in non-substantive matters as this would contravene the 
legitimate interests of the public.160 This judicial attitude was not limited to the UK. In the 
US too, the Supreme Court refused to endorse statutory restrictions on contracts, and 
invalidated economic regulations on minimum wage and maximum working hours as they 
interfered with liberty and property and would alter the free-market order.161 The 
legislative and judicial non-interventionism in the economic field was an application of the 
public policy influenced by the laissez-faire doctrine which privileged individuals’ rights 
over societal rights.162 
However, the massive advancement in the methods of production and distribution 
that markets witnessed towards the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of 
the twentieth century gave rise to a new contractual paradigm based not on individual 
negotiation, but on the basis of adherence. 163 The emergence of the new paradigm rebutted 
 
159 Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq. 462 at 465. 
160 Andrew Burgess, ‘Consumer Adhesion Contracts and Unfair Terms: A Critique of Current Theory and a 
Suggestion’ 15 Anglo-AmLR 255, 256; Peter Cartwright, Consumer Protection and the Criminal Law: Law, 
Theory and Policy in the UK (Cambridge University Press 2001), p. 8. The public policy with the 
establishment of the welfare state shifted towards a more interventionist role of the government and the 
individuals rights transformed into social values. States began to recognize the social change and introduced 
social legislations that provided protection for weak and vulnerable parties, Vera Bolgar (n 156), p. 57. 
161 See for instance, Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Coppage v Kansas, 236 US 1, 27 (1915). 
162 Vera Bolgar (n 156), p. 57.  
163 There is a plethora of legal literature in the US and Europe on contracts of adhesion and their development 
since the first decade of the last century. Although they discuss contracts of adhesion from an American or 
European perspectives, their theoretical analysis and argument is not limited to a certain jurisdiction and can 
be used to illustrate and provide a systematic presentation of the problem in Kuwait. See generally Friedrich 
Kessler, ‘Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract’ 43 ColumLRev 629; Todd D 
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and proved the fallacy of the presumption of individuals’ equality and freedom of 
choice.164 Business firms began to standardize their terms of business in the form of 
adhesion contracts to satisfy the growing demand and use them in every transaction with 
the same product or service. The widespread use of adhesion contracts allowed powerful 
enterprises to realize their substantial advantages, particularly in the elimination of 
negotiation cost and the allocation of risk. The result was that the individuality of the 
parties has faded away and consumer autonomy has been reduced to the decision of 
whether or not he accepts the standard contract.  
The deterioration of private autonomy and the rise of a novel contractual 
paradigm led some legal jurists to question their legality and whether they should be 
regarded real contracts. The French jurist Saleilles was probably the first academic to 
discuss the new paradigm and coined the term ‘contract of adhesion’ in his seminal work 
De la declaration de volonté165 in the course of his discussion of party autonomy in the 
German Civil Code. In his analysis, Saleilles drew an important distinction between the 
conventional contract and another type of contract which he called, for lack of a better 
term, ‘contract of adhesion’.166 He addressed contracts of adhesion in the context of his 
discussion of section 133 of the German code, which pertains to the rules governing the 
judicial interpretation of a declaration of the will. Saleilles noted that the ordinary contract 
represented unification of the contracting parties’ wills and, in interpreting contracts, the 
court had to look at the parties’ unified will to determine the meaning of the terms. 
However, if the will of one party exclusively dominated and dictated the terms, then the 
 
Rakoff, ‘Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction’ 96 HarvLRev 1173; Patrick Atiyah, The Rise 
and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford University Press 2003); Guido Alpa, ‘Protection of Consumers 
against Unfair Contract Terms: Legislative Patterns of Controlling Adhesion Contracks in Europe’ 15 
Willamette LRev 267. 
164 Ruth Sefton-Green, ‘Duties to Inform versus Party Autonomy: Reversing the Paradigm (from Free 
Consent to Informed Consent)?-A Comparative Account of French and English Law’ in Howells Geraint, 
André Janssen and Reiner  Schulze (eds), Information Rights And Obligations: A Challenge For Party 
Autonomy And Transactional Fairness (Ashgate 2005), p. 172; Friedrich Kessler, p. 631. 
165 Raymond Saleilles, De la déclaration de volonté; contribution à l'etude de l'acte juridique dans le Code 
civil allemand (art. 116 à 144) (F. Pichon 1901). 
166 Vera Bolgar (n 156), p. 53. 
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contract failed to embody the "unification of wills" premise and the court would not be 
able to ascertain the intention of the contractors because there was one will only.  
Saleilles’s viewpoint was that the adhesion contract was, in fact, a "unilateral 
declaration of intent", an acte juridique, and was more akin to legislation because it 
manifested the characteristics of a law of general application where the rules were dictated 
by a superior power (the state) and were addressed not to a single individual, but to a 
collective number of individuals.167  
Accordingly, to Saleilles, contracts of adhesion were an alien species to contract 
theory because they were the exclusive work of one party who alone imposed in advance, 
without discussion, his absolute and final will on the other. What distinguishes this 
unilateral act of will is that the will of the adhering party is not a constituent element of the 
contract; it is no more than a fulfilment of a condition of its execution. The ordinary 
principles of construction in Saleilles’ view, therefore, was not able to ascertain the 
"unified will" because such contracts are contracts in name only168; they are unilateral acts 
that lack consensus and are concluded in a manner contrary to the common rules in the law 
of contract which require concurrence of two wills. Both parties express their consent, but 
for one of them the consent is not voluntary because the terms of the contract are no longer 
the embodiment of discussion. He held that this called for a different method of contract 
construction that took into account the position of the weak party to interpret the terms in 
his favour.169 
One could challenge Saleilles’s argument by stating that while it is true that the 
weak party is unable to discuss the terms of the contract, he remains free in the sense that 
he can always choose whom to contract with and above all, has an option not to enter into 
agreement at all. However, this argument is based on false assumptions and, hence, is 
 
167 Raymond Saleilles, pp. 229–230. 
168 Ibid.  
169 Arthur Von Mehren, ‘A General View of Contract’ in Arthur Von Mehren (ed), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol VII Contracts in General (JCP Mohr 1990), p. 15. 
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inconclusive for two reasons. First, most often the providers of these contracts control the 
market and offer the same product or service with substantially similar terms because they 
have already standardized the conditions for the supply of the product or service in the 
industry.170 Second, the avenue of not to contract is merely theoretical because the 
necessities of life oblige individuals to accept the terms of adhesion contracts as laid down 
in advance by the large enterprises regardless of how harsh they are. Contracts such as, 
labour, electricity and transport contracts are indispensable for individuals because they 
depend on them for their living. 
A contrasting view was expressed by the French legal philosopher Demogue who 
challenged Saleilles’s anti-contract thesis and regarded the contract of adhesion as natural 
evolution and positive market practice because it enables individuals to arrange their 
private affairs in a more efficient and expedient manner. This form of contracting 
eliminates trade barriers and reduces the overall cost of transactions. He commented that 
"The legal systems of the western world, inspired largely by the wish to encourage 
business and the active life, have sought so to arrange the performance of juridical acts, 
and legal life in general, as to economize time to the utmost, thus making it easier for 
individuals to act and thereby to create wealth".171 In his view, this is an application of 
what he called the "law of the least effort". However, while it is true that contracts of 
adhesion play an important role in organising business practices, Demogue’s pure 
economic treatment was criticized172 on the grounds that it failed to consider an important 
fact about of such contracts, namely that they were used by traders as a tool to oppress 
weak parties and impose unconscionable clauses.173 He did not propose any legislative 
 
170 Friedrich Kessler (n 163), p. 632. 
171 René  Demogue, ‘Analysis of Fundamental Notions ’ in Alfred Fouillée (ed), Modern French legal 
philosophy (Boston Book Co. 1916), p. 471. 
172 Edwin W Patterson, ‘The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts’ 64 ColumLRev 833, p. 857. 
173 Lewis A Kornhauser, ‘Unconscionability in Standard Forms’ CalifLRev 1151, p. 1162. Kornhauser cited 
several cases to show that standard form contracts were used to impose exorbitant prices or oppressive 
clause.  
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solution to the problems posed by contracts of adhesion, but rather proposed an ongoing 
process of conciliation between conflicting parties.174  
It took some time for the term adhesion contracts to be introduced into Anglo-
American legal vocabulary. The legal literature was initiated by Edwin Patterson in 
1919175 and was further expounded by Friedrich Kessler who presented an influential 
analysis of contracts of adhesion from an American perspective in a seminal article entitled 
‘Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract’.176  
Kessler’s article is particularly important because it traces the roots of adhesion 
contracts back to the relationship between individuals and large enterprises, and explains 
the implications of this relationship for the entire social order.177 In addition, it links the 
development of adhesion contracts with the evolution of the large-scale enterprise with its 
mass production and mass distribution, making the emergence of new types of contracts 
inevitable.178  
According to Kessler, adhesion contracts are unique because they are drafted 
unilaterally by the seller who possesses ‘unfettered discretion’ by virtue of his superior 
position resulting from a monopoly (natural or artificial) to dictate the terms of the 
agreement that best reflect his interest in which the consumer has ultimately involuntarily 
to adhere to. He further argues that even if the weaker party shops around for better terms, 
his effort will most likely fail because either the drafter controls the market or all its 
competitors use substantially similar terms. Thus, the consumer has no actual alternative 
and his contractual intention is but a "subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated 
by the stronger party".179  
 
174 René  Demogue (n 170), 476–477. 
175 Edwin W Patterson, ‘The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy’ 33 HarvLRev 198. 
176 Cited above (n 163). Several treatments preceded Kessler’s article but his contribution was the first 
persuasive analysis and coherent presentation to the extent it defined the parameters of the discussion. See for 
instance; Karl N Llewellyn, ‘(Book review) The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and 
Continental Law’ 52 HarvLRev 700. 
177 Todd D Rakoff (n 163) , pp. 1215–1216. 
178Friedrich Kessler (n 163), p. 631. 
179 Ibid., p. 632. 
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Some scholars have noticed that the classical rules of the law of contract were 
insufficient to protect weak parties against the unequal distribution of property in society 
and, therefore, these rules were futile in preventing the freedom of contract from being a 
one-sided privilege. Kessler, for example, pointed out that courts and commentators alike 
had failed to notice the emergence of a radically novel contractual order and wrongly 
sought solution in interpretation techniques to protect the weaker party. The result was that 
society had to bear the expensive cost of uncertainty for the preservation of an apparent 
homogeneity in the law of contract.180 He further warned of their consequences and 
concluded: "standard contracts in particular could thus become effective instruments in the 
hands of powerful industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new 
feudal order of their own making upon a vast host of vassals" and called for generating 
new legal principles to govern this modern model of contracting.181  
Kessler’s analysis has stimulated some commentators to identify the 
characteristics of contracts of adhesion to differentiate them from ordinary contracts. 
Lenhoff deduced, through extrapolation of American case law, that adhesion contracts 
have five main features. These five features can be summarised as follows: 
i. They are based on standardized forms. 
ii. The forms are used to satisfy mass demands for goods and services.  
iii. The forms are prepared for an indefinite number of individuals rather than 
to a single individual.  
iv. The forms are drafted by large-scale enterprises which possess superior 
bargaining power and are able to influence the market monopoly to a certain 
extent. 
 
180 Ibid., p. 633. 
181 Ibid., p. 640. 
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v. The individual consumer lacks bargaining power and his choice is limited to 
either adhering to the contract or rejecting it altogether.182  
 
A comparable characterization of contracts of adhesion was made in French 
jurisprudence focusing on the subjective elements of the agreement which encompasses the 
following features: (i) the offer is of a general nature and is continuous. It is addressed to 
the public and is maintained for an unlimited time; (ii) the offeror is in a monopolistic 
position whether legal or factual or at least has a major economic power, either by himself 
or by his union with similar businesses; (iii) the purpose of contract is the provision of 
goods or services that are sought by all individuals; (iv) the offer is presented in the form 
of a standard contract that embodies the general conditions and reflect the interests of a 
block of businesses; and (v) the contract includes a series of clauses all designed to benefit 
the offeror.183  
The above-mentioned characterization of contracts of adhesion merits a few 
observations. First, all contracts of adhesion are effectively standard form contracts but the 
opposite is not true. There are two types of standard-form contracts.184 The first type is of 
ancient origin, and relates to contracts formulated and concluded between parties of 
relatively equal bargaining power, which clauses have been settled and adopted over the 
years by negotiation between traders to facilitate their business conduct. These are 
commercial standard-form contracts between traders, such as policies of insurance, bills of 
lading, and building contracts. The legality and enforceability of these contracts are not 
questionable as their terms are presumed to be fair and reasonable because they are the 
 
182 Arthur Lenhoff, ‘Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study in the Light 
of American and Foreign Law’ 36 TulLRev 481, p. 481. Lenhoff’s description of the characteristics of 
contracts of adhesion has been generally accepted by commentators; see Burgess, p. 257 and Alpa p. 269. 
183 Marcel Planiol and Georges Ripert, Traite Pratique de Droit Civil Francais, vol VI Obligations (Librairie 
Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 1952), pp. 136–137 ; for a third characterization, see Rakoff, p. 1177. 
184 This division has been made by Lord Diplock in Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v Macaulay [1974] 
1 W.L.R. 1308, 1316; Wilson adds a third group termed contractual dirigism which is "state of affairs in 
which certain terms of specified contracts are prescribed and others proscribed by legislation", Nicholas 
Wilson, ‘Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts’ 14 ICLQ 172, p. 176. 
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outcome of negotiation and representation of the wills of multiple parties. In contrast, the 
second type is the consumer adhesion contract which is of relatively modern origin. It 
involves the provision of goods or services, and is concluded between an inferior consumer 
and a trader holding a strong bargaining position. The terms of the consumer contract have 
not been the subject of negotiation and the consumer role is reduced to accepting the 
contract as is or rejecting it as a whole.  
The second standard form contract relates to the assumption that has been put 
forth by scholars such as Kessler and Lenhoff that contracts of adhesion exist in the 
absence of competitive markets and that the drafting party is abusing his monopolistic 
position, which is not entirely correct. The theoretical approach used by Kessler is based 
on what has been termed the "exploitation theory" which suggests that large enterprises 
tend to exploit their market power and abuse their right to contract by utilising standard 
form contracts as an instrument to maximize their benefits and to exclude any "irrational 
factor" in litigation.185 Some scholars have criticized this thesis: Priest, for example, 
believes that Kessler’s exploitation theory is outdated and was valid until the 1970s when 
there was no other coherent legal explanation for standard contracts and this seemed 
consistent with the market practices at that time.186 Others contended that it was doubtful 
that there was an apparent relationship between bargaining position and the use of 
adhesion contracts. Instead, it was argued that empirical analysis showed no correlation 
between the use of standard contracts and bargaining power. Research indicates that 
standard contracts are used because the information cost for consumers is high and the 
ordinary consumer does not have the time to read the standard contract and, even if he 
does, it is most likely that he would not understand the terms of the contract.187 
 
185 Friedrich Kessler (n 163), p 632. 
186 George L Priest, ‘A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty’ 90 Yale LJ 1297, pp. 1299–1302. 
187 Hugh Beale, ‘Inequality of Bargaining Power’ 6 OJLS 123, p. 131; Hugh Beale, ‘Legislative Control of 
Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’, p. 233.  
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The third observation that can be made is that the lack of bargaining power in the 
form of absence of negotiation in adhesion contracts is not the underlying problem for the 
adhering party; rather, it is his inability to influence the terms of the contract. The drafting 
party may easily escape the effects of this condition and avoid judicial control by opening 
a window for negotiation for the adhering party and agreeing to discuss some terms or the 
non-core terms but eventually offer no real choice and prevent any alteration of the terms. 
Furthermore, negotiation may prove futile in sophisticated contracts where it is hard for the 
layman who lacks necessary knowledge be it technical or legal to genuinely comprehend 
and assimilate the nature of the terms and assess their possible consequences. Therefore, 
assigning a narrow meaning to negotiation may be meaningless and injure the interests of 
the adhering party. It is for this reason that the Directive, in Art. 3(2), and the UTCCR  in 
Regulation 5(2) gave a broad meaning to negotiation. The negotiation must be real and the 
consumer must have been given a real opportunity to influence the substance of the term 
that was fixed prior to the negotiation.188 
 
2.2.1 The concept of adhesion contract in the KCC 
 
In the Arab world the theory of adhesion contract was first introduced in the Egyptian Civil 
Code of 1949 in Art. 100, which was largely influenced by the prevailing theory of 
 
188 Art. 3(2) of the Directive states: "A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it 
has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the 
term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract". The wording of Regulation 5(2) is 
exactly the same. See also, Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (A 
Joint Consultation Paper Law, Commission Consultation Paper no 166/Scottish Law Commission Discussion 
Paper no 119), (2) 2002 , paras 4.42–4.54; Hugh Beale, ‘Unfair Terms in Contracts: Proposals for Reform in 
the UK’ 27 JCP 289, p. 293.  
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adhesion contract in France.189 This article, in turn, influenced the drafters in other Arab 
states and was reflected in their civil codes.190  
However, the Arab version of the theory acquired a life of its own and 
transformed into a slightly different concept. This can be illustrated by the translation of 
the term adhesion itself. The term used in French Law is contrat d’adhésion, which can 
literally be translated as "affiliation contract" because it contains standard terms that are 
not open for discussion and the adhering party affiliates himself to the contract without 
argument. Nonetheless, the term was translated into Arabic to idha’an, which means 
acquiescence or submission, instead of affiliation (indhemam). The Arabic translation was 
first used by Al-Sanhuri who believed that his translation was more appropriate because it 
carried negative connotations as opposed to the positive term affiliation: "His [the adhering 
party’s] consent exists but it is a compelled consent and for this reason these contracts 
were termed contracts of acquiescence (idha’an)".191 
Thus, the notion of acceptance in adhesion contracts in Arab jurisprudence is 
associated with the notion of compulsion or coercion because the adhering party is seeking 
an essential product provided through a monopoly which does not allow room for contract 
discussion. The association of the notion of monopoly with essential product finds its roots 
in Islamic jurisprudence where Muslim jurists require the possession of an essential 
commodity by a trader in order to recognize the existence of a monopoly.192 Modern legal 
scholars seem to have been influenced by this understanding and sought to establish an 
 
189 This is apparent in the writings of Al-Sanhuri, the most prominent leading civil law jurist in the 20th 
century, who relied heavily on French theorists to formulate the Arabic version of the theory of adhesion 
contracts. See his Middle Commentary, pp. 293–301. 
190 See for example, Iraqi; Art. 167(1); Syrian, Art. 101, Libyan, Art. 100; Jordan, Art. 104; and Kuwait, Art. 
80. 
191 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 293. He further notes: this term has received wide acceptance in the legal 
language both judicially and jurisprudentially and therefore was incorporated into the new legislation (the 
Egyptian Civil Code), nt. 1, pp. 293–294. Prior to the promulgation of the 1949 Civil Code, some Egyptian 
courts used the term ‘affiliation contract’ instead, see for example, Damanhur District Court, Civ. No. 
346/1946, 14/12/1946. 
192 Mohammad Abdulthaher Hussain, Introduction to Legal Studies: The Right Theory (Cairo, Dar Annahdha 
1996) (in Arabic), p. 50  
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Islamic basis for the notion of monopoly despite the difference in importance between the 
term in contemporary economics and in Islamic law.193 
 
2.2.2 The legal nature of adhesion contract in the KCC 
 
Under the heading "Special forms of contracting",194 Art. 80 KCC states: "The existence of 
the contract is not precluded if acceptance comes in the form of adherence of one party to 
the will of another by the delivery to a pre-drafted and non-negotiable model agreement 
prepared by the offeror". 
The first observation that can be made here is that this article concedes that 
adhesion contracts are an aberration of the general rule in contract formation. It was mainly 
introduced to affirm the legal nature of adhesion contracts and to prevent any dispute that 
may arise as to their legal nature. The explanatory notes to the code provide:  
 
"The code favours the correct view [the contractual idea] which has always been 
upheld by the courts and a plethora of jurists. It takes into consideration that 
although the adhering party is in a much weaker position, be it economic or social, 
than his counterpart and that his consent comes in the form of submission to the 
drafter’s conditions and acquiescence to his will, the adhering party consent, 
nonetheless, does exist and is sufficient to form a valid contract. The abidance of 
 
193 Monopoly (ihtikar) in Islamic Law (fiqh) means hoarding and arises when a trader collects and stores an 
essential commodity in anticipation for an increase in price. Islam forbids such practice and bans its 
formation because it inflicts harm on others and deprives them from availing of basic necessities. What 
constitutes a basic necessity is subject to dispute. There are three views regarding the issue. One view is that 
monopoly cannot arise except with respect to food. The second view adds clothes next to food and the third 
view holds that monopoly exist with respect to any commodity the people need which hoarding inflicts harm. 
See Hosni Abdeldayem, Monopoly Contracts (Alexandria, Dar Alfikr Al-Jamei 2008) (in Arabic), p. 127 et 
seq.  
194 The Civil Code enumerates five special form of contracting; preliminary contracts, promise to contract, 
earnest contract, auction contracts and adhesion contracts.  
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the adhering party without discussion cannot be remedied by rejecting the 
contractual idea; rather it is by protecting his weakness".195 
 
The main problem engendered by adhesion contracts is that they cast doubt on the 
quality of acceptance of the adhering party. Since the emergence of adhesion contracts in 
the last century this doubt has caused a heated debate between two schools of thought as to 
their nature and whether they should be regarded as real contracts. 
The first school, led by Saleilles, proposed an anti-contractual thesis which denies 
the contractual nature of contracts of adhesion.196 In their view, the common will of the 
parties cannot be conceived without prior exchange of views. However, in adhesion 
contracts the legal relationship between the parties is characterized by an exclusive 
dominance of a unilateral will that dictates the content of the agreement to its benefit. The 
offer is prepared beforehand by a monopolistic firm and presented without negotiation, 
therefore, the contract is not a result of mutual understanding. The function of acceptance 
is merely to fulfil a condition in execution of the offeror’s stipulation.197 Any assumption 
of a concurrence of wills is artificial because the adhering party is forced to accept the 
offer as is, without discussion.198 For these reasons adhesion contracts are more akin to 
juridical acts and cannot be regarded as real contracts.  
The second school entertains an opposite view. It believes that contracts of 
adhesion are real contracts in which acceptance does exist. The proponents of this theory, 
while recognizing the unique nature of acceptance in adhesion contracts, insist that they are 
not lacking any of the conditions required for the existence of negotiated contracts. In 
order for a contract to come into existence, all that is needed is a correspondence between 
 
195 The Explanatory Notes to Kuwaiti Civil Code, p. 94.  
196 Raymond Saleilles, pp. 229–230. 
197 Mohsen  Al-Baih, The General Theory of Obligation (vol. 1) (Cairo, Maktabat Aljala'a no year) (in 
Arabic), p. 144 ; Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, pp. 296–297; Atef Abdulhamid Hasan, Consumer Protection 
(Cairo, Dar Annahdha Alarabiyah 1996) (in Arabic), pp. 74–78. 
198 Mohsen  Al-Baih, ibid.  
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offer and acceptance, which is already available in adhesion contracts.199 The expression 
of will that indicates the willingness of a person to be bound to a particular offer of another 
is sufficient for the formation of a contract, even in the absence of negotiation. Discussion 
is not necessary for the formation of contracts because in reality individuals in their day-to-
day transactions accept prices and terms set by traders without negotiation. If the purpose 
of negotiation is to arrive at a mutually satisfactory arrangement, then it would be irrational 
to require the parties to negotiate the terms if the terms of the bargain suit them.200 In 
addition, it is generally conceded that exact balance cannot be achieved in every 
transaction.201 Contracts inevitably display inherent differences between the rights and 
obligations of the parties due to the fact that individuals themselves vary in their economic 
position or knowledge. The adhering party’s weakness is not a legal phenomenon but an 
economic one202 and economic equality between the contracting parties has never been a 
requisite to contract formation. Therefore, the economic imbalance or disproportion alone 
does not justify the denial of the contractual nature of adhesion contracts.203 
It is for this reason that the code adopted the ‘contractual theorists’ view and 
acknowledged the contractual nature of contracts of adhesion in Art. 80.204 However, this 
does not mean that the code equates them with negotiated contracts where the parties stand 
on equal footing. It has introduced some rules to compensate for the weakness of the 
adhering party. This appears prominently in the special protection afforded to the adhering 
party by virtue of his inability to negotiate the contract terms and his vulnerability to unfair 
terms. The code attempts to strengthen his contractual position in two ways: (i) by granting 
the court broad discretion to vary the unfair provisions or exempt the adhering party from 
 
199 Atef Abdulhamid Hasan, p. 80. 
200 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 297; Mohsen  Al-Baih, 145 et seq. 
201 Mohsen  Al-Baih, p. 146.  
202 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 297. 
203 Ibid.; Mohsen  Al-Baih, p. 146. 
204 The explanatory notes to the Kuwaiti Civil Code, p. 94. 
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their application; and (ii) by obliging the court to construe ambiguous terms in favour of 
the adhering party.205  
 
2.3 Procedural problems associated with the regulation of adhesion contracts in 
the KCC 
 
For any protection system against unfair contract terms to be successful, it should first and 
foremost take into account the inherent weakness of the consumer against the professional 
before and during the performance of the contract. The consumer is the weak party 
throughout the contract stages: before the contract formation, during contract formation 
and even after the conclusion of the contract. Therefore, it is important to lay down some 
rules for the protection of the consumer before the formation of the contract to ensure his 
informed consent. It is unfortunate that the KCC does not contain procedural rules that aim 
to protect the consumer in the pre-contract stage but confines protection to the substantive 
side of unfair terms. 206 Any discussion of the protection of consumers against unfair terms 
should first attempt to find out how to protect the consent of the consumer so that it 
represents his true contractual will.  
The following section will discuss the problem of informed consent in adhesion 
contracts and explain why the rules are inefficient in this regard. It will also suggest some 
solutions that the researcher believes will strengthen the position of the consumer and 
contribute to ensuring his informed consent. The legal nature of adhesion contracts will 
first be discussed and why they are regarded as derogation from the conventional concept 
of contract will be explained. The adhering party’s consent and its associated problems will 
 
205 Articles 81 and 82 respectively. These two articles will be discussed in the next two chapters. 
206 This problem has been overlooked not only in the statutory regulation of adhesion contracts, but also in 
legal literatutre. Several legal scholars have discussed contracts of adhesion and confined the analysis to the 
substantive aspect of this species of contracts. See for example, Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, pp. 293–301; 
Solaiman Murkus, pp. 182–186; Ibrahim Abu Allail, pp. 176–182, Abdulmonem Faraj Assada, ‘On Adhesion 
Contracts’ ( (PhD thesis), Cairo, University of Fuad I 1964) (in Arabic). 
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then be examined, and finally solutions to overcome the problem of informed consent in 
adhesion contracts are proposed. 
 
2.3.1 Lack of informed consent in adhesion contracts and its associated problems 
 
One of the major criticisms that can be directed at the existing legal rules governing 
adhesion contracts in the KCC is that they do not seek to protect the adhering party’s 
consent prior to the conclusion of the contract. Rather, the rules focus only on substantive 
aspects of unfairness in adhesion contracts and totally disregard the procedural aspects. 
More specifically, the theory of contracts of adhesion deals with one aspect of the adhering 
party’s weakness, namely his economic weakness, and does not address an equally 
important species of weakness that relates to his lack of knowledge. The scope of 
protection in the rules has been limited to the performance stage of the contract and does 
not extend to deal with improprieties in the pre-contractual stage in which the effects of the 
lack of knowledge and inexperience are clearly manifested. Indeed, the code follows an ex 
post approach and confines the court authority to restoring substantive imbalance but not 
procedural imbalance. Consequently, if an adhering party wishes to avoid an adhesion 
contract due to procedural unfairness, such as in situations where the professional provides 
little information or does not observe the requirement of transparency, the only avenue 
available to him would be to invoke the general rules in contract theory concerning defects 
of consent which might not always cover these instances.207 To reinforce this argument, 
one could cite the following observation from a recent study:  
 
"It is well established that the theory of adhesion contracts does not provide 
special protection for the consent of the adhering party nor does it provide 
 
207 The defects of consent are enumerated by name in the KCC and they include; error, fraud, duress, and 
exploitation. Lack of knowledge or inexperience in itself does not qualify for avoidance of contract. 
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effective means to enlighten him about the implications of his obligations . . . on 
the contrary, it regards submission to prescribed terms to be one form of 
acceptance which amounts to real acceptance sufficient for the formation of the 
contract".208  
 
The rules bind the adhering party by his acceptance even though it might not truly 
represent his contractual will. 
The deficiency of the rules in protecting the adhering party’s consent can partly be 
ascribed to the lack of sufficient rules to tackle procedural unfairness in adhesion contracts. 
This invites one to consider two issues to show the aspects of this deficiency. The first 
relates to the nature and quality of consent in adhesion contracts, and the second concerns 
the mechanism of contracting in adhesion contracts which allows the professional to abuse 
his economic and knowledge superiority, and draft the terms in his favour. These two 
issues will be addressed in the next part of this section. In the third part some proposals 
that could contribute to enhancing the adhering party’s consent as well as controlling the 
contractual behaviour of the professional are offered. 
 
2.3.2 The nature of consent in adhesion contracts in the KCC 
 
Generally, acceptance can be defined as a declaration of will in which the offeree 
expresses his unreserved approval of an existing offer that must be communicated to the 
offeror in order to be effective and constitute  the contract.209 Acceptance cannot be 
deemed valid unless it is expressed in a free manner, that is, free from defects of consent 
and expressed by a person who has capacity to contract.210 
 
208 Mohammad Abd Al-Aal, p. 88. 
209 Art. 43.2 provides "the acceptance must coincide with the offer"; see also, Abdulhay Hejazi, p. 623; 
Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 115 et seq.; Jamil Al-Sharqawi, The General Theory of Obligation, vol 1 (Cairo, Dar 
Annahdha Alarabiyah 1993) (in Arabic), p. 308 et seq.; Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 271 et seq. 
210 Art. 83. 
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It follows from the principle of freedom of contract that the parties are free to 
regulate the content of their obligations by participating in the determination of the terms 
of the contract. This is the normal contracting paradigm which assumes that pre-
contractual negotiations precede the conclusion of the contract in order to reach a bargain 
that satisfies both parties.211 Accordingly, under this paradigm the offeree’s acceptance is a 
true reflection of his contractual will. However, in adhesion contracts co-determination or a 
common contractual will per se is non-existent. This absence distinguishes adhesion 
contracts from negotiated contracts because the adhering party’s contractual will does not 
contribute to the formation of the common will of the parties.212 The process of concluding 
adhesion contracts departs from the normal paradigm of contract formation and contradicts 
the principle of private autonomy because of the total absence of negotiation, which, 
ultimately, results in an imposition of the proffering party’s contractual will.  
It could be inferred from the wording of Art. 80 KCC that acceptance in adhesion 
contracts is distinct from acceptance in negotiated contracts. Art. 80 asserts the validity of 
the adhering party’s consent and indicates that although the acceptance has not been given 
freely, it still exists. However, the problem of acceptance in adhesion contracts is that it 
does not necessarily manifest the contractual will of the adhering party, especially if the 
contract contains unfair terms.213 This is why some contract theorists have often described 
acceptance in adhesion contracts as "compelled acceptance" that is closer to acquiescence 
than a consent representing the will of the adhering party.214 Others have qualified it as 
"coerced acceptance" that is connected to economic rather than psychological factors.215 
 
211 Anwar Sultan, Sources of Obligations (Alexandria, Monsha’at al-Ma’aref 1996) (in Arabic), p. 66; 
Ahmad Al-Refai, The Civil Protection of the Consumer in Relation to the Content of the Contract (Cairo, Dar 
Alnahdha Alarabia 1994) (in Arabic), p. 48.   
212 Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 179. 
213 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 293.  
214 Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 179.  
215 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 93. It seems that Al-Sanhuri has been influenced by the writings of Saleilles 
on adhesion contracts and favoured a translation of the original French term contrat d’adhesion that carries 
negative connotation to mean submission (Ith’aan) as opposed to the positive/neutral meaning of the French 
term that means affiliation or subscription. Al-Sanhuri translation has been widely accepted by jurisprudence 
and courts, and his selection was later on used in all Arab civil laws; see pp. 293–294 footnotes Nos 1 and 2. 
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Because the contract terms are presented as a whole package on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, 
the adhering party (i.e., the consumer) is coerced into accepting the professional’s terms, 
even though his acceptance does not reflect his true contractual will. However, this type of 
coercion is of an economic nature and does not vitiate the contract as physical or moral 
coercion does. According to Art. 156(1) of the Kuwaiti Civil Code, coercion – be it 
physical or moral – is deemed a defect of consent that impairs the freedom of contract by 
placing a constraint on the will of a person, consequently inducing him to consent. In order 
for coercion to vitiate the contract, it must pose a threat of grave and imminent danger to 
person or property; economic coercion in adhesion contracts does not present the same 
threat. 
There is another matter that should be pointed out with respect to acceptance in 
adhesion contracts and that is that it does not strictly conform to the notion of 
correspondence between offer and acceptance. If the contract of adhesion contains unfair 
terms, then the adhering party reluctantly accepts them due to his lack of meaningful 
choice. Some authors have pointed out that the lack of choice explains the adhering 
parties’ disinclination to review their agreements prior to their conclusion. It is well 
accepted among scholars that consumers do not read their agreements before signing them 
and even if they do read them, it is unlikely that they would be able to understand their 
content.216 Shopping around for better terms does not avail them or guarantee a better deal 
either because the goods or services they are seeking are supplied by a monopoly or the 
terms are substantially similar in the market and have been standardized by members of the 
same trade.217  
 
216 Rakoff asserted that it is well accepted among scholars that consumers do not read their agreements before 
signing them and even if they read them it is unlikely they would be able to understand their content, Todd D 
Rakoff, p. 1173. See also, Ahmad Al-Refai, p. 50; Thomas Wilhelmsson and Chris Willett, ‘Unfair Terms 
and Standard Form Contracts’ in Geraint Howells, Iain Ramsay and Thomas Wilhelmsson (eds), Handbook 
of Research on International Consumer Law (Edward Elgar 2010), p. 169; Law Commission, Second Report 
on Exemption Clauses (Law Com No 69), 1975 , paras 11 and 146.  
217 This is either because the goods or services the adhering party is seeking are supplied by a monopoly or 
the members of the trade have standardized their conditions. See Kessler's discussion above. 
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It could be argued that there is no exact coincidence between the proffering 
party’s offer and the adhering party’s acceptance if the contract contains unfair terms. The 
acceptance is partial and does not reflect his genuine contractual will to be bound by the 
unfair terms. However, from a pure legal perspective, once acceptance is expressed and 
communicated to the offeror, it becomes binding regardless of whether the offeree accepts 
or refuses the unfair terms. What matters the most is the manifestation of the contractual 
will even though there might be a conflict between his internal will and external will.218 
 
2.3.3 The mechanism used to conclude adhesion contracts 
 
The contracting model of contracts of adhesion is characterized by the exclusive 
dominance of one contractual will which dictates the terms of the agreement and its means 
of formation. The role of the second contractual will is merely to complement this will by 
abiding by its conditions so that the contract can be created. The second will is not allowed 
to influence the content of the contract nor discuss it. This absence of ability to negotiate 
compels it to accept all the contract terms, including terms that are detrimental to its 
interest.  
The code lacks preventative measures that are aimed at controlling the stronger 
party’s behaviour by forbidding him from abusing his right to contract and drafting the 
contract to his benefit. Apart from Art. 39 KCC, which provides that "the offer must 
describe at least the nature of the contract and its essential conditions", there is no other 
provision in the code that sets general minimum standards on contract drafting.219 The 
code leaves it completely up to the proffering party to determine the substance, form and 
 
218 The rationale behind the code reliance on the external will of the contracting party to determine his 
acceptance lies in considerations relating to the stability of transactions in the market and protection of the 
other party’s expectations and trust. For a discussion of the internal and the external will in the Kuwaiti law 
see Ibrahim Abu Allail, pp. 94–98; in general, see Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, pp. 110–114; Solaiman 
Murkus, pp. 143–151; Anwar Sultan, pp. 58–60. 
219 With the exception of its regulation of insurance contracts in Art. 782 in which the insurance company is 
required to display certain terms distinctively and in intelligible manner, such as those relating to invalidation 
or arbitration, the code lacks any other guidance on how terms should be drafted. Regulation of style in this 
article proves that control of contract drafting within the code is the exception. 
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style of the contract. By failing to regulate the matter, this law fails to prevent unfair 
contracting practices in which professionals ma
Two examples can be offered to illustrate the insufficiency of the rules to control 
procedural unfairness in adhesion contracts. The first concerns abuse of the contract 
language in the form of using complex or ambiguous wording for the ordinary members of 
the public. While the code in Art. 82 lays down the contra proferentem rule, which 
provides that any ambiguities in the contract shall be construed in favour of the adhering 
party, it does not set a pre-contractual duty on the author of the terms to use plain and 
intelligible language or at least proscribe him from obscuring the meaning of the terms. 
The court is allowed to construe the terms in favour of the adhering party only if they are 
susceptible to different meanings but not when they are complex and incomprehensible. 
Professionals may obscure the meaning of the terms by using complex language that is 
incomprehensible to the lay person who will ultimately fail to draw accurate conclusion as 
to their scope or legal implications. 
The second illustration concerns binding the adhering party to terms that he did 
not have the opportunity to review by incorporating these terms into the agreement by 
reference. If the stronger party refers in the original document of the contract to other 
documents that were not readily available before contracting and the adhering party signs 
the original document, then his signature binds him to the incorporated terms even if he did 
not read them. The general rule in contract formation mandates that reception or signing 
the document is a strong presumption of acceptance but, in fact, this assumption does not 
accord with the reality in adhesion contracts in many situations.220 Nevertheless, the law 
regards his acceptance in the form of signature or the mere reception of the contract 
 
220 Ibrahim Abu Allail, 179; Ahmad Al-Refai, p. 51. Cf the notion of constructive consent in US law, see 
John JA Burke, ‘Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach’ 24 Seton Hall LegisJ 285, p. 296 et seq.; 
English law attaches great importance to signatures. The general rule is that a party is bound by his signature 
regardless of whether he has read the contract or not so long the party took reasonable steps to bring the 
terms to his attention (Parker v South Eastern Railway [1877] 2 CPD 416), or whether he understands the 
terms, see L'Estrange v Graucob [1934] 2 KB 394; see also, JR Spencer, ‘Signature, Consent, and the Rule in 
L’Estrange v. Graucob’ 105 CambLJ, p. 114.  
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document to be sufficient to indicate his knowledge of the terms and establish their binding 
force.221  
The law in other jurisdictions sought to mitigate the effects of incorporation of 
terms by setting a minimum requirement for the standard terms to become obligatory for 
the adhering party. In Germany, for instance, section 305c(1) of the BGB invalidates 
unreasonable terms if the drafting party fails to provide the adhering party with an 
adequate notice as to their existence before the conclusion of the contract.222 Section 
305(2), too, requires that in order for a standard business condition to form part of the 
contract, the user must be given a reasonable opportunity to take note of the contents.  
A further illustration is the indicative list of the Directive. It enumerates a number 
of terms that are presumed to be unfair between consumers and businesses. Among them is 
point (i), which refers to a term that is "irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with 
which he had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the 
contract". Similarly, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts223 
provide a significant exception to the general rules of consent in contract formation in 
standard agreements through the codification of the principle of "surprising terms".224 If a 
surprising term has been included in a standard agreement, which the adhering party could 
not reasonably have expected, then it would be held ineffective, unless it has been 
expressly accepted by the adhering party. 
The rationale behind these exceptions is to prevent the drafting party from 
sneaking terms in without the knowledge of the adhering party225 and "to avoid a party 
which uses standard terms taking undue advantage of its position by surreptitiously 
 
221 Ahmad Al-Refai, p. 50.  
222 BGB section 305c(1) reads: "provisions in standard business terms which in the circumstances, in 
particular with regard to the outward appearance of the contract, are so unusual that the other party to the 
contract with the user need not expect to encounter them, do not form part of the contract". Translation of this 
provision is provided in Hugh Beale and others, p. 783. 
223 The official text of the UNIDROIT Principles and comments can be accessed through 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralversionprinciples2010-e.pdf 
224 Art. 2.1.20. 
225 Thomas Wilhelmsson and Chris Willett, p. 171. The scope and application of this exception varies from 
one jurisdiction to another. 
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attempting to impose terms on the other party which that party would scarcely have 
accepted had it been aware of them".226 
Any reform of the present control system of unfair terms in the context of 
adhesion or consumer contracts should take into account the implementation of these rules. 
Their establishment is certainly necessary to overcome the procedural unfairness in 
adhesion or consumer contracts to ensure that the proffering party took reasonable steps to 
bring the terms to the attention of the adhering party. They represent a starting point on 
which other rules can be built to address the adhering party’s weakness and ensure his 
informed consent prior to the formation of the contract. 
The section that follows attempts to suggest some solutions that the researcher 
believes could contribute to effective protection against procedural unfairness and the 
abuse of contract practice.  
 
2.3.4 Suggestions on how to overcome the procedural problems associated with 
adhesion contracts 
 
The lack of informed consent in adhesion contracts has led to the development of new 
legal concepts in other jurisdictions to ensure that the consumer’s acceptance is a true 
reflection of his contractual will, as well as mitigating the negative effects of the process of 
acquiring his acceptance. These concepts include the pre-contractual duty to inform, the 
right of withdrawal and the requirement of transparency of terms. Any legal reform of the 
current rules in the KCC should take into consideration these concepts, and introduce 
subjective and objective measures to protect the adhering party’s consent and his rational 
choice. In the opinion of the researcher these measures should include, bringing significant 
clauses to the attention of the consumer, expressly give the consumer the right to access the 
full contract documents prior to the actual formation of the contract, grant a state agency 
 
226 Comment 1 to Art. 2.1.20. 
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the authority to review and verify of the contract, mandate that the terms are written in 
plain and intelligible language, and grant the consumer the right to withdraw from the 
contract after its conclusion. Calls have been made by some jurists to adopt these 
mechanisms to safeguard consumers’ consent prior to the conclusion of the contract.227 
These three concepts will be dealt with in turn. 
 
2.3.4.1 Duty to inform 
 
It is worthwhile mentioning at the outset that the KCC recognizes the duty of disclosure in 
a few contracts. In insurance contracts, for instance, the insured party is required to reveal 
all information relating to the risk he is insuring against.228 Similarly, in the contract of 
sale the seller must provide all information necessary for the creation of sufficient 
knowledge about the object of the sale.229 In addition, in the context of deceit as a defect in 
consent the debtor always has a positive obligation to speak and refrain from dishonest 
silence to conceal a fact that would have prevented the formation of the contract had the 
other party known a
Can one conclude from these isolated pre-contractual duties that the code 
institutes a general obligation to inform that should be observed in all contractual 
relations?231 The straightforward answer seems to be no. A simple extrapolation of the 
code provisions suggests that the position of the code is to confine the recognition of the 
duty to inform to instances where a party is bound to give information by virtue of a 
statutory provision or under the clauses of the contract. It is the researcher's opinion, 
 
227 To name a few, see Hassan Gemei, Consumer Protection: the Special Protection of the Consumer's 
Consent in Consumer Contracts, Omar Abdulbaqi; Ahmad Al-Refai, Alhimayah Almadaniyah Lilmostahlik, 
(Dar Annahda, 1994); Nazih Al-Mahdi, The Pre-Contractual Obligation of Disclosing Information 
Pertaining to the Contract and its Application on Some Types of Contracts (Cairo, Dar Annahdha Alarabiyah 
1982) (in Arabic).  
228 Art. 790 KCC. 
229 Art. 456 KCC. 
230 Art. 152 KCC. 
231 Hassan Gemei, Consumer Protection: the Special Protection of the Consumer's Consent in Consumer 
Contracts, p. 15. 
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however, that it is possible for the Kuwaiti courts to synthesize a wider obligation to 
inform from these isolated instances and from the principle of good faith.232 This can be 
achieved through the adoption of what the French jurist Ghestin calls the process of 
"amplifying induction" to deduce from these scattered manifestations a general legislative 
intent that aims to redress the contractual inequality and increase the responsibilities of 
professionals by imposing a general duty to inform. Subsequently, this can be implemented 
systematically in all contracts involving a lay person, not only a consumer, to foster his 
informed consent.233 Some writers suggest that the courts should not wait for regulatory 
intervention to protect consumers, but take the initiative by broadening the interpretation of 
the KCC provisions in favour of consumers.234 However, in reality it is doubtful whether 
this could be attained as it has been empirically proven that the Kuwaiti courts’ general 
position is to follow a restrictive approach in interpreting the existing rules. Their disregard 
of the contemporary trends in contract law is indicative of their refusal to relax the 
meaning of the rules or derive new obligations from the existing ones.235 If Al-Nakkas’s 
conclusion is used, it is possible to argue that at this stage the only viable way to recognize 
a general obligation to disclose would be through legislative intervention. 
Regulatory intervention can be rationalized by reference to the need to achieve 
commutative justice in contracts because informational inequality prevents the realization 
of this end. It is important to provide consumers with all necessary information relating to 
the price, terms and conditions, characteristics of the product or the service so that 
 
232 Art. 197 provides that contracts must be performed in good faith. 
233 For more details on Ghestin’s approach, see Pierre Jr. Legrand, ‘Information in formation of contracts: a 
civilian perspective’ 19 CBLJ 318, pp. 341–342; Barry Nicholas, The French Law of Contract, pp. 104–105; 
Jacques Ghestin, p. 151. 
234 Jamal Al-Nakkas, p. 55. 
235 For a clear illustration of the Kuwaiti judiciary reluctance to broaden the interpretation of the KCC rules, 
see ibid, pp. 52–53. The Kuwaiti courts could infer a general obligation to inform from the principle of good 
faith mentioned in articles 195 and 197 relating to determination of the subject matter of the contract and 
contract performance respectively. The French, for example, founded the duty to inform on Art. 1134.3 
relating to good faith (bonne foi) and Art. 1135 relating to equity (équité). The Kuwaiti courts could also 
infer a general obligation to inform from articles 195 and 197 relating to determination of the subject matter 
of the contract and contract performance respectively. Some commentators even argue that the duty to inform 
is grounded on the theory of validity and integrity of consent, see Omar Abdulbaqi, p. 200. 
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consumers can make informed decisions.236 Information asymmetry between consumers 
and professionals increased significantly over the past century by virtue of industrial and 
technological advancement which made it almost impossible for the lay person to grasp all 
the technical and legal details associated with contracts.237 The discrepancy in the level of 
knowledge and expertise between consumers and professionals is conducive to contractual 
imbalance.238 Some writers have indicated that contractual imbalance between consumers 
and professionals in the present age is not only of an economic nature, but also 
informational; therefore, the equality in knowledge is as important as equality in economic 
positions.239 As a result, it is necessary to redress this imbalance by imposing a general 
obligation to inform on professionals to alleviate information asymmetry arising from the 
lack of disclosure of information to achieve contractual justice based on mutual trust.240 
However, mere provision of the duty to inform might not completely alleviate 
information asymmetry. Many of the modern consumer transactions are disadvantageous 
to consumers either because of their sophisticated subject matter or the manner in which 
they are concluded. On the one hand, contracts such as consumer credit contracts are 
characterized by their complexity of details that may not be fully understood by most 
consumers.241 On the other, consumers may be psychologically pressured to make 
impulsive decisions through aggressive selling practices without being able to assess the 
possible consequences of their decisions. Consequently, there are instances where even if 
all information is provided for the consumer, his consent will not be informed consent. 
This is why it is necessary to add an extra layer of protection to reinforce the consumer 
 
236 See Hassan Gemei, Consumer Protection: the Special Protection of the Consumer's Consent in Consumer 
Contracts, p. 14 et seq. 
237 See Peter Cartwright, p. 20 et seq.  
238 Ibid., p. 22. It should be noted that some consumers can make rational purchasing decisions by gathering 
the necessary information on their own. However for many others "the learning process is more difficult and 
thus more costly", John Rothchild, ‘Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace Utopianism’ 
74 IndLJ 5.  
239 Omar Abdulbaqi, p. 202. 
240 Ibid.; see also Nazih Al-Mahdi, who was among the foremost scholars to draw attention to the 
significance of the duty to inform and called for its implementation, pp. 67 and 225. 
241 Omar Abdulbaqi, p. 763; Marco Loos, ‘Rights of Withdrawal’ in Geraint  Howells and Reiner  Schultze 
(eds), Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (Sellier 2009), pp. 237 and 249. 
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position and reduce the disparity in the rational decision between him and the professional 
regarding the conclusion of the contract. This could be achieved through the 
implementation of the right of withdrawal which will be the subject of discussion in the 
next section. 
 
2.3.4.2 Right of withdrawal  
 
The right of withdrawal242 (also known as cooling-off period) is a procedural solution 
awarded to the consumer to allow him unilaterally to terminate the contract within a 
specified period without having to provide any reason or incurring any liability.243 It is a 
mechanism whose objective is to compensate for the disadvantageous position of the 
consumer by granting him additional time before being irrevocably bound by the 
contract,244 as well as protecting his consent to ensure it came into existence as a result of 
careful consideration.245  
There is a direct link between the professional’s duty to inform and the 
consumer’s right of withdrawal. The professional has an obligation to provide sufficient 
information to the consumer regarding the terms of the agreement and the essential 
characteristics of the supplied goods or services. If the former fails to fulfil this obligation 
or supplies goods or services with disappointing quality, then his conduct should be 
 
242 Under EU law, the right of withdrawal was initially introduced to curb abuses of doorstep selling. It 
appeared for the first time in the Door Step Directive 85/577/EEC and since then it has been implemented in 
other Directives such as Distance Selling Directive 97/7/EC and Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48/EC, 
Evelyne Terryn, ‘The Right of Withdrawal, the Acquis Principles and the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference’ in Reiner Schulze (ed), Common Frame of Reference and Existing EC Contract Law (Sellier 
2008), pp. 145–148.  
243 Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 274; Omar Abdulbaqi, p. 768; Christian Twigg-Flesner and Reiner Schulze, 
‘Protecting Rational Choice: Information and the Right of Withdrawal’ in Geraint  Howells, Iain  Ramsay 
and Thomas  Wilhelmsson (eds), Handbook of Research on International Consumer Law (Edward Elgar 
2010), pp. 130 and 131.  
244 Christian Twigg-Flesner and Reiner Schulze, p. 145. 
245 Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 276. Abu Allail argues that although the right of withdrawal is connected to 
consent, it is not related to the theory of defects of consent because the purpose of this theory is to protect the 
consent by ensuring its freedom from defects, whereas the role of the right of withdrawal is to ensure that the 
declaration of the party consent was a result of due deliberation and reflection. 
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indirectly sanctioned by granting the consumer the right to withdraw from the contract.246 
However, the right of withdrawal is not only based on the information model.247 It exists 
independently of whether  or not the information is provided and its main objective is to 
compensate for the disadvantaged weak position of the consumer.248 This is why it should 
be introduced in the context of adhesion contracts in the KCC to give the adhering party an 
opportunity to reconsider his contractual commitment to ensure that his consent is 
informed.  
However, this right has an extensive influence on the contract by restricting its 
binding force. It strongly undermines the principle of pacta sunt servanda249 because it 
allows unilateral amendment of an already effective contract to the benefit of one party, 
consequently opening the door to a threatening to the stability of transactions. Therefore, 
how can one justify the award of the right of withdrawal in adhesion contracts when it 
seemingly contradicts the classical principles of contract law?  
It should be borne in mind that the principle of pacta sunt servanda is not an 
absolute principle within the KCC. The code states in Art. 196 that "contracts are the law 
between the parties. Neither is allowed to cancel or amend its rules unless permissible by 
agreement or law". This provision establishes a general rule that contracts must be 
observed by both parties and, at the same time, implies that the contract parties can include 
whatever lawful terms they desire, including terms that place limitations on the biding 
force of the agreement. The code even embodies this principle in the contract of sale and 
recognizes the buyer’s right to withdraw by mutual agreement if explicitly mentioned in 
the contract, such as in the sale upon trial or testing or sale by way of down payment.250 
Additionally, exceptions to the binding force of the contract may be prescribed by 
legislation. Law No. 64/1999 concerning intellectual property rights grants the author of 
 
246 Clarisse Girot, p. 71. 
247 Christian Twigg-Flesner and Reiner Schulze, p. 145. 
248 Ibid., p. 146. 
249 Marco Loos, p. 241; Omar Abdulbaqi, p. 764. 
250 Art. 458 and Art. 74 KCC respectively.  
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literary works, subject to court approval, the right to withdraw his work from 
circulation.251 Therefore, in principle, the right of withdrawal is not alien to the Kuwaiti 
contract law and its implementation can be easily justified in the context 
. 
The right of withdrawal can also be justified, in my opinion, on the basis of the 
principle of freedom of contract. This principle implies that contractual obligations rely on 
the consent of the parties and that the agreement should be the result of mutual 
understanding and meets the expectations of each party. Thus, if the professional abuses 
his right to contract to obtain an excessive advantage over the consumer which results in 
gross imbalance between the two parties, then such behaviour should be sanctioned by 
reversing the positions of the parties and granting the weak party the right to cancel the 
agreement uni
act.  
However, preconditions and restrictions on the exercise of this right should be 
introduced alongside its recognition. A balance should be struck between the interests of 
the consumer and the professional to prevent its abuse by consumers, especially when the 
professional does not breach hi
 
2
 
A further deficiency in the theory of adhesion contracts under the KCC is that it does not 
aim to control the form of the contract. The code lacks explicit rules about contract drafting 
and leaves it up to the professional to determine the content and form of the contract 
document. Not only can the professional obscure the meaning of the terms in his favour by 
 
251 Art. 35.  
252 Abuse can be prevented by placing limitations on this right, such as restrict the exercise of the right to 
withdraw to a specific timeframe and allow exceptions for particular goods.  
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using sophisticated language, but he can also shrink the print size of the terms to 
discourage consumers from reading the document. The protection measures provided in the 
code in this regard are futile because they do not address the formal aspect of the contract 
document. What is needed is to strengthen the position of the consumer prior to the 
conclusion of the contract by obliging the professional to make the terms more accessible 
to the adhering party. Therefore, another preventative measure should be introduced to 
reinforce the duty of information and the right of with
 party prior to the conclusion of the contract.  
This can be attained through the adoption of the principle of transparency.253 It 
simply means that contracts should be drafted and communicated in plain and intelligible 
language. The objective of this requirement is to allow the ordinary member of the public 
to determine the legal and economic significance of the term, and enable him to assess 
their implications without legal advice. On the other hand, it seeks to deter abuse of 
language and style of the contract by the professional, and oblige him to give the adhering 
party the opportunity to examine the terms. There is a pressing need to establish such a 
he Kuwaiti contract law and deem its violation as an illegitimate business practice. 
The requirement of transparency prescribes that the professional observes two 
duties that complement each other. First, the terms must be "plainly" drafted in a 
comprehensible format to avoid any ambiguity or complexity as to their meaning. That is 
to say that the professional should avoid the use of technical legal terminology and make 
the significance of the terms precise, complete and straightforward. Second, the layout of 
the contract in terms of presentation and structure should make the text "intelligible" so 
that the consumer can easily follow it. The size of the print in the document, and the 
quality and colour of the paper should contribute towards facilitating the legibility of the 
 
253 The principle of transparency is an important measure to control unfair terms. It is embodied in Art. 5 of 
the Directive, well as Regulation 7(1) of the UTCCR.  
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of the consumer, then these clauses must be brought to his attention and printed in a 
distinct colour to highlight their significance. 
The imposition of the requirement of transparency would not be fruitful unless its 
breach is tied to a sanction. Although the code adopts the contra proferentem rule in Art. 
82 and mandates that doubt as to the meaning of the terms should be construed in favour of 
the adhering party, it remains a weak weapon and does not suffice to discourage the abuse 
of language and style in contract formation. Many terms may have one possible meaning 
yet are drafted in neither plain nor intelligible language for ordinary individuals. Therefore, 
the breach of this requirement should be explicitly prohibited and sanctioned.  
A look at comparative law provides a learning experience that could be beneficial 
in presenting recommendations for reform of the Kuwaiti law. In Germany the courts have 
developed a tendency to declare contractual terms ineffective on the mere grounds that 
they lack transparency.254 In one of the cases the Bundesgerichtshof (hereinafter BGH) 
(the Federal Supreme Court) held that terms can be unfair because of their lack of 
transparency, regardless of whether or not they were unfair in substance.255 In the UK, 
under the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 (hereinafter UCTA), one of the factors the 
court can take into account when assessing whether a term is reasonable is the 
intelligibility of the text. Thus, terms could fail to satisfy the test of reasonableness and be 
regarded as unfair if unintelligible.256 This view has been reinforced by case law.257 In 
addition to UCTA and case law, Regulation 6(2) of the UTCCR provides that the core 
 
254 Christian Armbrüster, ‘Standard Contract Terms and Information Rules’ in Hugh Collins (ed), Standard 
Contract Terms in Europe: A Basis for and a Challenge to European Contract Law (Kluwer Law 
International 2008), p. 167. 
255 BGH 17 January 1989, NJW 1989, 582. See also Paolisa Nebbia, pp. 138–139. 
256 Schedule 2 of the UCTA supplies the court with a number of guidelines that the court can take into 
consideration. Guideline (c) provides: "whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the 
existence and extent of the term (having regard, among other things, to any custom of the trade and any 
previous course of dealing between the parties". 
257 See, for instance, Stag Line Ltd v Tyne Ship Repair Group Ltd [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 211; George Mitchell 
Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] QB 284, 314. In Stag Staughton J commented: "I would have been 
tempted to hold that all the conditions are unfair and unreasonable for two reasons: first, they are in such 
small print that one can barely read them; secondly, the draughtsmanship is so convoluted and prolix that one 
almost needs an LLB to understand them. However, neither of those arguments was advanced before me, so I 
say no more about them". 
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terms (i.e., the definition of the subject matter of the contract, or to the adequacy of the 
price or remuneration, as against the goods or services supplied) would lose their 
exemption and be subjected to judicial review for fairness if they are not in plain and 
intelligible language.258 In recent years the Law Commission recommended in its report 
that it should be possible for a contract term to be found to be unfair principally or solely 
because it is not transparent.259 The commission produced a Draft Unfair Contract Terms 
Bill, which was published in its report, and proposed that in determining whether a term is 
"fair and reasonable" it should be assessed according to the extent to
nt.260  
Kuwaiti law should take these legislative solutions into consideration and 
expressly prohibit the use of complex language in consumer contracts by introducing a 
general duty of transparency and attach specific sanction to its breach to deter 
professionals from abusing their right to contrac
 non-transparent terms ineffective.261  
In conclusion, the existing regime for the control of unfair terms as outlined in the 
KCC will remain inefficient and deficient as long as it seeks to remedy the adhering 
party’s economic weakness and continue to disregard his knowledge weakness. The 
absence of ex ante protection measures contributed to the failure of the present control 
regime as it merely seeks to regulate substantive unfairness. Any future reform of the 
 
258 The House of Lords in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank [2002] 1 All ER 97 in the 
context of its discussion of the regulations and the principle of good faith highlighted the importance of the 
proper use of language and style in contract drafting. Lord Bingham said at para 17: "Openness requires that 
the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. 
Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer".  
259 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292 Cm 6464, 
Scot Law Com No 199), 2005 , para 3:102. 
260 Ibid. at Annex A, Clause 14(1). 
261 Administrative bodies can direct professionals to use or avoid certain terminology to make agreements 
more accessible to ordinary consumers. The Office of Fair Trading in the UK, for instance, issued guidance 
on unfair terms in consumer contracts and warned that reference to technical vocabulary, such as indemnity 
and statutory rights, should always be avoided because they would have onerous implications of which 
consumers are likely to be unaware. See section IV of the Unfair Terms Guidance: Guidance for the Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, OFT 311, OFT, September 2008. 
87 
 
ontrol system of unfair terms in Kuwait should combine both procedural and substantive 
.4 Adhesion contracts as interpreted by the courts: A conceptual problem 
ing 
party to 
ulated in the above articles 
                                                           
c
elements in order to restore contract equilibrium. 
 
2
2.4.1 The dichotomy between the rule of law and its application 
 
The regulatory framework for protection against unfair contract terms in the KCC is 
defined in the context of adhesion contracts in articles 80–82.262 The adopted approach for 
the control system is rather simple and straightforward. The code requires the satisfaction 
of two conditions in a contract to be regarded as an adhesion contract and, hence, qualify 
for protection against unfair terms: (i) the contract must be pre-drafted by the offeror, and 
(ii) the adhering party is prevented from negotiating the terms. In order for the adher
be protected against unfair terms, he must expressly request judicial intervention, 
otherwise the court is proscribed from reviewing the unfair terms of its own accord.263  
Although these articles can, to a limited extent, provide consumers with protection 
against unfair terms, the restrictive interpretation of the concept of adhesion contracts by 
the courts and jurists succeeded in narrowing their scope considerably to encompass a few 
contracts only. They prescribe additional features in order to consider a contract an 
adhesion contract, namely the offer must relate to goods or services of an essential need, 
the offeror is a monopoly whether in fact or law, the monopoly makes its offer on general 
terms. However, when the concept of adhesion contract as artic
 
262 Art. 80 KCC provides: "It does not preclude the existence of the contract if acceptance comes in the form 
of adherence of one party to the will of another by the delivery to a pre-drafted and non-negotiable model 
agreement prepared by the offeror". Art. 81 KCC provides: "If the contract is concluded by way of adhesion 
and includes unfair terms, the court may, at the request of the adhering party and in accordance with the rules 
of equity, amend the terms to alleviate unfairness or relieve the adhering party from their application even if 
he is aware of their existence. Any agreement to the contrary of this provision shall be deemed null. Art. 82 
KCC provides: "In adhesion contracts, doubt shall always be construed in favour of the adhering party". 
263 It is noteworthy that even if the adhering party makes such a request, the court jurisdiction remains 
discretionary and, therefore, depending on its understanding, the court may refuse to amend the contract in 
favour of the adhering party; see Art. 81 KCC. 
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l-established fact in courts’ decisions and in the 
n 
sted with the judicial and jurisprudential theory of adhesion contracts, there is a 
noticeable division between the rule of law and its application.  
The researcher believes that the judicial and the jurisprudential approach towards 
the concept of adhesion contract is not only incorrect and contrary to the spirit of the code, 
but also outdated, impractical and deprives weak parties from the protection they deserve. 
If the present regime for the protection against unfair terms is to be corrected, then the first 
step should be to disassociate the protection against un
ion contracts and attempt to reconceptualize the theory to address the weakness of 
the adhering party regardless of the type of contract.  
In the following pages an attempt is made to sketch out the judicial and 
jurisprudential theory of adhesion contracts (hereinafter ‘the traditional theory’) and to 
discuss why the researcher believes it is erroneous. This is followed by an outline of the 
new trend in Ar
of its adoption. 
2.4.2 The traditional theory of adhesion contract 
 
The failure of the protection regime against unfair terms in the Kuwaiti law can largely be 
ascribed to the meaning the courts and jurists gave to adhesion contracts, which narrowed 
the application of the theory. It is a wel
writings of legal scholars264 that in order for a contract to be regarded as an adhesio
contract, three characteristics must exist: 
                                                            
264 In scholastic writings, see Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, pp. 294–295; Solaiman Murkus, p. 183; Al-Sayed 
Omran, The Protection of the Consumer during the Formation of the Contract (Alexandria, Monshat Al-
Maaref 1986) (in Arabic), p. 27; Abdulmonem Faraj Assada, p. 77; Said Abdussalam, Contractual Balance 
in Adhesion Contracts (Cairo, Dar Alnahdha Alarabia 1998) (in Arabic), p. 37, Abdulrasol Abudlredha and 
Jamal Al-Nakkas, p. 78; Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 179. Examples of judicial cases are Com App No. 770/94, 
19/12/1994; Com App No. 142/95, 27/11/1995; Civ App No. 10/85, 27/3/1985; Com Adm App No. 1024/89, 
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ii. The monopoly makes its offer on general ter
 
What follows is a discussion of each charact
 
2.4.2.1 Essentiality of the good or service 
 
The assumption under the principle of freedom of contract is that the contract is a true 
reflection of the parties’ common contractual will because negotiations over the 
contractual terms allow the parties to structure their deal in a manner that satisfies each 
party. In contrast, the contracting paradigm in adhesion contracts deviates from this 
principle due to the absence of the negotiation phase in which the stronger party imposes 
his terms on the adhering party. Therefore, the adhesion contract is seen as an exception to 
this principle because of the absence of contractual freedom and lack of real choice. This is 
why some theorists suggest that consent in adhesion contracts is a form of compelled or 
economic coercion, as pointed out earlier.265 However, it would seem that traditional 
theorists believe that lack of choice can only occur when the good or service the adhering 
party is seeking is essential to his living; in other words, they correlate the notion of 
coerced consent with the notion of es
 only in the context of coerced consent as a result of the adhering party’s need to 
acquire an essential good or service. 
What is an essential good or service? According to traditional theorists, in order 
for a good or service to be essential it has to be indispensable and necessary for the 
livelihood of individuals. Indispensability of the good or service simply means that 
 
14/11/1989; Com App No. 428/89, 5/12/1989; Com. Cass. No. 217/95, 24/11/1996; and Com. Cass. No. 
 
101/89, 2/11/1998. 
265 See the discussion on the nature of consent. 
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individuals cannot live without the good or the service or could, but with great 
difficulty.266 In some cases the courts refer to the notion of "harm" as a criterion to 
distinguish between essential and non-essential goods; the good can only be regarded as 
essential if its deprivation causes harm to the public.267 The classical examples of a good 
or service provided in the literature are water, electricity, telephones, tr
l and labour.268 Because the lives of individuals depend on these goods or services, 
they have to get them even if the contract terms are unfair or burdensome.269 
The traditional theorists view essentiality from an objective perspective in the 
sense that the good or the service should not only be indispensable for few individuals or 
for a particular group of individuals, but for the public as a whole.270 Therefore, if a certain 
good or service is essential for a group of individuals but not for the public, then it falls out 
of the scope of their theory of adhesion contracts and, hence, do not qualify for protection 
against the unfair terms. However, the traditionalists’ perspective on the state of 
essentiality is not static, and may change from time to time and fro
g to the needs of the society. Therefore, the circumstances of the adhering party 
could also be determining factors in the meaning of essentiality.271  
Determination of whether a good or a service is essential is a factual matter that 
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court and cannot be revised by the 
Kuwaiti Cassation Court.272 This means that if th
service to be of an essential nature, then the Cassation Court does not have the 
authority to challenge the lower court’s decision.  
 
266 See the cases and writings cited in the beginning of this section (section 3.4.2). 
267 Com App No. 428/89, 5/12/1989 
268 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 295; Com App No. 142/95, 27/11/1995, as an example. 
269 Al-Sanhuri, ibid. 
270 Ibrahim Abu Allail, nt. 1 p. 179. 
271 Hassan Gemei, The Effect of Inequality between Contractors on the Contract Terms, p. 104. 
272 The Cassation Court in Kuwait is a pure legal court and does not review the facts of the case. It can only 
render the lower courts’ decisions for procedural and legal errors in case of breach, misapplication or 
misinterpretation of the law (Art. 152 of Law No. 38/1980 concerning Civil and Commercial Procedure). 
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In the researcher’s opinion, the requirement of essentiality can no longer be 
maintained because it is flawed and raises the following problems:  
 
 This classical understanding of adhesion contracts is influenced by the old theory 
of adhesion contract that dominated Western legal thought (especially in France 
and the US) which ties adhesion and standardisation of business terms to 
monopoly and abuse of economic power.273 The legal writings in the first half of 
the twentieth century show that the predominant ideology was that the strong 
party manages to dictate its own terms not only by virtue of its superior economic 
position, but also because it provides essential commodities for the individual’s 
needs.274 While this argument was valid in the 
control the supply of necessary goods and services, it can no longer be maintained 
with the opening and liberalisation of markets where several competitive 
businesses provide essential goods and services. 
 The concept of adhesion contract was principally created to address the economic 
weakness and lack of bargaining power of the consumer. Therefore, its main 
purpose is to confront traders’ abuse of their right to contract and rebalance the 
undertakings of the parties. Yet, the requirement of essentiality can deprive the 
 
273 See the discussion above, p. 7 et seq. It seems the Arab judiciary and jurisprudence remain faithful to the 
opinion of the early scholars, in particular Al-Sanhuri and Assadda, who defined the conceptual framework 
for adhesion contract and examined its characteristics as it were in the first half of the twentieth century. Al-
Sanhuri (often described as the father of the Arab civil law) was the first contract law jurist to deal with 
adhesion contracts in his compendium on civil law and Al-Saddah, who composed the first thesis on 
adhesion contracts in 1946. The works of these two esteemed scholars appear to have been influence by the 
dominant legal thought in France with respect to adhesion contract in the middle of the twentieth century. 
They cited French authors such as Saleilles, Missol and Saint-Remy, who all provided analysis of the 
adhesion contracting paradigm as it was prior to the 1950s. The concept of adhesion contracts in French 
jurisprudence, however, has evolved significantly since the development of consumer protection movement 
in 1970s to adopt a more relaxed concept of adhesion contracts that emphasises the ability of the superior 
party to impose his conditions rather than the satisfaction of the three above mentioned features. The French 
courts frequently intervened to control unfair terms in adhesion consumer contracts, even if the contract does 
not satisfy all the criteria of adhesion contract and the protection no longer associates adhesion contracts with 
monopoly. See, for example, Jacques Ghestin, Traité de Droit Civil—La Formation du Contrat (3rd edn, 
Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence 1993) at para 94 et seq. See also Art. 35 of the law 78–23 of 10 
January 1978 (now Art. L-132-1 et seq. of the Consumer Code of 1993) which provided protection against 
unfair terms regardless of whether or not the good or service is essential. See also, Hugh Beale and others, 
pp. 789–792. 
274 Abdulmonem Faraj Assada, p. 64. 
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consumer of his right to protection in cases where his economic weakness is 
clearly manifested on the sole ground that the object of the 
essential. Thus, tying the notion of adhesion to the essentiality of the object of the 
contract is not accurate, as consumers may adhere to the unfair terms even if the 
object of the contract is not for the satisfaction of an urgent need. 
 Additionally, besides the consumer’s economic weakness, another aspect of 
weakness has emerged in modern times by virtue of scientific and techno
advancements and that relates to information asymmetry and lack of knowledge. 
The rigidity of the classical theory of adhesion contracts fails to deal with this 
aspect and makes the law futile in protecting consumers in most contracts. 
 The premise of the classical theorists engenders a paradox. Although the object of 
some contracts falls outside the conceptual fram
n
widely accepted as a classical example of adhes
 
2.4.2.2 The offeror has a monopoly whether in law or in fact 
 
nd feature of adhesion contracts, according to the traditional theory, is that the 
offeror must be in a monopolistic position, whether legal or factual, or is at least in a 
dominant position that leads to limited competition.  
In the traditional theorists view, the offeror’s monopolistic position enables it to 
stipulate and impose the terms on the adhering party for lack of com
to review its terms. Therefore, the adhering party is in no position to refuse the 
 
275 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri. 295; Abdulmonem Faraj Assada, p. 212. Similarly, the Kuwaiti courts in a 
recent decision, Com App No. 770/94, 19/12/1994, considered a credit card agreement (Diners Club) to be an 
example of adhesion contracts where it is only an alternative payment system and does not fall within the 
purview of the classical categorisation of the traditional theorists of essential services. 
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 presented because the offer relates to the satisfaction of an essential need that 
cannot be substituted by any other professional. 
The traditional theorists’ requirement of monopoly as an essential aspect in 
adhesion contracts raises a number of comments. 
First, the requirement of monopoly in adhesion contracts is superfluous and 
unnecessary. The theory of adhesion contracts was primarily created to counter the 
economic weakness of the adhering party which allows the offeror to dictate the terms and 
refuse to discuss them by virtue of its monopolistic position. Thus, the rationale for 
protection in adhesion contracts is not the idea of monopoly itself, but rather the effect that 
monopoly engenders which, contrary to the principle of freedom of contract, allows one 
party to dominate the whole transaction. Therefore, the protection against unfair terms 
should not be limited to contracts entered into with monopolies and should be expanded to 
include any situation where the contractual freedom of the adhering party is absent. In 
addition, binding the use of adhesion contract to monopoly is m
on practice in the market, even by small businesses, to use standard contracts to 
facilitate transactions. In contrast, adhesion contracts may be used even if the stipulator is 
not economically superior such as in the case where a bank seeks to print some material 
and agrees to abide by the terms the printing company offers. 
Secondly, the effect of monopoly in the view of the traditional theorists is, it 
seems, not only the elimination of the adhering party’s bargaining power due to his inferior 
economic position, but also his deprivation of freedom of choice because monopoly 
restricts new competitors from entering the market to provide substitutes or offer better 
contract terms.276 Therefore, their view can be analysed in terms of two elements: (i) 
economic and (ii) legal, and their integration is a requisite for a contract to be regarded as 
an adhesion contract. The economic element is the superior
 
276 Abdulmonem Faraj Assada notes that there is almost a consensus on the requirement of monopoly, and 
further adds that the monopoly must be apparent and last for a long period, p. 58 et seq.; Atef Abdulhamid 
Hasan, p. 66.  
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element 
or bargaining position in the form of a monopoly.278 The Arab 
jurists w
 because it inflicts harm on society and deprives the public 
is the absence of negotiation in the form of unilateral setting of the terms. The 
economic superiority of the stipulator should not be measured by reference to the adhering 
party, but rather by the supplier’s market size and share, which has to be so large, to the 
extent that it dominates the market and stifles competition. 
Thirdly, by requiring the supplier to be a monopoly, the traditional theorists insist 
on the historical origin of adhesion contracts which has already been abandoned long ago. 
Studies conducted on adhesion contracts in the Western world during the first half of the 
twentieth century linked their emergence as a new contracting mechanism to large-scale 
monopolistic enterprises that found it economical to use standard form contracts to supply 
mass demands for goods and services.277 Thus, when the early commentators sought to 
identify the main features that characterised the contract of adhesion, they noticed that the 
stipulator enjoyed a superi
ho investigated the theory echoed the features as presented, primarily, by French 
jurisprudence at that time. However, subsequent studies on adhesion contracts have not 
attempted to develop the theory according to the changes that have taken place in the 
market and in the society. 
Fourthly, Arab jurists’ insistence on the association between the notion of 
monopoly (ihtikar) and essential commodity finds its roots in Islamic jurisprudence where 
Muslim jurists require the possession of an essential commodity by a trader in order to 
recognize the existence of monopoly.279 However, monopoly in Islamic law (fiqh) has a 
different connotation: it means hoarding of goods and arises when a trader collects and 
stores an essential commodity in anticipation of an increase in price. Islam forbids such 
practice and bans its formation
                                                            
277 See the discussion on the characteristics of adhesion contracts in section 2.2 of this chapter. 
278 Marcel Planiol and Georges Ripert, pp. 136–137; Arthur Lenhoff, p. 481.  
279 Mohammad Abdulthaher Hussain, p. 50. 
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iling themselves of basic necessities.280 Modern Arab legal scholars seem to have 
been influenced by this understanding and sought to establish an Islamic basis for the 
notion of monopoly despite the difference in meaning of the term in contemporary 
economics and in Islamic law. 
Fifthly, the problem with terms such as monopoly and dominant position is that 
courts and jurists have resonated them for over a half a century without explaining their 
connotations in full. From the cases cited above and the writings of the jurists on adhesion 
contract, one can generally deduce that the traditional theorists divide monopoly into two 
types: (i) legal and (ii) factual. The connotation of the first type should not pose any 
difficulty in Kuwaiti law because it is already mentioned in the Kuwaiti Constitution, in 
Art. 153, which provides: "No monopoly shall be granted except by a law and for a limited 
period". Furthermore, Art. 152 of 
t on natural resources or a public service.281 Thus, legal monopoly is an exclusive 
licence granted by the government to a person to exploit a natural resource or to provide a 
utility service. In contrast, factual monopoly arises when a firm controls a market that does 
not feature legal restraint to entry. 
However, monopoly is an economics term and can only be thoroughly understood 
with reference to microeconomics and, if it is to be defined, it should be with reference to 
economics. However, when the term as defined in econom
uwaiti courts in the context of adhesion contracts, one can conclude that the 
judicial understanding of monopoly is rather unclear and perplexing. To illustrate this, 
monopoly needs to be defined from a microeconomics perspective and the courts’ 
treatment of the concept needs to be assessed.  
 
280 What constitutes a basic necessity is subject to dispute. There are three views regarding the issue. One 
 that monopoly exists with respect to any commodity the people need, the hoarding 
 and Monopolistic Actions (Kuwait, Kuwait University Press 
abic), p. 7. 
view is that monopoly cannot arise except with respect to food. The second view adds clothes next to food 
and the third view holds
of which would inflict harm. See Hosni Abdeldayem, p. 127 et seq. 
281 See also, Ahamad Al-Melhem, Monopoly
1997) (in Ar
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e substitutes.283 It is a market structure where one trader 
accounts
tion contract on 
the grou
indeed a monopoly but these two views diverge on whether it was a legal monopoly or a 
In microeconomics, monopoly means absence of competition and total absence of 
competition in pure economic terminology occurs when there is a "perfect (or pure) 
monopoly". 282 Perfect monopoly exists when a person is the sole supplier of a commodity 
for which there are no clos
 for all the industry sales of a certain good or service. Therefore, it is characterized 
by the existence of a single seller; absence of close substitutes of the commodity it offers; 
the seller is a price maker (i.e., possesses considerable control over the price); and it has no 
immediate competitors because it is protected by barriers that prevent potential competitors 
from entering the market.284 
However, when one looks at the courts’ decisions with respect to adhesion 
contracts, the conclusion could be reached that the courts almost in all cases refrained from 
defining monopoly, and in some cases it gave the meaning of monopoly another 
construction, creating confusion as to what monopoly really means. Here a prominent case 
can be cited to support this argument.  
In 1989 the High Court of Appeal in Kuwait dismissed an appeal to alleviate 
unfair terms relating to the unilateral change of prices in a mobile subscrip
nds that the service provider, the Mobile Telecommunications Company (MTC), 
was not a monopoly on the grounds that its establishment decree did not grant it the licence 
to monopolize the market, despite the fact that it was the exclusive provider of a mobile 
telephony service.285 The conclusion of the court which denied the monopolistic nature of 
the company’s activity triggered dispute and criticism among academics.  
Two opinions suggest that the court erred in its decision and that the company was 
                                                            
282 Campbell McConnell, Stanley Brue and Sean Flynn, Microeconomics: Principles, Problems, and Policies 
(19th edn, McGraw-Hill/Irwin 2012), p. 195. 
283 Ibid. 
284 Campbell McConnell, Stanley Brue and Sean Flynn. 
285 Com App No. 428/89, 5/12/1989.  
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factual monopoly. The first view286 regards MTC as a factual monopoly because even 
though it was the exclusive telecommunications operator in the country at that time, its 
establishment decree stated expressly in Art. 3 that the operation licence did not grant the 
company a monopoly or a concession.287 In contrast, the secon
 was indeed a legal monopoly, regardless of what Art. 3 of the company’s 
establishment decree expressly provided because the government had granted the 
company, through legislative apparatus, the exclusive right to provide mobile telephony 
service since 1983, which gave it 100% control over the market.  
It seems to the researcher that the second view is more consistent with the logical 
interpretation of the company’s establishment decree and the purposes of its promulgation, 
that is, the set-up of a telecommunications operator as a sole provider of a mobile 
telephony service. It transcends the literal meaning of the provisions of the decree, 
especially Art. 3, to search for their actual meaning. Moreover, a closer look at Art. 153 of 
the constitution suggests that in order for a legal monopoly to exist, satisfaction of one 
condition is required; that is, monopoly is granted by law, which is the case. The decree 
gave effect to a legal monopoly that contro
oes not grant the company a monopoly does not change the fact that it was indeed 
a legal monopoly. Furthermore, a legal restraint on market entry existed, and it was not 
possible for other businesses to enter and compete in the telecommunications market 
without a licence from the government.289 
 
 Art. 3 of the Emiri Decree of 22/6/1983. After Kuwait had joined the World Trade Organization 
(hereinafter ‘WTO’), the telecommunications sector was liberalized and opened for competition. The sector 
in the country currently comprises three mobile operators. Nonetheless, the researcher believes that if the 
nature of mobile telephony contracts were be examined again by the courts, the courts would continue to 
refuse to regard them as adhesion contracts on the grounds of the absence of monopoly.  
286 Ahamad Al-Melhem, pp. 94–95. 
287
288 Tamah Al-Shemmari, ‘The Extent of Price Determination for Goods and Services under Sharia and 
Kuwaiti Law (in Arabic)’ Law Gaz 141, pp. 153–154. 
289 Although not clearly articulated, the courts seem to consider duopoly and oligopoly to fall under the 
purview of monopoly, that is, the market could be dominated by two persons or a small number of persons 
where each holds a large number of the market share. This is the case in the insurance sector where several 
companies compete in the market but the courts, nevertheless, consider their contracts to be adhesion 
contract, see Ahamad Al-Melhem (1997), p. 95. 
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96 which added new articles to the Commercial Code.290 
Art. 60 b
er 
question
answer to these questions and leaves the matter to the exclusive discretion of the courts.  
The concept of monopoly remained vague because neither the law nor the courts 
Another problem arises when one seeks to identify the courts’ concept of 
dominant position leading to limited competition. While the measurement of monopoly 
power in case of perfect monopoly is uncomplicated, neither the courts’ decisions nor the 
majority of scholarly writing on adhesion contracts explain when a business is in a 
dominant position. This can be ascribed to the fact that the concepts of "monopoly" and 
"dominant position" had not been statutorily regulated in Kuwait until 1996 with the 
introduction of Law No. 13/19
is B of the law established a criterion for the measurement of monopoly based on 
its "ability to control the prices of goods and services". The Explanatory Note to the law 
provides examples of the monopolistic position: (i) when the trader has no competitors, (ii) 
when the trader faces immaterial or limited competition or (iii) when the trader possesses a 
market share far greater than its competitors, unless it proves that it cannot control the 
prices or avoid competition.291 
However, this criterion can be criticized on the basis that it does not shed enough 
light on what "ability to control the prices" actually means.292 The law raises furth
s such as: What is the extent of the "ability to control the prices" and how it can be 
measured? What is the acceptable level of price change with which one can say a trader 
holds a monopolistic position? In competitive markets what is the size of the market share 
that the trader must possess in comparison to its competitors in order to declare that it 
holds a monopolistic position? The law, unfortunately, does not provide a conclusive 
explained when a trader comes into a monopolistic position and how its influence in the 
                                                            
290 The law was primarily introduced to foster competition and curb anti-competitive practices that have 
detrimental consequences for the operation of a free market. However, the importance of this law in the 
 legislation to measure monopoly power. For further 
ad Al-Melhem, ‘Privatisation and Protection of Investors in Kuwait : Reality and Ambition’ 
present discussion lies in the fact that it was the first
details, see Ahm
13 ALQ 178, pp. 178–199. 
291 See also Ahamad Al-Melhem (1997), pp. 88–89. 
292 Ibid., p. 96. 
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repealed with law No. 10/2007 Concerning the Protection of 
Competi
concept of monopoly has 
remained surrounded with ambiguity and uncertainty, with the absence of clear-cut rules 
s ability to control the prices in the market or his 
arket share in order to qualify for the description of monopoly. 
with private contracting, namely (i)  
                                                           
market can be measured. The shortcomings of Law No. 13/1996 were later realized and 
was, therefore, 
tion.293 The new law substituted the concept of monopoly with dominance and 
regarded a trader as being in a dominant position if it controlled more than 35% of the size 
of the market.294 
The discussion above shows that the courts’ decisions and scholarly writings on 
adhesion contracts lack a clear definition of the concept of monopoly, which has been 
largely left unregulated until the enactment of Law No. 13/1996. However, even with the 
enactment of this law, which attempted to set a criterion for the measurement of 
monopolistic position, except in the case of pure monopoly, the 
that determine how to calculate a trader’
m
 
2.4.2.3 The general nature of the offer 
 
The third feature of the traditional concept of adhesion contracts is the generality of the 
terms of the offer. This feature, in fact, echoes Art. 80 KCC which acknowledges the 
permissibility of using pre-drafted agreements as a modern contracting mechanism. 
Because it is practically impossible for businesses that supply mass goods or services to 
negotiate their contract terms with each and every consumer, they seek to conclude the 
contract with an alternative mechanism by reducing the process of contracting through the 
elimination of the three stages concomitant 
 
293 However, it is worthwhile mentioning that the law was primarily promulgated to satisfy Kuwait’s 
commitments to the WTO, which requires the existence of anti-monopoly laws and sufficient regulations that 
his article can also be criticized because it does not elaborate on 
guarantee effective protection of competition; see the Explanatory Note to Law No. 10/2007. 
294 Art. 1(d) defines dominance to mean: "a situation which enables a person or a group of persons work 
collectively directly to indirectly exercise control over a commodity market by possessing a percentage 
exceeding 35% of the size of that market". T
how a trader market share can be measured. 
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feror as opposed to private contracting.296 Abstraction of the offer 
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lders of the 
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ent of the generality of the offer is sufficient to regard a contract as 
an adhesion contract. It is consistent with the reading and spirit of the text of Art. 80, and 
                                                           
ality, (ii) negotiation and (iii) time. This can be achieved with the generalization of 
the offer so that these three stages can all be condensed into one stage by making the offer 
abstract, detailed and specific, and continuous.295 
First, the offer is prepared in an abstract manner and is addressed to an 
undetermined number of persons rather than to a specific person. The individuality of 
parties does not exist in mass contracts because the personality of the adhering party is 
insignificant to the of
the standardization of the terms for all those involved in this type of transaction as 
the commodity the offeror provides is intended to satisfy a public demand, such as gas, 
electricity and water. 
In addition, the generality of the offer assumes domination of contract formation 
by the offeror through the standardization of the terms of the offer by virtue of its economic 
and knowledge superiority. The effect of standardization is the elimination of the 
negotiation phase in which the offeror can prevent discussion, and impose the terms that 
reflect its interest and allow it to shift the allocation of risk on to the shou
r.297 Not only this, but with the utilization of standard contracts the offeror can 
facilitate the rationalization of managing its business by saving transaction costs, time and 
effort that has to be spent on drafting and discussions of individuals contracts. 
Thirdly, the offer in adhesion contracts is characterized by its continuity in the 
sense that it is not bound to a limited or a specific period, but rather it is valid for an 
unlimited number of transactions as this is consistent with the nature of mass contracts. 
The requirem
 
295 Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 178; Abdulmonem Faraj Assada, p. 66. 
296 Kessler commented: "The individuality of the parties which so frequently gave color to the old type 
contract has disappeared. The stereotyped contract of today reflects the impersonality of the market", p. 631. 
297 Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 178.; Abdulmonem Faraj Assada, p. 68. Al-Sadda further adds that the offer is 
usually complicated to the extent that it is incomprehensible to the normal person and is, therefore, rarely 
read.  
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nts aim to liberalize their 
economi
control system of unfair terms in Kuwait, then the first step towards reform should be the 
                                                           
should be the only requirement for the existence of adh
a
 
2.4.3 Towards a modern concept of adhesion contracts 
 
The main problem with the traditional theory of adhesion contracts is that it leads to the 
inevitable promotion of the principle of sanctity of contract and the stability of transactions 
at the expense of contractual justice. Its narrow conception limits the application of the 
theory and leaves out of its scope several types of contracts merely because they do not 
satisfy its rigid requirements. Today’s markets became more competitive as a result of the 
creation of the World Trade Organization, and governme
es and abolish monopolies. In addition, the developments in science and 
technology have made goods and services more sophisticated, and gave rise to consumers’ 
knowledge weakness in addition to their economic weakness.  
This is why many countries have deserted the old theory in favour of a new 
approach that is more consumer-biased. It has been pointed out by some that several 
jurisdictions have enacted legislation prohibiting the use of unfair terms in consumer 
contracts since the 1970s because of the consumer protection movement that swept the 
world.298 The present legislative trend, especially in European countries, towards unfair 
terms is to rebalance the undertakings in contracts concluded between professionals and 
consumers whenever the will of one party dominates the contract and imposes terms 
detrimental to the consumer.299 Thus, if one is to propose a legislative overhaul of the 
 
298 Among these countries are Sweden in 1971, Denmark in 1974, the German Federal Republic in 1976, the 
UK in 1977, France in 1978 and Austria in 1979; see Ewoud Hondius, ‘The Legal Control of Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts: Some Comparative Observations’ in Thierry  Bourgoignie (ed), Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts (Louvain-la-Neuve 1983), pp. 38–40. 
299 Art. 3 of the Directive provides: "A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be 
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer". The article 
constitutes the backbone of the unfairness test in the Directive and has been transposed verbatim into the 
internal legislations of several EU members, the UK is one example. See regulation 5 of the UTCCR.  
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ional feature that 
has not been expressly mentioned in the code should be rejected because it is an 
 from Art. 80 and lacks any proper statutory basis. 
 
                                                           
ment of the traditional theory of adhesion contracts and the establishment of a new 
framework for protection that takes into account the developments in modern contract law.  
A modern trend has emerged in recent years calling for the adoption of a more 
liberal concept of adhesion contracts that accommodates the necessities of consumer 
protection.300 The new trend focuses on the mechanism of concluding adhesion contracts 
rather than the causes for their existence, and requires the fulfilment of two criteria that 
could lead to the impairment of freedom of contract and suppression of private autonomy: 
(i) unilateral preparation of the contract terms and (ii) absence of negotiations.301 This 
understanding seems more consistent with the wording and the purpose of Art. 80 KCC as 
these two features are the only features that are explicitly provided by the code for 
existence of adhesion contracts. The code does not refer to monopoly or essentiality of the 
good or service as the traditional theorists require. Therefore, any addit
unjustifiable deviation
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The freedom to contract in contract theory remains of supreme importance. However, it is 
not without restrictions. The law gives individuals the freedom to arrange their own affairs 
by mutual agreement but, at the same time, provides means to redress any injustice that 
might arise out of the contract. The fact that the adhesion contract is monopolized by one 
of the parties who has stronger bargaining power exposes the adhering party to the risk of 
accepting unfair terms against his will. For this reason, the law has permitted the courts to 
intervene in favour of the adhering party and to eliminate the unfair terms. Therefore, 
 
300 Husam Al-Ahwani, ‘Consumer Protection in the Framework of the General Theory of Contract’ 
(Consumer Protection in Sharia and Law Conference, (UAE, 6-7 December 1998) (in Arabic). 
301 Husam  Al-Ahwani, Sources of Obligations (no publisher 1992) (in Arabic), p. 79; Mohammad Zahra, 
Sale of Buildings under Construction (Kuwait, Kuwait University 1998) (in Arabic), p. 96 et seq.; Ahmad 
Al-Refai, p. 8; Mohammad Abdulthaher Hussain, p. 52. 
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mer contracts as a 
discrete category of contracts, just like labour and tenancy contracts, to address their 
inherent weaknesses and protect them against the abuses of businesses.  
judicial review is one of the most important means of consumer protection against unfair 
terms. However, it has been presented in this chapter that the current concept of adhesion 
contract as regulated by the Kuwaiti Civil Code, and as adopted by the courts and jurists is 
unsuited to counter the problem of unfair terms in consumer contracts. On the one hand, 
the code lacks necessary measures to safeguard the adhering party’s consent and reinforce 
his position prior to the conclusion of the contract. On the other hand, the current 
prevailing understanding of adhesion contract that covers a few contracts only and 
excludes consumer contracts from its purview is contrary to the wording of Art. 80 and the 
regulatory trend of controlling unfair terms. It has been submitted that this understanding 
should be abandoned in favour of a more rational and liberal approach that adequately 
protects the adhering party whenever he is prevented from influencing the substance of the 
contract. Indeed, the scope of the concept of adhesion contracts should be broadened and 
be a general umbrella that protects weak parties in all non-negotiable agreements 
regardless of the type of the contract, whether consumer, tenancy, labour and so forth. 
However, to provide optimum protection for consumers the researcher believes that it is 
time to introduce consumer-specific regulation and to recognize consu
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Chapter Three: Discovering the Meaning of Unfair Terms in the KCC 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
For any control system of unfair terms to achieve an adequate level of protection, it not 
only requires the existence of a mechanism for controlling unfair terms, but also the 
effectiveness of such mechanism. The effectiveness of the mechanism depends a great deal 
on the clarity and certainty of the concept of contractual unfairness, and the existence of 
criteria for its assessment. The previous chapter was concerned with the problem of the 
definition of adhesion contract the courts have provided. This chapter will discuss another 
problem caused by the KCC and is related to the vagueness of the standard of contractual 
unfairness. Although the code has established, in Art. 81, a system for the protection 
against unfair terms and permits the courts to review unfair terms in adhesion contracts, it 
does not clarify how or when a certain contractual term can be labelled as unfair. 
Therefore, this chapter will attempt to formulate a standard of contractual unfairness 
consistent with the KCC drawing on comparative law.  
 
3.2 Problems associated with the concept of unfairness in the Kuwaiti Civil Code 
3.2.1  The ambiguity of the concept of unfair terms 
 
Certainty is crucial in law-making. One way to achieve this end is to establish clear notions 
of technical concepts to avoid potential ambiguities. Definitions and standards are 
important because they explain the ideology that underpins a certain legal concept, and 
serve as direction posts for the application of the rule of law and determine its scope. 
The first observation that can be made as to the regulation of unfair terms in Art. 81 
KCC is that it does not elaborate on the notion of contractual unfairness or the criteria for 
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its assessment.302 Whether or not a certain contractual term is regarded as being unfair 
depends, to a significant extent, on the meaning given to it. The lack of statutory standard 
of unfairness is a major cause of the weakness in the control system.  
Before attempting to define unfair terms, it is important first to provide a 
taxonomy of contractual terms to understand their position in the KCC in relation to other 
contractual terms. By terms is meant those provisions that the parties insert in their 
agreement to determine its content with a view to creating rights or obligations. 
 
3.2.1.1 Valid terms 
 
As a consequence of the theory of the autonomy of the will, individuals are free to decide 
the contract terms that best suit their interests.303 The code recognizes the parties’ freedom 
to include any term they assent to, unless it is against public order or good morals or not 
statutorily prohibited.304 Apart from these three restrictions there is no limitation on the 
parties’ contractual will. The general rule in contracts is that all consensual terms are 
principally permissible and enforceable except if the contrary is shown by one of the 
parties.  
3.2.1.2 Invalid terms 
 
In contrast to valid terms, the code declares the invalidity of certain contractual terms, 
although limited in number, by prohibiting their inclusion in contracts either explicitly, 
 
302 Art. 81 KCC reads: "If the contract is concluded by way of adhesion and includes unfair terms, the court 
may, upon the request of the adhering party and in accordance with the rules of equity, amend the terms to 
alleviate unfairness or relieve the adhering party from their application even if he is aware of their existence. 
Any agreement to the contrary of this provision shall be deemed null". 
303 Once the terms of the contract are agreed upon, then the contract generates a binding force because it is 
the expression of the parties’ free will. Art. 196 KCC provides: "Contract is the law of the parties; neither can 
individually revoke nor alter its rules except where permitted by agreement or statute". 
304 Art. 175 KCC. 
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such as terms stipulating an interest in loan agreements between non-merchants,305 or 
implicitly if the terms contradict statutory provisions, public order or good morals.306 
Invalid terms cannot be enforced because they do not actually exist from a legal 
viewpoint. Hence their invalidity can be declared by the court on its own motion without 
application by the parties. If the invalid term is separable from the rest of the agreement, 
then it alone will be invalidated without having an effect on the validity and the 
enforceability of the remaining provisions. The law gives the courts the authority to avoid 
invalidity by attempting to preserve the contract whenever possible from nullification by 
excluding the illegal pArt. Such act of judicial review is referred to as inqas (reduction of 
contract) whose purpose is to ensure the stability of transactions and to protect the 
expectations of the parties.307  
However, if the invalid term is inseparable from the contract or is indispensable to 
one party, then the entire contract will fall apart and be rendered void. The rationale behind 
this is that if the term is of special value to one of the parties, then this term is not merely 
an additional element in the contract, but rather is the "motivating cause" of the agreement. 
If the cause is illicit, then it will eventually lead to the nullification of the entire agreement 
as the contract is missing an essential requirement.308 
 
3.2.1.3 Unfair terms 
 
Pinpointing an accurate meaning for the concept of unfair terms is not an easy task. The 
absence of a definition in the code has blurred the dividing line between unfair terms, on 
the one hand, and valid and invalid terms, on the other. It appears from the wording of Art. 
 
305 Art. 745 KCC. 
306 The court has discretionary power to determine when a term breaches the law, public order or good 
morals.  
307 Ibrahim  Abu Allail, ‘The Scope and Conditions for the Reduction of Juridical Acts’ (1987) 11(2) JouroL 
11, p. 39. 
308 Art. 176 KCC states: "A contract is void when a contractor is obligated without a cause or for an illicit 
cause" 
107 
 
                                                           
81 that the code does not consider unfair terms always to be per se unlawful. Rather, their 
inclusion in contracts is generally permissible and ought to be complied with according to 
the principle of freedom of contract. However, because they render the contract 
inequitable, the code allows the courts to intervene and address the injustices they produce 
either by their attenuation or elimination. 
The principal provision in the code that deals with unfair terms is Art. 81 
concerning Contracts of Adhesion. It reads:  
 
"If the contract is concluded by means of adhesion and includes unfair terms, the 
court may, upon request from the adhering party, amend such terms to alleviate 
their unfairness or entirely relief him from them even if he was aware of such 
terms. All with what the rules of justice require. Every agreement to the contrary 
of this article shall be deemed void". 
 
The Explanatory Notes to the Civil Code comment on this article but without explaining 
their meaning. Rather, it adds more ambiguity to the concept by describing in a very broad 
language what would make contractual terms unfair: "if they are inconsistent with honour 
and integrity that should prevail in transactions or with what the observance of good faith 
requires".309 Unfair terms are mentioned again in Art. 784(b) relating to insurance 
contracts: "any of the following terms appearing in a policy of insurance shall be null: (b) 
any unfair term, the breach of which appears to have no effect on the occurrence of the 
insured risk". The code here expressly invalidates unfair terms but again does not explain 
their meaning.310 
 
309 Explanatory Notes to the Civil Code, p. 95. 
310 Unfair terms also appear to in two other statutes. In the Maritime Trade Code (Law No. 28/1980) in Art. 
272(4) Concerning Maritime Insurance where the wording is exactly the same as the wording in the 
aforementioned Art. 784(b) KCC. They are also referred to in Art. 60 (bis B) of Law No. 68/1980 concerning 
the Commercial Code, repealed with Law No. 10/2007 Concerning the Protection of Competition, on the 
abuse of dominant position which reads: "If a trader abuses its dominant position, the court may, upon 
request of the injured party, order compensation, amend the contractual unfair terms, or relieve him entirely 
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The omission of definition can be interpreted as a deliberate choice by the drafters 
as they realized the difficulty of formulating a succinct and precise definition appropriate 
for inclusion in the code, preferring to leave the task to the courts should the occasion 
arise. It seems there is a pattern in the Civil Code, though not absolutely consistent, to 
eschew definitions of legal concepts311 in favour of broad or abstract terminology, leaving 
it to the judiciary to fill in the gaps. This approach may find its reasoning in the fact that 
the drafters did not want to restrict the courts’ interpretative authority and bind them to one 
meaning, and preferred to leave them a broad margin of discretionary power to construct 
the notion of unfairness according to their own understanding and the circumstances of 
each case. In this way, the law is left flexible, permitting the courts considerable autonomy 
to deliver justice within the framework of the code. However, a survey of case law shows 
that the courts have repeatedly refrained from determining the meaning of unfair terms 
even when the end result is their nullification.312 
While it is true that abstraction of certain legal concepts in statutes may be 
necessary to give the courts some degree of latitude in interpreting the law and establishing 
precedents, absence of a clear definition of problematic notions would normally present 
two disadvantages. First, it renders the law uncertain until the courts build up a significant 
body of case law on the meaning of the concept; a process that could take a considerable 
length of time. Second, it opens the door to various, and possibly conflicting, meanings, 
especially in judicial decisions when coherence in judicial interpretation of complex legal 
concepts is necessary. 
Leaving the notion of unfairness undefined might lead to further negative 
outcomes. The notion of contractual unfairness in Kuwaiti law is relatively recent and had 
 
from such terms". The main purpose of this article is not to protect consumers, but to address unfair 
competition, and to ensure fair and free competition in the market by suppressing any anti-competitive 
conduct and abuse of dominant position by incumbent businesses. 
311 Such as, public order, good morals, good faith, integrity and fair dealing. 
312 In one of the few cases, the Court of Cassation annulled an "exclusion from indemnity clause" in the 
course of its review of an insurance contract on the grounds of it being unfair but did not delve into the 
meaning of the unfairness. However, the decision did state that the reason for the clause nullification was 
because it contradicted the gist of insurance and violated the public order, Com. Cass. No. 650/99, 9/4/2000. 
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not received much judicial consideration before the enactment of the code in 1981, and the 
possibility of developing a narrow notion of unfairness that limits the scope of protection 
cannot be completely ruled out.313 Therefore, legislative determination of the notion of 
unfairness is necessary to avoid any ambiguity or dispute that may arise as to its meaning. 
In other jurisdictions such as, the UK, France and Germany, judicial determination of the 
notion of unfair terms preceded the enactment of any regulatory legislation. The treatment 
of the notion of contractual unfairness was first assumed by the courts before legislative 
intervention took place where the courts had to eliminate unfair terms under the general 
principles of contract law. The courts’ attitude has led to the establishment of sound legal 
precedents and, subsequently, the development of a theory of unfairness over the course of 
several years, which was later incorporated into statutes.314 
The introduction of a comprehensive standard of contractual unfairness would 
also facilitate the categorisation of all unfair terms under the umbrella of one concept. That 
would not only enhance the weak contractual position of consumers against businesses, but 
also contribute to the certainty and clarity of the law, and the consistency of judicial 
decisions.315 Any reformation of the present control system of unfair terms in Kuwait 
should elaborate on the concept and standard of contractual unfairness to maximize legal 
certainty and effectiveness of protection.  
 
 
 
 
313 See also Gemei’s opinion in support of this argument, Hassan Gemei, The Effect of Inequality between 
Contractors on the Contract Terms, p. 247.   
314 For instance, this is the case in France, see Martin Ebers, ‘Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13)’ in 
Hans Schulte-Nölke, Christian Twigg-Flesner and Martin Ebers (eds), EC Consumer Law Compendium: The 
Consumer Acquis and its Transposition in the Member States (Sellier 2008), p. 209. 
315 A look at comparative law strengthens the researcher’s argument as several jurisdictions have already 
included a test for unfair terms in their national legislations. See, for example, Art. 3 of the Directive; 
Regulation 5 of the UTCCR in the UK; Art. 31 of the Belgian Act of 14 July 1991 on Commercial Practices 
and Consumer Information and Protection; Art. 35 of the French Law 78-23 of 10 January 1978; Art. 1437 of 
the Quebec Civil code; Section 9 of the German AGB-Gesetz 1976. 
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3.2.1.4 Doctrinal definitions of unfair terms 
 
The legal uncertainty created by the absence and ambiguity of the concept prompted some 
authors to analyse the concept and formulate a definition of unfair terms. Naturally, the 
definitions they proposed differ and there is no agreement on one definition. Despite the 
differences, it is noticeable that they all centre around the concept of imbalance that they 
create between the rights and obligations of the parties. These definitions can be separated 
into two categories: 
The first category includes definitions that address the question of unfairness from 
a pure contract theory perspective by focusing on general principles in contract law such as 
good faith, fair dealing, integrity, justice and public order. Some contract law theorists 
relied on these general principles to formulate a definition. Abdulbaqi, for example, 
proposes the following definition: "terms are unfair if they are contrary to the spirit of right 
and justice that should prevail in transactions".316 Another author embraces a similar 
definition: "unfair terms are those terms which contradict with honour, integrity and good 
faith".317 However, these definitions suffer from two problems. First, they are too generic 
as they are founded on principles that are required in all contractual relations. Second, they 
fail to provide an accurate sense of the concept of unfair terms because they merely negate 
the opposite.  
Other contract law theorists have been more conscious about the concept of 
unfairness, and articulated less generic definitions by emphasizing notions such as 
"contractual equality" and "excessive benefit"318 but without specifying the basis of 
unfairness. 
 
316Abdulfattah Abdulbaqi, The Theory of Contract and Unilateral Will (Cairo, Nahdhat Masr 1984) (in 
Arabic), p. 212. 
317 Ibrahim Abu Allail, 1998, p. 181. 
318 Unfair terms are those terms "imposed by the offeror on the offeree in a manner inconsistent with due 
contractual equality to achieve an extra benefit in comparison to the obligation he owes that result in a burden 
on the offeree that lack any benefit", Mohammad Al-Khatib, ‘The Judge’s Power of Amending the Contract 
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The second category of definitions deals with the concept of unfairness from a 
consumer law perspective, referring to objective criteria such "abuse",319 "excessive 
advantage",320 "contractual imbalance"321 and "superiority of contractual position".322 
Therefore, unfair terms have been defined as follows: 
 
1. Terms imposed upon a non-professional or a consumer by a professional through 
the abuse of his economic power in order to receive an excessive advantage.323 
2. Any pre-drafted term by a party possessing economic power to gain an extra 
advantage vis-à-vis the obligations of another party.324 
3. Terms that are imposed by a strong party by virtue of its economic power to 
achieve significant imbalance at the expense of the other party.325 
4. Another author describes unfair terms as terms that exist in contracts imposed by 
a more experienced and economically stronger party, and cause an imbalance 
between the rights and obligations in favour of the stronger party. 326  
 
These definitions are far more accurate than the definitions put forth by the 
contract theorists because they take into consideration three important elements: (i) the 
cause, (ii) the purpose and (iii) the effect of unfair terms. The cause is the inequality in the 
bargaining power between the parties, which distracts the offeree – usually a consumer – 
from any meaningful choice and prevents him from opposing the terms. The unfair 
character of the term becomes more evident when the contract is prepared by an 
 
under Yemeni, Egyptian and Islamic Laws’ ( (PhD thesis), Cairo, Aim Shams University 1992) (in Arabic), 
p. 217. 
319 Al-Sayed Omran, p. 27 et seq. 
320 Ibid., Hassan Gemei, The Effect of Inequality between Contractors on the Contract Terms, p. 308; Ahmad 
Al-Refai, p. 115l; Said Abdussalam, p. 50; Omar Abdulbaqi, p. 402; Ahmad Rabahi, ‘The Protection of the 
Contract Parties against Unfair Terms’ ( (PhD thesis), Wahran University 2008) (in Arabic), p. 27. 
321 Ahmad Al-Refai, ibid.; Omar Abdulbaqi, ibid., Ahmad Rabahi, ibid. 
322 Ahmad Al-Refai, ibid., Said Abdussalam, ibid.; Omar Abdulbaqi, ibid. 
323 Al-Sayed Omran, p. 32. Clearly this definition has been influenced by the French definition of unfair 
terms and reproduced the definition as set out in the loi Scrivener of 1978. 
324 Said Abdussalam, p. 50.  
325 Omar Abdulbaqi, p. 403.  
326 Hassan Gemei, The Effect of Inequality between Contractors on the Contract Terms, p. 308.  
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economically superior and more competent party, such as a business. The purpose of 
imposing unfair terms is the excessive advantage the offeror seeks to derive at the expense 
of the consumer. The end result of imposing unfair terms would be an imbalance between 
the rights and obligations of the parties. 
 
3.2.2 The objective scope of protection against unfair terms 
 
One of the problems of the control system of unfair terms as articulated in the KCC lies in 
the objective scope of the application of the rules. As explained in the previous chapter, the 
protection against unfair terms is confined to those terms contained in adhesion contracts. 
The objective scope of adhesion contracts as defined in Art. 80 of the code is determined 
by two limitations: (i) the advance preparation of the terms and (ii) the impossibility of 
negotiation. In this respect, the code and the Directive follow the same approach to 
defining the objective scope of protection, since both pieces of legislation restrict the scope 
of application to non-negotiated terms that have been formulated prior to the formation of 
the contract.  
The discussion of the regulation of the objective scope of protection in the 
Directive is useful because it makes it possible to highlight the deficiencies in the Kuwaiti 
law and offer proposals on how to improve protection against unfair terms. 
 
 
3.2.2.1 A comparison between the approach in the Kuwaiti law and European Union 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
 
Although both pieces of legislation do not define what constitutes a non-negotiated term or 
contract, they differ in two respects. First, the scope of the Directive is broader than the 
Kuwaiti law because it does not limit the protection to adhesion contracts only, but rather 
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extends the protection to cover "pre-formulated individual terms" prepared by the 
professional even for a single transaction only, provided that it was not negotiated.327 
Unlike the Kuwaiti law, the Directive provides a greater level of protection by taking a 
term-by-term approach whereby the court will assess each term independently. 
Second, the Directive is more specific and accurate than the Kuwaiti law because 
it uses the notion of ability to influence the terms as a basic criterion to determine when a 
term has been individually negotiated. 
Art. 3(2) of the Directive provides that the term "shall always be regarded as not 
individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has 
therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term, particularly in the context of 
pre-formulated standard contracts".328 Here, the Directive establishes the notion of 
inability of the consumer to influence the substance of the term as a fundamental criterion 
to determine when a term has not been individually negotiated. It supports this criterion by 
introducing an absolute presumption329 of absence of negotiation whenever the term has 
been formulated in advance and gives standard contracts as a typical example. These two 
elements are cumulative requirements that must be met together in order to recognize 
absence of negotiation.  
In contrast, according to Art. 80 of the Kuwaiti Civil Code, the defining features 
of adhesion contracts are the advance preparation of the terms and absence of negotiations. 
Art. 80 provides: "It does not preclude the existence of the contract if acceptance comes in 
the form of adherence of one party to the will of another by the delivery to a pre-
formulated and non-negotiable model agreement drafted by the offeror [emphasis added]". 
                                                            
327 Art. 3(1). The "pre-formulated individual terms" is a new category of contract terms created by the 
Directive. It lies between standard terms and negotiated terms, and was mainly introduced to soften the 
strong German opposition of the commission’s proposal to control the scope, which was intended to catch all 
unfair terms, whether negotiated or not; see Hans-W Micklitz, ‘German Unfair Contract Terms Act and the 
EC Directive 93/13’ in Julian Lonbay (ed), Enhancing the Legal Position of the European Consumer (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law 1996), p. 180.  
328 Art. 3(2). 
329Mário Tenreiro and Karsten Jens, ‘Unfair terms in Consumer Contracts: Uncertainties, Contradictions and 
Novelties of a Directive’ in Hans Schulte-Nölke and Reiner Schulze (eds), Europäische Rechtsangleichung 
und Nationale Privatrechte (Nomos 1999), p. 235. 
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It appears from the wording of Art. 80 that the notions of pre-formulation and non-
negotiation of the contract are two requirements that must be satisfied together in order to 
recognize the state of adhesion. The satisfaction of one requirement is not sufficient 
because the code perceives the adhesion contract as a one-sided contract in which the 
contractual process is concentrated in the hands of the offeror in the form of dictation of 
terms of the contract and refusal to negotiate.  
The KCC does not elaborate on the meaning of pre-formulation or non-
negotiation, but the courts330, supported by most commentators331, developed a narrow 
interpretation of the two notions in the context of their discussion of adhesion contracts as 
to mean absolute independence of the offeror in formulating the terms and total absence of 
negotiation. They view the adhesion contract as a mass contract in which the offer is 
characterized by its generality, which requires standardization of the terms to cover a 
multitude of transactions and is addressed to an undetermined number individuals. This 
means that the adhering party always plays a negative role where his choice is limited to 
either accepting or refusing the terms.  
However, Art. 80 and its interpretation by the courts and commentators raises 
some questions and criticism over the lack of clarity of the wording and its ambiguity. 
 
i. The meaning of pre-formulation 
 
Similar to the Directive, the code uses the notion of pre-formulation of terms as one of the 
criteria to define the adhesion contract and the Directive uses it to discern non-negotiated 
terms. However, the scope of application of the Directive in this respect is wider than the 
code where it is sufficient for a single term to be drafted in advance in order to enjoy 
protection against that particular term, even if the rest of the agreement is negotiated. 
                                                            
330 In courts’ decisions; see, for example, Com. Cass. No. 217/95, 24/11/1996; Com. Cass. No. 101/89, 
2/11/1998. In scholarly writings see Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 293; Ibrahim Abu Allail, p. 179.  
331 See the discussion in chapter three in relation to the traditional theory of adhesion contracts. 
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Compared to the Directive, the Kuwaiti Code requires the whole contract to be prepared in 
advance in order to regard it as an adhesion contract and so qualify for protection against 
unfair terms. 
The wording of Art. 80 reveals a weakness in its legal drafting as it requires that 
the contract be drafted by the offeror. The literal interpretation of this article suggests that 
the contract has to be issued by the offeror himself otherwise it would not be regarded as 
an adhesion contract. Accordingly, it could be argued that if the contract is drafted or made 
on the basis of a third party contract, such as a trade association, then it would not be an 
adhesion contract because the offeror did not initiate the terms himself. This is a loophole 
that can be exploited by businesses to circumvent judicial control of unfair terms by using 
a model contract formulated by a third party. 
Issues such as this caused hot debate in Germany prior to the implementation of 
the Directive where it was questioned whether terms presented by the offeror, but drafted 
by third parties such as notaries and solicitors, could be regarded standard terms and, 
consequently, subject them to the AGB-Gesetz. The question had not been resolved until 
the implementation of the Directive, which extends the protection to any pre-formulated 
contract drafted by any party other than the consumer. This rule has been incorporated into 
section 310(3)(1) of the BGB, which contains a presumption that attributes all standard 
terms to the business party unless the consumer puts them forward.332 The significance of 
this amendment is that terms drafted by a third party are automatically imputed to the 
professional.333 
In Kuwaiti law there is a need to close this loophole and remove the requirement 
of formulation of the terms by the offeror and ascribe all terms to the offeror whether 
drafted by him or a third party. 
                                                            
332 "Standard business terms are deemed to have been presented by the business party, unless they were 
introduced into the contract by the consumer".  
333Norbert Reich, ‘The Implementation of Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts in 
Germany’ 5 ERPL 165, p. 165, at p. 169; Hans-W Micklitz, pp. 180–181.  
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A further related observation is that the use of phrases such as ‘drafted’ and 
‘model contract’ in Art. 80 entail that the terms must be in writing in order for the adhering 
party to invoke protection; this puts the applicability of the law on oral terms under 
suspicion. It might be rare, but not inconceivable, for some terms to be oral and presented 
to the adhering party on a take-it-or-leave it basis, such as when a seller stipulates orally 
over the telephone that the consumer agrees to exempt or limit his liability. It is unclear in 
this case whether protection would cover orally incorporated terms in adhesion contracts 
with the explicit reference of Art. 80 to written terms. 
In this regard the Directive provides a greater level of protection by embracing a 
broad concept of pre-formulated terms to cover even unwritten terms. Although a first read 
of the Directive may suggest that it is only applicable to written terms because it, too, uses 
the phrase ‘drafted’ in Art. 3(2), a closer look at its preamble reveals otherwise.334 Recital 
11 to the Directive emphasise the fact that "The consumer must receive equal protection 
under contracts concluded by word of mouth [emphasis added] and written contracts". This 
means that the phrase ‘drafted’ in the Directive should be understood in a wider sense to 
mean ‘prepared’.335 Similarly, in the UK the courts adopt a broad notion of ‘standard form 
contract’ and held that the phrase was wide enough to include any contract whether 
"wholly written or partly oral".336 
 
ii. Non-negotiation versus inability to influence the terms 
 
The two pieces of legislation approach the effects of the idea of absence of negotiation 
from different perspectives. If one looks at the Kuwaiti law, one finds that it is content with 
the idea of the refusal of the offeror to negotiate the contract as a criterion to determine 
 
334 E. H. Hondius, ‘The Reception of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts by Member 
States’ 3 ERPL 241, p. 242, at p. 246. 
335 It could be said that the reason for using the word ‘drafted’ is that it is hard nowadays to imagine a non-
written consumer contract as almost all such contracts are written in advance by professionals and Recital 11 
was inserted to avoid any dispute that might arise regarding the coverage of oral terms. 
336 McCrone v Boots Farm Sales Ltd 1981 SC 68 per Lord Denpark at 74. 
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absence of negotiation. It has been judicially and scholarly established that the notion of 
non-negotiation in Art. 80 means total absence of negotiation because the generality of the 
offer in adhesion contracts necessarily entails making it on take-or-leave basis.337  
In this regard, the Directive is more precise than the Kuwaiti law as it uses the 
notion of inability to influence the pre-formulated terms as a determining factor in the 
absence of negotiations. The significance of this specificity is that mere discussion of the 
terms is not sufficient to declare a term as having been individually negotiated, but rather 
the adhering party must have an opportunity to change the terms in order to acknowledge 
the existence of negotiations.  
Indeed, the requirement of refusal to negotiate the contract in Kuwaiti law is 
susceptible to abuse by professionals and facilitates the circumvention of the rules. The 
offeror may enter into fictitious negotiations with the consumers or agree to make minor 
amendments to the contract to purport that the contract has been negotiated and evade 
control of the unfair terms.  
Nonetheless, in either piece of legislation it is not always easy to draw a clear line 
and distinguish between negotiated and non-negotiated terms because the two ideas tend to 
overlap with each other. In practice the distinction becomes tricky and less clear, such as 
when the professional explains the terms for the consumer and offers him a free choice 
between two or more pre-formulated terms. On the one hand, it could be argued that the 
terms fall within the scope of the law as the terms have been pre-formulated in advance 
but, on the other hand, a contrary view may be advanced that although the terms are indeed 
pre-formulated, the consumer has been able to influence the substance of the term by 
deciding what to include.338 
In the context of the Directive more complex questions may arise, such as what 
sort of negotiation activity is required to purport that a term has been individually 
 
337 See the cases cited in chapter three, section 4.2 and the commentaries cited in their favour. 
338 For this meaning, see Nicholas Lockett and Manus Egan, Unfair terms in Consumer Agreements : The 
New Rules Explained (Wiley 1995), p. 22. 
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negotiated? And what level of influence must be exerted in order to achieve individual 
negotiation?  
Obviously, one cannot speak of individual negotiation and exclusion of protection 
when the two parties engage in negotiation but ultimately disagree and leave the terms 
unmodified because the consumer has not been able to exert any influence. However, is it 
possible to regard a term as being individually negotiated if the two parties argued over a 
particular term and the consumer manages to reformulate the term but the modified term 
achieves the same effect or is detrimental to his interests? Or when the consumer has been 
offered a genuine opportunity to influence the disputed terms but declines to take an 
action? 
It is difficult to answer these abstract questions but a look at national traditions 
may  make it possible to find proper answers. If one looks at the case law in Germany and 
the UK one could say that the courts take a fairly strict approach to the interpretation of the 
notion of individual negotiation.339  
In Germany there was a discussion about what constitutes an individually 
negotiated term. Some academics hold that in order for a standard term to be considered as 
being individually negotiated, it is not sufficient that it is negotiated and amended but 
rather the amendment has to be in favour of the consumer in order to admit that it has been 
individually negotiated.340 Other authors, however, adopt an opposite view and maintain 
that nothing prevents an unmodified standard term from being negotiated as the parties 
may thoroughly discuss the term but ultimately agree to leave it as is.341  
If the these two views are compared, it seems to the researcher that the second 
opinion carries more weight than the first because the contractual wills of the negotiating 
parties may coincide without the terms having to be amended if the terms turn out to be 
 
339 It is worthwhile noting that in France the Code de la Consommation offers comprehensive protection 
against unfair terms, and does not differentiate between negotiated and non-negotiated terms; see Art. L132-
1.  
340 Mário Tenreiro and Karsten Jens, p. 237. 
341 Ibid. 
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reasonable and fair to both parties. This opinion can be supported with reference to a 
decision by the BGH where it established that for a term to be regarded as being 
individually negotiated, the customer must fully understand the terms and appreciate their 
legal consequences.342 This decision implicitly means that a term can be deemed 
individually negotiated even if it was not modified, so long as the receiving party 
negotiated the terms and freely accepted their legal ramifications. However, this does not 
mean that the BGH takes the notion of individual negotiation lightly. In an earlier decision 
it emphasized that mere opportunity to influence the terms does not amount to individual 
negotiation and when the consumer is offered a choice between specific alternative terms, 
then this does not mean that he has influenced the terms.343 
 Similarly, in the UK the courts appear to impose a high threshold for accepting a 
term as having been individually negotiated344 and in some cases they appear to adopt a 
stricter notion of individually negotiated terms than their German counterparts. 
In UK Housing Alliance Ltd v Francis345 the Court of Appeal ruled that the 
opportunity to consider and negotiate the terms does not mean that the terms have been 
individually negotiated, even if the consumer was offered professional advice by his 
solicitor. Citing Regulation 5(2)346 of the UTCCR, the court held that "this therefore 
imposes an absolute prohibition on a finding of individual negotiation if there has not been 
an ability to influence the substance of a term. It does not follow from the existence of the 
ability to influence the substance of a term that the term has, in fact, been individually 
negotiated. That is still a matter for the supplier to prove".347 This means that neither the 
negotiation activity alone nor the mere existence of ability to influence the substance of the 
 
342 BGH,19 May 2005, NJW 2005, 2543. 
343 BGH, 3 December 1991, NJW 1992, 50. In this case the BGH held that free choice between alternative 
terms on its own does not render a term individually negotiated.  
344 Christian Twigg-Flesner, ‘The Implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive in the United 
Kingdom’ 8 CIL 235, pp. 235–61, p. 245. 
345 UK Housing Alliance (North West) Ltd v Francis [2010] EWCA Civ 117. 
346 The wording of Regulation 5(2) is comparable to its origin in Art. 3(2) of the Directive. It provides: "A 
term shall always be regarded as not having been individually negotiated where it has been drafted in 
advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term". 
347 At [19], per Longmore LJ. 
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term are sufficient in regarding a term as having been individually negotiated. The courts 
have frequently refused to embed the notion of ‘standard terms of business’ under UCTA 
in a rigid formula and interpreted it in a rather flexible manner. Here are some examples: it 
was held that the negotiated general conditions of contract remained standard if untouched 
by the negotiation,348 that small variations of the standard terms will not make the terms 
negotiated,349 and that the contract is essentially still made on the defendant’s standard 
terms if amended but the amendments are ‘narrow and insubstantial’ or ‘immaterial’.350 
Such a pro-consumer protection position may sometimes seem unfair to the 
professional such as when he offers the consumer a real opportunity to review and 
influence the content of the terms but the consumer willingly accepts the burden of the 
terms. It could be argued that in this case the consumer does not deserve protection against 
these particular terms because the requirement of ability to influence the terms was present. 
However, the case law in England shows that the courts will look closely at whether the 
consumer had a real ability to influence the terms.351 Some commentators have argued that 
this is the most reasonable interpretation of Art. 3(2).352 This meaning resonated in the 
statement made by the Law Commission on Unfair Terms in its Consultation Paper in 
which it maintains that "for any negotiations to be meaningful, the customer must 
genuinely understand the proposed term and must be able to assess its possible impact".353 
Therefore, as in the situation in Germany, amendment of terms is not always necessary in 
determining whether a term has been individually negotiated as the matter is of fact and 
degree, and the consumer is protected against pre-formulated terms, so long as he has not 
been able to exert influence over them. Consequently, where the consumer had such an 
ability and the professional was open to amending the pre-formulated terms, then the terms 
 
348 St Albans City and District Council v International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481.  
349 Pegler Ltd v Wang (UK) Ltd [2000] EWHC Technology 127. 
350 Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 984. 
351 Mindy Chen-Wishart, Contract law (Oxford University Press 2012), p. 413. 
352 Geraint Howells and Thomas Wilhelmsson, EC Consumer Law (Aldershot, Ashgate 1997), p. 92. 
353 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (A Joint Consultation Paper 
Law, Commission Consultation Paper no 166/Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper no 119), (2) 2002 
at para 4.50.  
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can be regarded as having been individually negotiated regardless of whether or not they 
have been amended, provided that the consumer had a real possibility to influence the 
substance of the terms. Of course, the burden of proof is incumbent on the professional 
who has to show that such genuine opportunity was offered.354 
All in all, both in Germany and in the UK the notions of negotiation and influence 
have to be interpreted in a restricted way, and unmodified terms should never be regarded 
as having been individually negotiated without qualification as this contradicts with the 
general rule as provided in Art. 3(2) of the Directive.355  
 
iii. Assessment of the limitation of protection to non-negotiated terms 
 
While it is accepted that individually negotiated terms are less likely to be unfair than 
standard terms, there may, nonetheless, be plausible reasons for extending the control to 
negotiated terms. The consumer may not always genuinely understand the terms and assess 
their possible impact due to incomprehensibility, inaccessibility, inequality of bargaining 
power and so forth. Therefore, should the present objective scope of protection against 
unfair terms as articulated in the Kuwaiti law and the Directive be broadened to cover 
negotiated terms too?  
It is worthwhile mentioning that the original proposal of the Directive was 
prepared with a view to covering all consumer contracts whether standardized or 
negotiated.356 However, owing to the divergences between the control models and their 
functions in the Member States,357 strong disagreement ensued between the delegates and 
prevented them from reaching consensus on the scope of application. Germany, in 
 
354 Art. 3(3) of the Directive puts the burden of proof of negotiation on the professional. 
355 The use of the word ‘always’ implies that pre-formulated terms are, as a general rule, not negotiated.  
356 See the Commission’s 1990 proposal OJ 1990 C243/3. 
357 According to Wilhelmsson and Willett, the regulatory models of unfair terms in the Member States can be 
categorised into four basic models: (i) the ‘no particular problem model’ that was implemented in the UK 
prior to the enactment of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, (ii) the ‘standard form contract model’ that 
was introduced by the German Standard Terms of Business Act of 1976, the ‘consumer protection model’ 
(iii) followed by the French Loi Scrivener 1978, and (iv) the ‘general fairness model’ contained in the Nordic 
contract law; see Thomas Wilhelmsson and Chris Willett, p. 165 et seq. 
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particular, opposed the extension of the application of the Directive to negotiated terms as 
its law, the AGB-Gesetz 1986, was restricted to standard contracts only. It has also been 
argued that the extension of the scope of control to cover individually negotiated terms 
would represent a ‘drastic restriction’ of the principle of private autonomy and the 
economic functions of the freedom of contract.358 This argument is based on the idea that 
the contract is viewed as an important tool that enables private law subjects to participate 
in the market to achieve a correct result without regulatory incursion by the state. Hence, 
any limitation on the freedom of contract would dilute the free market economy and lead to 
its proper functioning being hampered.359 
One would have to admit that from a pure contract law perspective the extension 
of the objective scope of protection conflicts with the principle of freedom of contract. 
However, the removal of the negotiated terms restriction may be seen from a consumer 
protection perspective as a very desirable development. Several countries, such as 
Denmark, France, Sweden and Finland, include negotiated terms within the scope of their 
laws without any problems.360 In the UK the Law Commission reviewed the exclusion of 
negotiated terms and proposed that the protection regime should apply to both negotiated 
and non-negotiated terms because of the considerable uncertainty over the notion of 
individually negotiated terms and failure of the consumer to realize the implications of 
negotiation.361 Similarly at the EU level, following a Green Paper launched by the 
commission in 2007, a clear majority of the Member States supported extending the scope 
to negotiated terms and argued that individual negotiation of terms did not put the 
 
358 Hans Erich Brandner and Peter Ulmer, ‘The Community Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts: Some Critical Remarks on the Proposal Submitted by the EC Commission’ 28 CML Rev 645, p. 
652. This particular article had a considerable influence on the final draft of the Directive, see Law 
Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach?, issues 
paper, 25 July 2012 , p. 23.  
359 Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New 
Approach?, issues paper, 25 July 2012 , p. 23. 
360 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (A Joint Consultation Paper 
Law, Commission Consultation Paper no 166/Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper no 119), (2) 2002, 
para 4.53. 
361 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292 Cm 6464, 
Scot Law Com No 199), 2005, para 3.50 et seq.  
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consumer in a stronger position, since the professional possessed more knowledge and 
expertise in negotiating terms.362 
The exclusion of individually negotiated terms from control, according to some, 
has a minimal impact on consumers because almost all consumer contracts are pre-
formulated.363 However, this view disregards the fact that professionals may abuse the 
exemption and bring about negotiations over the terms to evade the application of the 
rules. Even if the consumer willingly accepts negotiation of the terms, he may not be able 
to assess the implications of negotiation because of his inherent weakness, be it economic, 
legal or intellectual. Even if he is able to appreciate the full implications of the terms, it is 
unlikely that he will have sufficient bargaining power to amend them. In practice 
businesses see the exemption of negotiated terms as a loophole.364 It has been empirically 
proven that businesses frequently attempt to manipulate negotiations so as to avoid having 
their unfair terms subject to control,365 and there are cases where the terms were purported 
to have been individually negotiated but the influence of the consumer was 
able.366  
In sum, if the purpose of the law is to protect the weak party in the transaction, 
then it is doubtful that a negotiation process based on the imbalance of the bargaining 
power of the parties can ensure a fair result. In the researcher’s opinion this is sufficient 
reason to extend the objective scope of p
 
 
362 Report on the Outcome of the Public Consultation on the Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer 
Acquis, Commission Staff Working Paper , para. 4.7 
363 Hugh Beale, ‘Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’, 
p. 239 
364 See OFT Response to the Law Commission Issues Paper, OFT 1456, November 2012 , pp. 47–48. 
365 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292 Cm 6464, 
Scot Law Com No 199), 2005, para 3.156.  
366 OFT 1456, p. 47. 
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3.3 Attempt to find a basis for the concept of unfairness in the KCC 
3.3.1 In search of the meaning of unfairness 
 
Since Art. 80 of the code concerning unfair terms does not spell out a definition of 
unfairness nor provide criteria to judge when a particular term is unfair, one might be able 
to determine their meaning by looking into other provisions in the code. A viable solution 
would be to deconstruct the phrase ‘unfair’ (or ‘abusive’ if translated literally) and attempt 
to find its root within the code, if any. A quick search in the code reveals that the notion of 
‘abuse’ is referred to in the regulation of the theory of abuse of rights in Art. 30. Owing to 
the similarity of the terminology used, the theory of abuse of rights might help to explain 
the meaning of unfair (or abusive) terms. However, before venturing into this task, it is 
useful first to review the notion of contractual fairness from the perspective of the French 
law, since the Kuwaiti approach of protection and control of unfair terms has been 
influenced by the French theory of adhesion contracts. 
 
3.3.2 A comparative review of the concept of unfairness 
 
The concept of unfair terms under the Kuwaiti law is comparable to that adopted in the 
French law by reason of the fact that the theory of adhesion contract was developed by the 
French judiciary. The explanatory note367 to the KCC explains that the regulation of theory 
was inspired by the Egyptian Civil Code in (Art. 100) which, in turn, was heavily 
influenced by the French judicial and jurisprudential understanding of the theory.368 
Therefore, it seems that the Kuwaiti legislator intended to transplant the theory and the 
underlying concepts that it is grounded on. It is useful, therefore, to explore the French law 
in an endeavour to determine the meaning of unfair terms.  
 
367 See pp. 93–94. 
368 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 293 et seq.  
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In determining what constitutes an unfair term, the French law adopted an 
approach that revolved around the notion of excessive advantage that the professional 
sought to derive at the expense of the consumer. This is evident in Art. 35 of the Act of 
1978,369 also known as loi Scrivener, which defines unfair terms as "those terms imposed 
on the consumer by an abuse of economic power (abus de la puissance économique) by the 
professional to derive an excessive advantage (avantage excessif)".370 The law establishes 
a causal link between these two criteria as the excessive advantage cannot be gained 
without the abuse of the economic power. Some have held that these two elements are 
cumulative and must be satisfied together before a clause can be characterized as unfair 
(abusive).371 However, some authors have contended that in practice the requirement of 
abuse of economic power seems superfluous because the two criteria tend to overlap with 
each other as the excessive advantage is always presumed to have been imposed through 
the abuse of economic power.372 
In spite of the inclusion of these two criteria in Art. 35 of the loi Scrivener, it can 
be said that the concept of unfair terms was surrounded by some vagueness and 
imprecision. The two criteria served as a general definition or guidance for the 
Commission of Unfair Terms (Commission des Clauses Abusives) which then may 
recommend to the Council of State the prohibition or amendment of certain unfair 
terms.373 No contractual term could be classed as unfair until the commission declared it 
so. In practice this contributed to the proliferation and continued use of unfair terms in the 
 
369 Loi no 78-23 du 10 janvier 1978 sur la protection et l’information des consommateurs de produits et de 
services. Art. 35 became Art. L132-1 of the Consumer Code of 1993 (Code de la Consommation) which was 
amended in 1995 as a result of the implementation of the Unfair Terms Directive.  
370 Hélène Bricks, pp. 10–11. 
371 François Terré, Philippe Simler and Yves Lequette, p. 339. 
372 Jean Calais-Auloy, ‘Les Clauses Abusives en Droit Français’ in Jacques  Ghestin (ed), Les Clauses 
Abusives dans les Contrats Types en France et en Europe, actes de la table ronde du 12 décembre 1990 
(Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 1991), p. 117; Paolisa Nebbia, ‘Unfair Contract Terms’ in 
Christian Twigg-Flesner (ed), The Cambridge Companion to European Union Private Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2010), p. 222. 
373 Art. 38. 
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French market.374 The failure of the law to prevent and control unfair terms can partly be 
ascribed to the broad definition of unfair terms which proved to be problematic and flawed 
for the reasons cited b
First, the association between the imposition of unfair terms and the abuse of 
economic power is not accurate as the professional may not be in a superior economic 
position but is still able to impose unfair terms on the consumer due to the latter’s lack of 
knowledge or need, for example. Conversely, the professional may be a large corporation 
and occupy a dominant position in the market but is unable to impose unfair terms because 
of its fear of losing its customer base or damaging its reputation.375  
This shows that the criterion of the abuse of economic power as provided by Art. 
35 seems to lack clarity, especially where the law has avoided giving a definition for the 
phrase ‘economic power’ and disregarded including a test for its measurement. It is, it 
seems, for this reason that the French Consumer Code 1995 omitted the criterion of abuse 
of economic position and required the satisfaction of one criterion only.376 However, the 
removal of reference to ‘abuse of economic power’ has been said to have little significance 
as the Court of Cassation377 ruled that the abuse of economic power was inherent in all 
unfair terms in contracts concluded between professionals and consumers.378 
Secondly, it is not clear what ‘excessive advantage’ denotes nor how it should be 
measured as the law has not provided a mechanism that can be used to assess the 
 
374 Some authors estimated that thousands of unfair terms in consumer contracts were, in effect, even four 
years after the promulgation of the law. Jean Calais-Auloy and Luc Bihl, ‘Valuation of Legislative Attempts 
on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts in France’ in Thierry Bourgoignie (ed), Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts : Legal Treatment, Effective Implementation and Final Impact on the Consumer (Louvain-la-
Neuve 1983). 
375 Atef Abdulhamid Hasan, p. 99; Hassan Gemei, The Effect of Inequality between Contractors on the 
Contract Terms, pp. 270–271. 
376 The 1995 amendment is considered a significant improvement on the control system of unfair terms in 
France. It refined the cumbersome double test of unfairness by eliminating the ‘abuse of economic power’ 
criterion and substituting the criterion of ‘excessive advantage’ with ‘significant imbalance’, thus creating 
more legal certainty. Marie-Odile Thiry-Duarte, ‘Rapport sur l'application Pratique de la Directive 
93/13/CEE en France’ (The Directive on `Unfair Terms', Five Years Later- Evaluation and Future 
Perspectives Conference, Brussels, 1-3 July 1999); Sophie Vigneron, ‘The Implementation of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive in France’ 8 CIL 105, p. 105. 
377 Cass civ (1), 6 January 1994, D. 
378 Hugh Beale and others, pp. 816–817; François Terré, Philippe Simler and Yves Lequette, p. 340. 
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advantage the professional generates at the expense of the consumer. Against this 
omission, it seems that the nature of the excessive advantage should be understood 
generally to include any advantage that creates unjustified imbalance in the rights and 
obligations of the parties and not confine it to monetary advantages only. Moreover, this 
criterion creates an additional issue concerning how the excessive advantage should be 
measured. Should the assessment be made in relation to the term in question in isolation of 
the rest of the agreement or it should be made in the light of the whole contract;379 in other 
words, in determining the unfairness, should the term that caused the imbalance be 
considered alone or in the context of the rest of the obligations the contract imposes on 
each party? It seems to the researcher that the second interpretation is more appropriate 
because while it is true that one term when read alone may manifest imbalance between the 
performances of the parties, the whole contract may, upon analysis, reveal terms that are to 
the benefit of the counter-party, which makes the contract balanced on the whole. So, 
while on the face of it, a disclaimer of warranty clause may look unfair, under certain 
circumstances it could be considered to be fair if compared to another contractual clause, 
such as when the stipulator offers a reduction in price in exchange for the disclaimer of 
warranty clause.380 However, the evaluation of the fairness or unfairness of a particular 
clause may prove to be difficult in some situations, such as when the compared obligations 
are of a different nature.381 
The third remark that can be made on the French regulation of the test of 
unfairness is that the law did not specify which party bore the burden of proof of showing 
the unfairness. Was this omission an error? Apparently not. The silence may be interpreted 
according to the general principles in civil procedure which provide that the burden of 
 
379 Hassan Gemei, The Effect of Inequality between Contractors on the Contract Terms, p. 269. 
380 See also, Hélène Bricks, p. 113. 
381 The question of evaluation of the imbalance and the difficulties it engenders is addressed in Art. 4 of the 
Directive. Paragraph (1) provides that the process of assessment of a an unfair term should take into account 
the nature of the goods or services, the time of conclusion of the contract, the circumstances attending the 
conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is 
dependent. This article was transposed into the French consumer code in Art. L132-1.  
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proof is incumbent on the party who is making the allegations; the consumer in this case. If 
this inference is correct, then the law places a high burden on the consumer who has to 
prove not only the excessive advantage, but also the superior economic position of the 
professional.  
 
3.3.2.1 The theoretical basis for the test of unfairness in French law 
 
The use of the phrases ‘abus de la puissance économique’ and ‘clauses abusives’ and their 
connotations in the loi Scrivener caused a division of opinion among academics as to what 
is meant by ‘abus’ in Art. 35, which the law used as a basic test for determining the state of 
unfairness. 
It has been advanced by some that the notions of abusive clauses and abuse of 
economic power are associated with the notion of abuse of the situation (l’abus de 
situation) which involves the exploitation of the consumer’s weak position by virtue of the 
professional’s superior economic position which enables him to impose abusive terms in 
his favour.382 Thus, if the professional imposes unfair terms on the consumer by using his 
dominant position in the market or by taking the consumer by surprise and initiates the 
contract negotiations such as in doorstep selling, then he is abusing the position he is 
enjoying. Here, the abuse of position can be compared to the notion of coercion, which 
vitiates the consent of the offeree because of his lack of meaningful bargaining power and 
is bound to accept the terms of the contract due to his ignorance or desperate need for the 
product offered by the professional.383 However, other scholars have rejected this 
argument on the basis that the regulation of the notion of abuse of the situation was 
intended to deal with special cases.384 It is not possible, therefore, to deduce a general 
legislative prohibition of abuse of a situation from these specific rules because the notion 
 
382 Jacques Ghestin, ‘L’abus dans les Contrats’ 2 Gaz Pal 379, p. 379. 
383 Ghestin, cited in Ahmad Al-Refai, p. 217; Ahmad Rabahi, p. 352. 
384 Such as, the Ordinance of 1 December 1986, which prohibited the abuse of a dominant position in the 
market and Art. L. 121-21 of the Consumer Code 1993 concerning Door-Step Sales to Consumers. 
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of the abuse does not amount to a discrete theory that can be extended and applied from the 
specific cases it was intended to confr
Other authors, however, argue that the notion of clauses abusives in Art. 35 has its 
roots in the traditional theory of abuse of rights (abus de droit), which is essentially 
concerned with placing limitations on the exercise of rights. Therefore, according to this 
view, abuse of the contractual rights occurs when the professional is apparently acting in 
accordance with his right to draft the contract but is, in fact, abusing the exercise of such 
right to generate unjustified excessive advantage. However, envisaging the imposition of 
unfair terms as an abuse of right has been opposed on the grounds that the theory of abuse 
of right is not applicable in contractual matters and that the unilateral drafting of a contract 
is not an exercise of a subjective right, but is rather an exercise of a de facto power.386 In 
addition, it has been asserted that the theory is too subjective to have a place in the theory 
of contract and leaves an overabundance of discretion in the hands of the judiciary.387 
 
3.3.3 The pure concept of unfairness in the KCC 
 
Unfair terms in the KCC can literally be translated as ‘abusive terms’. The word abuse, in 
Arabic ta’assuf or  فسعت, has a robust link to the word right and refers to the excessive or 
wrongful exercise of a right that resulted in the violation of the rights of others. When the 
offeror in adhesion contracts imposes an abusive term on the consumer, he is actually 
abusing his right to formulate the terms of the contract. This is apparently the reason 
behind subjecting unfair terms to judicial review.388 The notion of abuse is not mentioned 
in the code outside the context of adhesion contracts, except in Art. 30 concerning the 
regulation of the doctrine of abuse of rights. This article provides that the exercise of rights 
 
385 Abbas Karimi, p. 212; Ahmad Rabahi, pp. 352–353. 
386 Ghestin, p. 601 cited in Al-Refai, p. 217. 
387 David Angus, ‘Abuse of Rights in Contractual Matters in the Province of Quebec’ 8 Mcgill LJ 150, p. 
154.  
388 This conclusion can be deduced from the wording of the, The Explanatory Notes to the Civil Code; see p. 
95. 
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is unlawful if the holder deviates from the purpose of the right or the social function it 
intends to fulfil. The article enumerates four instances or criteria that can be employed to 
judge whether or not an exercise of a right has been abusive: (i) if the right is exercised to 
generate an unlawful interest, (ii) if the right is exercised with the sole intention of causing 
damage to others, (iii) if the interest desired is disproportionate to the damage caused to 
others and (iv) if the exercise of right inflicts gross and exceptional damage on others. 
However, the  conception of abusive exercise of rights in the code is not confined to these 
four criteria as the code cites them as examples of abuse of rights and sets a general 
standard of abuse that all right holders must not exceed when exercising their rights, that 
is, the teleology of the right and its social function.  
The doctrine of abuse of rights was regulated in the code to sanction the 
abnormal, excessive or abusive use of a right. The code, as with most modern codes in 
other jurisdictions, does not acknowledge the absolute nature of the rights of the individual 
and subject their exercise to certain limitations and to the supervision of the courts.389 A 
landlord is entitled to enjoy and dispose of his property as he deems fit. However, he is not 
allowed to exercise his right by, for example, erecting a wall on his property solely to 
block his neighbour’s window, otherwise he would be abusing his right of property. The 
KCC acknowledges the concept of relativity of rights and proscribes abusive exercise of 
rights; for example, it provides in Art. 810 that the proprietor is entitled to use his property, 
exploit it and dispose of it according to the law. Any harm the proprietor inflicts on others 
in the course of his wrongful use of his right gives rise to liability to remedy the injured 
party on the basis of delictual liability.390 
The theory of abuse of right is essentially the creation of the courts and legal 
theory. Its natural cradle was the right of property because such right has always been 
 
389 Ibid, p. 26. 
390 Art. 227. 
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regarded an absolute right.391 Nowadays, is undisputed that all individual rights are relative 
and the law holds the proprietor to be delictually liable for any harm his unlawful use of 
the right may cause to others. The classical examples in the Arab legal literature of the 
doctrine of abuse of rights are mainly associated with property rights.392 However, the 
theory is not limited to property law and extends to all areas of law. It has been recognized 
and applied to rights arising from various sources, such as labour relations in the case of 
unfair dismissal, landlord–tenant agreements in the case of the removal of a tenant without 
just cause, intellectual property rights and abuse of procedural rights in litigation.  
If this is the case, could the notion of unfair terms in the KCC be founded on the 
theory of abuse of rights? If yes, what criteria can be used to ground the liability of the 
professional and what regime of liability does the abuse of contractual right give rise to: is 
it contractual or delictual liability? 
Before attempting to answer the questions above, it would be helpful to shed some 
light on the regulation of the theory in the Kuwaiti Civil Code. 
 
3.3.4 The regulation of the theory of abuse of right in the KCC 
 
The basic principle in the theory of abuse of rights is simple. It provides that, as a general 
rule, the exercise of a right is a legitimate act so long as the right holder does not exceed 
the limits set by the law. If the right holder exceeds the normal exercise of the right, then 
he is abusing his legal rights, making him liable to repair the damages he causes with his 
act. 
The concept of abusive use of rights is not a creation of modern jurisprudence. 
While a general principle of abuse of rights had not been defined until the beginning of the 
twentieth century, traces of the concept can be found mainly in the field of property law in 
 
391 Jean Limpens, Robert Kruithof and Anne Meinertzhagen-Limpens, ‘Liability for One's Own Act’ in 
Andre Tunc (ed), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol XI (Mohr 1979), pp. 2–235. 
392 See, for example, Ibrahim Abu Allail, The Theory of Right (Kuwait, Dar Alkutub 1997) (in Arabic), p. 
328 et seq.  
132 
 
                                                           
Roman law,393 ancient French law394 and in Islamic law.395 The courts in France played a 
central role in the development of the theory and limiting the excessive exercise of 
rights.396 The principles of the theory were later shaped at the hands of jurists such as 
Josserand, Saleilles and Duguit,  who challenged the idea of absolutism of rights.397 The 
evolution and application of the theory has grown significantly since the beginning of the 
twentieth century and has been accepted as a viable recourse against the unlawful use of 
rights. The continual development of the theory by the courts eventually translated into 
legislation, and it now permeates public and private law alike.398  
Josserand’s thesis, of all the proponents of the abuse of rights theory, had the 
greatest influence on the Kuwaiti drafters, who endorsed the idea of relativity of rights, 
their social function and that the abuse of rights should be judged against the function it 
was meant to serve. The influence of the social function theory is evident in the Kuwaiti 
legal system and occupies paramount position. It amounts to a general constitutional 
principle and has been embodied in the Kuwaiti Constitution in art (16) which provides: 
"Property, capital and labour, are fundamental constituents of the social structure of the 
 
393 H. C. Gutteridge, ‘Abuse of Rights’ 5 CambLJ 22, p. 31. 
394 Henri Mazeaud and Andre Tunc, Traité Théorique et Pratique de la Responsabilité Civile, Délictuelle et 
Contractuelle, vol Vol 1 (5th edn, Paris, Montchrestien 1975), para 556, p. 646.  
395 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 696. 
396 The French courts sanctioned the abusive use of rights as early as 1855 to disallow the exercise of 
property rights to injure a neighbour (Court of Colmar, 2 May 1855, D.P. 1856.2.9). However, its recognition 
and development has been hampered as the legal thinking during this time was imbued with the spirit and 
ideals of the French revolution. 
397 The theory was met with strong opposition in the nineteenth and twentieth century. French scholars, such 
as Planiol ,argued that the term ‘abuse of rights’ was self-contradictory (contradictio in terminis) and does 
not convey any rational meaning. Rights, in his view, are always in conformity with the law and cannot be 
abused, and once they are abused, they cease to exist. In addition to Planiol, Ripert argued that the emphasis 
on the social orientation of rights and law against individualism would deprive the individual from his 
subjective rights. For a review of these views, see Vera Bolgar, ‘Abuse of Rights in France, Germany and 
Switzerland: A Survey of a Recent Chapter in Legal Doctrine’ 35 LaLRev 1015; Zimmermann and 
Whittaker, Good faith in European Contract Law: Surveying the Legal Landscape, in Reinhard Zimmermann 
and Simon Whittaker, ft. 166 and ft. 169, p. 34. 
398 The term ‘abuse’ is widely used in public and private law, such as ‘abuse of rights’, ‘abuse of power’, 
‘abuse of dominant position’, ‘abuse of corporate assets’ and ‘abusive (unfair) terms’; also see Vera Bolgar, 
‘Abuse of Rights in France, Germany and Switzerland: A Survey of a Recent Chapter in Legal Doctrine’, pp. 
1018–1023. 
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state and of the national wealth. They are all individual rights with a social function as 
regulated by the law."399  
The importance of the social function of rights has been confirmed in Art. 30 
KCC, which ties the legality of the exercise of private rights to the ends the individual 
seeks to fulfil. The code does not envisage private rights as ends in themselves, but rather 
means to achieve social objectives. Accordingly, private rights exist only to serve social 
interests and legal prerogatives are recognized so long as they are exercised in accordance 
with their social purpose. Any exercise that departs from the legitimate function of the 
right or is contrary to the social objective of the right should not be protected by the courts. 
  
3.3.5 The criteria for determining the abusive exercise of rights 
 
The Kuwaiti theory of abuse of rights is founded on the notion of fault and employs the 
behaviour of the reasonable person with an average intelligence as an objective test for the 
measurement of such behaviour. The holder of the right should observe and not deviate 
from such behaviour.400 If he deviates from such behaviour, then his deviation is 
considered a fault that will attract liability, even if the exercise of the right did not go 
beyond the bounds of the right.401 The holder of the right may seem to do exactly what he 
is entitled to, while, in fact, he is using his rights contrary to their social aims. 
The theory of abuse of rights is founded on delictual liability on account of the 
fact that abuse represents a fault that gives rise to liability and entitles remedy. The code 
broadens the scope of fault to encompass not only illicit, but also abusive acts. However, 
an exercise of rights will not be regarded as abusive if the holder did not deviate from the 
purpose or the social function of the right. This is the general standard.  
 
399 The explanatory note to the constitution explains that the statement that these rights fulfil a social function 
was meant to regulate the function of these rights for the benefit of the collectivity besides the proprietor’s. 
The goal of the social regulation of property is to prevent damage to the interests of the collectivity or 
abusing its use. 
400 Ibrahim Abu Allail, The Theory of Right, p. 327.  
401 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 703.  
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Besides this general standard, Art. 3 KCC provides four criteria or instances in 
which the exercise of right is deemed unlawful. 
The first criterion is when the right is exercised to secure an unlawful interest, 
such as when an employer uses his contractual right to dismiss an employee because he 
disagrees with his political orientation or when a landlord requests a tenant to vacate a 
property after failing to raise the rent.402 In this case the right does not deserve legal 
protection since its holder seeks an unlawful interest under the guise of an ostensible 
legitimate exercise of right. This means that from the perspective of the law, it is not 
sufficient that the interest the right holder seeks to achieve is apparent or beneficial, but it 
must also be consistent with the purpose of the right. The scope of the unlawfulness of the 
interest should be understood in a broader context to encompass any act that is contrary to 
public order and good morals. The explanatory notes to the code provide that "interest is 
unlawful not only when its achievement is in breach of the law but also when it contradicts 
with the public order and moral".403  
The test in assessing whether the use has been lawful in this case is objective, 
where the court will examine the exercise of the right in accordance with the behaviour of 
the reasonable person. This is a clear application of the notion of fault because it is the 
right holder here who deviates from the behaviour of the normal person to use his right in 
order to secure an unlawful interest. However, while the basic test for measuring the 
legality of the right holder act is essentially objective, the court might also take the 
intention of the right holder into consideration in determining whether the right has been 
abused.404 
The second criterion is when the right holder exercises his right for the sole 
intention of inflicting harm on another, that is, he is exercising his right for a purely 
malicious motive, such as when a person plants trees on his property exclusively to block 
 
402 Ibid. p. 706.  
403 , The Explanatory Notes to the Civil Code, p. 28. 
404 Mohammad Abdulthaher Hussain, pp. 276–277. 
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sunlight from reaching his neighbour's house or when an employer dismisses an employee 
because he testified against him in court. To establish abuse of rights in this case, it must 
be demonstrated that the right holder intended to injure another in the course of his 
exercise of the right (i.e., subjective test).405 The determining factor in this case is that the 
right holder’s primary motive must be to inflict harm on another, even if such exercise 
brought some advantage to the right holder by accident.406 Because the intention to harm is 
an internal, mental state, it might be too difficult or impossible for the injured party to 
prove it. Therefore, the court may, in some cases, rely on other factors to determine the 
malicious intent, such as the absence or triviality of interest.407 
The third criterion of abuse of right arises when the interest derived from the 
exercise of right is flagrantly disproportionate to the damage caused to another. This case 
is close to the previous one. However, the abuse is easier to prove in this case as the 
plaintiff does not have to show the malicious intent of the right holder. However, it is not 
enough for him to show on the balance of proportionality that the damage equates or 
slightly outweighs the interest achieved by the right holder, but it must show that such 
disproportion is significant (i.e., objective test).408 The code does not provide for a 
criterion for the evaluation of the disproportion between the interests of both parties, 
leaving the assessment to the exclusive discretion of the court according to the 
circum
The last criterion provided by Art. 30 is that of gross and exceptional damage. 
This case is directly derived from Islamic jurisprudence and finds its natural field of 
application in the area of the rights of neighbours and disturbances of neighbourhoods.409 
The code does not elucidate what constitutes gross and exceptional damage but, instead, 
 
405 Hasan Keerah, Introduction to Law (Alexandria, Monshaat Almaaref no date) (in Arabic), p. 773; cf. Abd-
Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 703. 
406 Hasan Keerah, ibid.  
407 Mohammad Abdulthaher Hussain, p. 272; Hasan Keerah, ibid. 
408 An intention to harm (subjective element) may also be involved in some situations as such abusive 
exercise of right creates a strong presumption of the bad faith of the right holder, but it is not necessary to 
prove it as the objective suffices. 
409 The Explanatory Notes to the Code, pp. 28–29.  
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the explanatory notes to the code refer to Art. 1199 of the Ottoman Civil Code, the 
Majallah, Al-Ahkam-i-Adliya (the Majallah).410 Gross damage, according to the Majallah, 
consists of any act that causes damage to a building, in terms of weakening it, causing it to 
collapse or making it impossible for it to be put to the use for which it was originally 
intended.411 However, the term should not be limited to the examples provided by the 
Majallah and be understood in a broader context to encompass every damage that inhibits 
or significantly reduces the injured party’s enjoyment of his legal entitlement, such as 
when a factory that discharges soot and unpleasant fumes is built in a residential area, and 
has the effect of seriously endangering the residents’ health and convenience.412 
Additionally, while the main area for the application of this case is the right of 
property, nothing prevents the extension of this case to other fields of the law such as 
contract law. A party that insists on the literal performance of an obligation, even though 
such performance has been too onerous due to the occurrence of general contingencies that 
could not be predicted at the time of contracting, would be abusing his right according to 
this case.413 
Needless to say, insignificant or minimal damage caused as a result of the exercise 
of the right does not make the person liable for his action on the basis of abuse of rights as 
his behaviour was consistent with the conduct of the ordinary person according to an 
objective test. In any way, the intention of the right holder is immaterial in determining the 
abusive conduct. 
 
410 The Ottoman Majallah provides in Art. 1198: "Any person may raise the wall of his property owned in 
absolute ownership to any extent he wishes, and may do anything he desires, and, providing that he does not 
cause his neighbour any great (gross) damage thereby the latter cannot prevent him from doing so". The 
Majallah was the civil code of the Ottoman Empire based on the Islamic jurisprudence of the Hanafi Cchool 
of Law. It is also the historical basis of the civil code in some Arab countries, such as Kuwait, Jordan, Syria 
and Iraq. It is worthwhile noting that although Islamic jurists refused the absolute nature of rights and 
condemned abusive exercises, abuse of rights has not been recognized as a theory. Some modern 
commentators argue that the notion of abuse of rights does not extend beyond relations between neighbours; 
see Chafik Chehata, ‘La Théorie de L'abus des Droits Chez les Jurisconsultes Musulmans’ 4 RIDC, pp. 217–
224. Cf. Mahmoud Fathy, ‘La Notion de L'abus des Droits dans la Jurisprudence Musulmane’ ( (PhD thesis), 
impr. de A. Mulcey 1912). 
411 See also, Hasan Keerah, pp. 778–779; Ibrahim Abu Allail, The Theory of Right, p. 330. 
412 Hasan Keerah, p. 780, Ibrahim Abu Allail, The Theory of Right, p. 330. The possible applications of this 
case are unlimited; they may include a noisy neighbour, a garage, a barking dog and so forth. 
413 In support of this opinion, see Hasan Keerah, p. 780 nt. 1.  
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3.3.5.1 Some remarks on the regulation of the theory in the KCC 
 
Although the regulation of the abuse of rights theory in the KCC has been inspired by the 
divergent French case law and Art. 4 of the Egyptian Civil Code, the drafters opted to 
adopt a different approach. Its codification reflects aspects of the two schools by blending 
both approaches into one article; the provision of a general standard of abuse, combined 
with applications that stem from Islamic Sharia rules.414 On the one hand, it provides a 
general standard based on the social function of rights against which all exercises of rights 
will be measured. On the other, it follows the Egyptian Civil Code by enumerating cases 
derived from Islamic jurisprudence in which the exercise is considered unlawful.415  
The introduction of objective and subjective criteria for the assessment of abusive 
conduct is consistent with the general standard of social function of rights established at 
the beginning of Art. 30 and also with the purpose of using the code as a tool to realize 
social justice.416 The combination of subjective and objective tendencies appears in other 
parts of the code, namely Art. 139 relating to interpretation of contracts, which gives effect 
to the letter of agreements and common will of the parties. 
The code bases the abuse of rights on delictual liability by considering abuse to be 
one form of fault that gives rise to liability. It uses the objective criterion as the primary 
criterion for the assessment of the exercise of the right by refining the notion of fault and 
accepting several degrees of fault through widening its scope further to encompass not 
only the wrongful acts, but also any ostensible legitimate exercise of right that deviates 
from the normative behaviour of the reasonable person. The introduction of the objective 
 
414 See articles 26–29, 1198–1200, and 1212 of the Majallah. 
415 The Egyptian Civil Code does not provide a general standard of abuse but includes three cases or criteria 
in which the exercise of right would be considered abusive. The cases are: (i) intention to harm, (ii) 
disproportion between the desired interest and harm, and (iii) unlawful interest. The Kuwaiti code added a 
fourth case or criterion derived from Islamic law concerning gross and exceptional harm; see the explanatory 
notes, pp. 28–29. See Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuricomment on the social goal test and reason behind its 
exclusion from the Egyptian Civil Code, pp. 706–707. 
416 , The Explanatory Notes to the Civil Code, p. 29; Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 127. 
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criterion also provides an important procedural advantage for the injured party because it 
relieves him of the troublesome question of proving the intention of the right holder.  
However, it could be argued that the adoption of the social function of rights as a 
general standard for the determination of abuse raises a practical problem concerning the 
determination of the social function of each right as it is not easy to attempt to find out 
what the purpose was for which the right was created.417 In addition, the adoption of such 
broad principle leads to legal uncertainty and arbitrary justice because it opens the door to 
conflicting judicial opinions according to the political, social and economic views of each 
judge.418 While the researcher agrees that such concerns are valid, they are nonetheless 
exaggerated. First, the court will not necessarily have to discern the social function of each 
right but will rather concentrate on whether the exercise of the right seeks to fulfil a 
legitimate social end. In practice the court will assess the behaviour of the defendant by 
applying the objective criteria and comparing it with the behaviour of the ordinary 
person.419 Secondly, case law shows no indication of arbitrary application of the rules, and 
even if such judicial vagaries existed, they can be deterred appropriately by the court of 
cassation, which supervises the correct application of the law and ensures unification of 
case law. It is true that the principle of social function of rights as a concept lacks 
precision, but one must not forget that flexibility and non-rigidity of legal rules are 
sometimes regarded as necessary to allow for just judgments in individual cases. 
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that while the provision of such a broad principle 
renders Art. 30 flexible, the drafters of the code provided four cases of abuse in order to 
increase the article’s legal uncertainty. 
 
 
 
417 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 707. 
418 Henri Mazeaud and Andre Tunc, p. 658. 
419 See, for example, Com. Cass. No. 93/97, 9/3/1998. 
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3.3.6 The theory of abuse of rights in the sphere of contracts 
 
Given the above discussion, it is clear now that the theory of abuse of rights is applicable 
to all sorts of subjective rights, including contractual rights. Contractual rights by nature 
are relative rights and their exercise is not discretionary, but is rather subject to the review 
of courts in case of abuse. While the parties are free to determine the content of their 
contract per the principle of freedom of contract by including any term they desire, the 
exercise of such freedom is constrained by three limitations: (i) statutory provisions, (ii) 
public order (iii) and good morals.420 This means that the contract drafter must abide by 
these three restrictions in determining the content of the contract and must avoid any 
abusive conduct as set out in Art. 30. Therefore, in relation to the applicability of the abuse 
of rights theory on contractual matters, one can deduce from Art. 30 that a party is abusing 
his right to contract in the following cases: if he imposes contract terms to derive an 
unlawful interest, if he imposes terms with the sole intention of inflicting harm on his 
counterpart, if the interest derived from the terms is disproportionate to the damage caused 
to his counterpart or if gross and exceptional damage is caused to the other party. 
The flexibility of the regulation of the theory of abuse of rights in the KCC allows 
its application to extend to all contractual relations and to govern all the contract phases. 
The provision of the theory in the preliminary section of the code is indicative of the 
legislative will to promote it to the status of an overarching principle that governs all legal 
acts, whether contractual or extra-contractual. While the theory has been essentially 
developed to counter the abusive exercise of property right, its applicability in contractual 
matters is now widely accepted.421 If one accepts that abuse is a misconduct or deviation 
from the normative behaviour of the ordinary person, then it can occur in the course of the 
exercise of any right, be it a property right or a contractual right. 
 
420 Art. 175.  
421 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 695 et seq.; Abdulmonem Faraj Assada, p. 360; Abbas Karimi, p. 11 et seq. 
140 
 
                                                           
 
3.3.6.1 Admission of the theory of abuse of rights as a means to counter abusive exercise 
of contractual rights 
 
To make the analysis more specific, a distinction will be made between three phases in 
which contractual abuse may occur: (i) the formation phase, (ii) the execution phase and 
(iii) the termination phase. 
 
i. Abuse of right in the formation phase 
 
It is axiomatic in contract law that individuals are free to decide whether or not to contract 
and with whom to contract. However, the exercise of this freedom is not absolute and in 
certain situations refusal to enter into a contract may give rise to liability; for example, if 
the offeror is a monopoly in the provision of a good or service of a basic need to the 
general public, then its refusal to provide the good or the service would constitute an 
abusive behaviour because of the harm this would cause to the ordinary person.422 
Similarly, while the principle in contract negotiations is that the parties are free to break off 
the negotiations at any stage and refuse to conclude the contract, such act may attract 
liability if it causes losses to the other party. There is a moral and legal pre-contractual 
obligation on the parties to act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing. If a party 
breaks off advanced negotiations without a legitimate reason after his counterparty has 
 
422 In support of this opinion, see Assada, pp. 365–367. Al-Sada differentiates between refusal to sell by a 
legal monopoly and a factual monopoly. It is illegal for the first type to decline to provide good or service for 
any member of the general public as this is a legal obligation imposed on the monopoly by virtue of its 
contract with the state. Whereas in the case of factual monopoly there is no such legal obligation on the 
monopoly which can withdraw its offer at any time. However, the right to withdraw the offer is not absolute 
and has to be based on valid reasons, otherwise it would constitute an abuse of the right of not to contract. 
Also see Ghestin’s discussion of the regulation of refusal to sell (le refus de vendre) in French law as a form 
of abuse in contractual matters, Jacques Ghestin, ‘L’abus dans les Contrats’, p. 379. 
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incurred significant expenditure thinking a contract would be concluded, then he would be 
liable on the ground of abuse of the right to negotiate.423 
 
ii. Abuse of right in the execution phase  
 
Of the contract phases, abuse of a contractual right mostly manifests during the execution 
phase of the contract. Here, a conflict of interests exists between a party who uses a 
contractual right and another who suffers from an injury caused by such usage. In adhesion 
contracts such a situation arises because his superior position enables the stronger party to 
dictate the terms of the contract that grant him exclusive rights which determine how the 
contract should be executed, thus putting the adhering party at his mercy.424 An example of 
this behaviour would be retaining the right to accept the employee’s work or obliging the 
policy holder to report incidents that are irrelevant to the risk insured against in insurance 
contracts. 
The idea of abuse of right in the execution of contract finds its grounds in the 
principle of good faith which obliges the parties to co-operate by taking into account the 
interests of the co-contractor and abstain from any act that might cause him injury.425 This 
requires the exercise of the contractual rights in accordance with what the other party 
reasonably expects and in a manner consistent with fair dealing.426 The KCC embraces a 
wide concept of good faith that not only emphasizes the parties’ inner state of mind, but 
also requires them to practice it in their dealings. To ensure that the parties adhere to good 
 
423 Mohammad Lotfi, Civil Liability in the Negotiation Phase (Cairo, no publisher 1995) (in Arabic), p. 77. It 
is worth noting that the Cassation Court in France declared in a famous case of that the liability for 
unjustified breaking off of negotiations is based on the doctrine of abuse of right and the decision to break off 
negotiations constitutes "an abuse of a right to negotiate". The court characterized the abuse as a fault that 
gave rise to delictual liability, see Cass. Civ. (3) 16/10/1973, D. 1974, IR 35. There is no explicit provision in 
the Kuwaiti Civil Code, nor a judicial decision that characterizes breaking off negotiations in a manner 
contrary to good faith as an abuse of right. However, nothing prevents the application of the theory on pre-
contractual matters if the conditions for its applications are available. 
424 Abdulmonem Faraj Assada, p. 368.  
425 Ibrahim Abu Allail, Contract and Unilateral Will, pp. 293–294. 
426 Ibid. 
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faith in real life, the code adds a duty of an objective character in the form of fair 
dealing.427 Therefore, in certain situations if the debtor requests a short extension of time 
for the performance of his obligation, the creditor cannot refuse his request if it was based 
on legitimate reasons, otherwise he would be abusing his right of performance. Equally, if 
the obligation can be performed in several alternative ways, the creditor cannot insist on 
the performance in a certain way if this way is more costly or cumbersome for the 
debtor.428 
 
iii. Abuse of right in the termination phase 
 
Finally, a contractual right may be abused in terminating or rescinding the contractual 
relationship. As a general rule, contracts can only be rescinded in the same way as in which 
they were created, that is, by the concurrence of two wills. However, in certain contracts 
the contracting parties may be granted the right to terminate the contract by unilateral will, 
such as in contracts for employment for an indefinite period. Nonetheless, the unilateral 
exercise of such right is not unconditional. From an historical perspective, exercise of the 
unilateral termination of contract for employment for an indefinite period was viewed as a 
discretionary right, which was exercised improperly by employers and caused injury to the 
employee.429 The application of the doctrine of abuse of rights has been extended to this 
area for the purpose of moralising the exercise of such right. As a result, protective 
measures were legislated, obliging the employer to practise his right fairly by giving the 
employee prior notice and choosing a proper time for dismissal.430 Failure to comply with 
these requirements would render the dismissal abusive and, hence, incur civil liability.  
 
 
427 Art. 197. 
428 Ibrahim Abu Allail, Contract and Unilateral Will, p. 294. 
429 Jacques Ghestin and Gilles  Goubeaux, Traité de Droit Civil: Introduction Générale (Librairie générale de 
droit et de jurisprudence 1994), pp. 780–781. 
430 See Assada, p. 384–385; articles 44 and 46 of the Kuwaiti Law No. 6/2010 concerning Employment in the 
Private Sector. 
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3.3.6.2 The theory of abuse of rights and unfair terms 
 
It has been argued by some that the theory of abuse of rights is inapplicable to unfair terms 
because the theory only applies to subjective rights. According to Ghestin, it seems more 
satisfactory to regard the unilateral drafting of contracts in the form of standardized 
contracts as a new contracting paradigm intended to speed up the contracting process than 
a subjective right. It is not clear, as he argues, whether the unilateral drafting of contracts 
should be considered an exercise of a subjective right where it is, in fact, merely an 
exercise of de facto power.431 Therefore, the application of the theory of abuse of right is 
not justified in this area as the inclusion of unfair terms in standard contracts is not due to 
abuse of right. 
One should concede that from this perspective the argument against the 
application the theory of abuse of right to unfair terms does carry some weight. The 
qualification of the imposition of unfair terms through unilateral drafting of agreements as 
an abuse of a contractual right seems imprecise, for the proferror is abusing, so to say, his 
freedom of contract, and the very term of abuse of rights demonstrates that the aim of the 
theory is to prohibit the wrongful exercise of rights and not liberties. Thus, abuse of 
liberties cannot be sanctioned by this theory.  
It is necessary before attempting to address this argument, to shed some light on 
the meaning of the term right in order to determine whether the theory applies to the 
freedom of contract and, hence, to unfair terms. First of all, it is important to note that the 
KCC does not adopt a specific definition of the term right. This indeed seems paradoxical 
since the law that grants individuals the power to exercise their rights and sets limits for 
their exercise does not specify their meaning. The ambiguity and complexity of the concept 
of right appears to be the reason that prevented the Kuwaiti legislator from adopting a 
specific definition. Indeed, there has been much debate and disagreement among legal 
 
431 Jacques Ghestin, ‘L’abus dans les Contrats’, p. 383.  
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scholars over the definition of the term, many divergent definitions arose in the debate and 
there is no agreement on one definition.432 
Without delving too deeply into the debate, it is sufficient to say that there are 
three major theories with regard to the definition of right. The first theory is ‘the will 
theory’ which stresses the power of choice of the right holder, viewing rights as a 
‘protected choice’.433 This view was criticized and rejected on the grounds that rights can 
also be enjoyed by the mentally retarded and children, even though they have no will as 
such.434 As a result of the criticism directed at the will theory, an alternative theory 
emerged, namely the interest theory,435 which focuses instead on the notion of ‘interest’ 
that the right aims to protect and held that rights are a ‘legally protected interests’. The 
Belgian jurist Dabin, however, proposed that the concept of right should be understood as 
consisting of two elements: the first being appartenance, or a link between the subject and 
the object of the right; and the second element is maîtrise, or a power of control over the 
object of the right.436  
Whether the concept of right is viewed as a ‘will’, an ‘interest’ or a combination 
of both, these theories demonstrate that there is no one correct definition and that the 
notion of the term is broad enough to admit different interpretations. There is no 
justification for limiting its meaning. Rather, it should be understood in a wider context to 
encompass any right that bestows powers on individuals. If any of the above definitions is 
accepted, then it is inevitable that the freedom of contract could be perceived as a legal 
right, for it is either a power granted by law or an interest protected by law or both. It 
derives its legitimacy from the Civil Code, which recognizes the individuals’ right to create 
 
432 For a review of these definitions and the arguments of each opinion, see Ibrahim Abu Allail, The Theory 
of Right, pp. 23–33; Hasan Keerah, pp. 431–443. 
433 This theory can be traced back to classical theorists such as Savigny and Windscheid. It has been largely 
disputed and rejected because it is too individualistic, Hasan Keerah, p. 431.  
434 Ibid. 
435 Advocated by jurists such as Jhering, see Keerah a, p. 433 et seq. for review and assessment.  
436 For a criticism of this theory, see Abu Allail, p. 29; Keera, p. 435 et seq. It is worth mentioning that some 
writers pointed out that the majority of Arab scholars were more inclined to Dabin’s definition of right, 
Mohammad Lotfi, Introduction to the Study of Law (6th edn, Cairo, no publisher 2008) (in Arabic), p. 426. 
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legal relationships. Hence, the opinion that perceives the process of contracting merely as a 
freedom disregards the fact that it is, at the same time, a statutory right.  
This researcher's argument can be substantiated further with reference to two 
articles in the KCC that could be used to characterize the ability to contract as a right. The 
first is Art. 84 concerning individuals’ capacity to contract. This article grants any person 
the legal right to enter into a contract so long as he is legally and mentally competent to 
create a binding agreement, and understands the nature and effects of his acts. The second 
article is Art. 175 which gives the parties the right to determine the content of their 
agreement and include any stipulation they consent to so long as it is not prohibited by law 
or is contrary to public order or good morals.  
Therefore, if the freedom to contract is characterized as a legal right, then it surely 
can be subjected to the theory of abuse of right. If a party seeks to use the contract to 
impose his will on his counterpart with the effect of creating a significant imbalance 
between the rights and obligations of the parties, then the right is diverted from its social 
purpose, hence, it is abused. The consequence of such abusive behaviour is to deny the 
offeror legal effect of the abusive terms. If the terms in question are material and essential 
to the existence of the contract, then the entire contract will be void due to the absence of 
cause, which is a fundamental prerequisite for a binding contact. 
 
3.3.6.3 Applicability of the abuse theory to unfair terms 
 
How can one determine whether or not a contractual term is abusive? What are the criteria 
that can be taken into account to qualify a term as abusive?  
An explanation of the concept of unfair terms in the light of the abuse theory 
entails a discussion of two questions: (i) What is the qualification of the offeror’s 
behaviour? (ii) If the first question is addressed, then it is necessary to explain how the 
criteria of abuse as provided by Art. 30 can be applied methodologically to unfair terms? 
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i. Qualification of the offeror’s behaviour 
 
First, the conduct of the offeror who imposes unfair terms constitutes fault because it is a 
deviation from the normative behaviour of the ordinary contractor who should take into 
account the effects of his conduct on his co-contractor. It occurs when a contractor abuses 
his contractual power by either imposing an abusive term or wrongfully exercising a 
contractual right. If such behaviour brings no or limited benefit to the author in comparison 
to the injury it inflicts on his counterpart, then he has committed a fault that attracts civil 
liability. One must not forget that the KCC gives the theory of abuse of rights broad effect 
by linking it to a social function and teleological philosophy. Rights are afforded legal 
protection so long as they are performed to serve a legitimate interest and fulfil a social 
function; therefore, their exercise must remain within the scope as defined by the law. 
Rights are not absolute, and there are duties tied to them and limits for their exercise – 
even if not expressly mentioned in the code – determined by the general criterion of social 
function. Thus, if the right holder diverts from the social purpose of the right and exceeds 
its permissible scope, then he should be held liable because his behaviour constitutes a 
fault and, hence, an abuse of right. 
In addition to the prevention of abusive behaviour, the KCC tends to moralize the 
behaviour of the contractors by imposing positive behavioural standards in the form of an 
internal standard of good faith coupled with an external standard of fair dealing.437 The 
inclusion of these two standards, besides the theory of abuse of rights, in the KCC can be 
interpreted as illustrations of the altruistic spirit that exists in the code, which aims to 
regulate the relations between individuals on a moral basis. Such a moralistic approach 
prohibits a contractor from behaving individually without taking into consideration the 
implications of his conduct towards his counterpArt. Accordingly, the contractual rights 
 
437 Art. 197 KCC: "the contract must be performed according to its stipulations in a fashion consistent with 
good faith and fair dealing". 
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should not only be performed in accordance with the law, but also the contractor should 
refrain from any act that may cause harm to his counterpart in the course of his exercise of 
that right.  
The offeror who imposes unfair terms is using the contract contrary to the purpose 
and social function for which it was intended, namely as a tool of exchange between 
contractors. Some writers have described such behaviour as abusive,438 for the offeror in 
adhesion contracts exploits his superior economic position to coerce the consumer into 
accepting his terms. However, it has been maintained that this type of coercion does not 
amount to a defect of contract that causes the nullity of the contract because it is connected 
to economic rather than psychological or moral factors.439 
The contract should be seen as a collaborative and co-operative arrangement that 
should serve the interests of both parties. In contractual matters the KCC seeks to promote 
social justice by surrounding the principle of autonomy of the will with several restrictions 
for the benefit of the collective by protecting the weak contractual party whenever the 
contractual balance is upset. It seeks to preserve individuals’ freedom of contract but not at 
the expense of the weak parties. In the words of Al-Sanhuri: "The society is concerned 
with the protection the weak party vis-à-vis the strong party. We have seen this in adhesion 
contracts, exploitation theory, theory of unperceived contingencies, labour contracts, 
insurance contracts".440 It undermines the institution of contract when one party disregards 
the social justice aims of the contract and uses it for the sole purpose of pursuing self-
interests at the expense of his co-contractor. This co-operative nature should not be 
neglected, even if the law recognizes the unilateral drafting of contracts as an exceptional 
contractual paradigm such as in standardized contracts. The legislative acceptance of the 
 
438 Solaiman Murkus, p. 184.  
439 Ibid. Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, pp. 293–294. It should be noted that not any coercive act necessarily leads 
to the nullity of the contract. Rather, the coercion must have determined the consent of the party constrained 
and the constraint must be illegitimate by the use of force or threat to use force. For this reason economic 
coercion does not vitiate the consent of the consumer, see articles 156–158 of the Kuwaiti Civil Code; , The 
Explanatory Notes to the Civil Code, pp. 145-149 ; Ibrahim Abu Allail, Contract and Unilateral Will, p. 383. 
440 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri., p. 127. 
148 
 
                                                           
elimination of the negotiation process in adhesion contracts was intended to facilitate the 
conclusion of mass contracts but, in reality, professionals exploit the process to insert 
terms that benefit them. In practice, the superior contractual position of the offeror enables 
him to dictate terms that have the object or effect of gaining an advantage that would cause 
damage to the consumer, such as terms that give the professional the right unilaterally to 
modify the terms of the agreement relating to price, duration or the quality of the good or 
service. The conduct of the offeror in this case is analogous to the conduct of a proprietor 
who insists on growing tall trees on his property that would block the rays of the sun from 
his neighbour. In both cases the conduct is abusive and, hence, unlawful. Therefore, the 
offeror who imposes unfair terms on his inferior counterpart by virtue of his superior 
contractual position to gain an excessive advantage with a view to creating a significant 
imbalance between the rights and obligations of the parties is thus abusing his right to 
contract.  
 
ii. Application of abuse criteria to unfair terms 
 
Secondly, the fundamental test and the four criteria of abuse of right as provided in Art. 30 
can indeed guide act as guides in determining when a certain contractual term is abusive. If 
the four criteria are applied, a contractual term can be deemed abusive if the offeror seeks 
to derive an illegitimate interest, intends to harm the co-contractor, if it creates a flagrant 
disproportion between the interest and the damage, and if it causes exceptional damage to 
the other co-contractor. With the exception of the third criterion, the researcher believes 
that it is difficult to envisage an unfair term in consumer contracts that does not fall within 
the purview of one of these criteria.441 It should be stressed that the criteria provided are by 
no means exhaustive as the code sets them as examples of abuse, and establishes the 
 
441 It is hard to imagine a situation where a supplier or a professional imposes an unfair term for the sole 
purpose of harming his clients. If such a term was inserted into a contract, then it could be nullified on the 
basis of absence of a licit cause. 
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concepts of the ‘teleology’ and ‘social function’ of the right as two fundamental standards 
against which the exercise of all rights must be judged. Consequently, if the contract is 
utilized for the pursuit of the offeror’s egotistic interests instead of the common good of 
the parties to the transaction, then it deviates from its purpose and social function as a tool 
of exchange to become an abusive practice and an oppressive tool.  
It appears that the majority of unfair terms in adhesion consumer contracts would 
fall within the scope of the third criterion – disproportion between the interest and damage 
– because unfair terms are always imposed by professionals to gain an advantage or secure 
an interest at the expense of the consumer. A contractual term that, for example, exonerates 
or limits a carrier from liability for bodily injury is certainly abusive and invalid442 insofar 
as the interest the carrier attempts to derive is excessively disproportionate to the damage 
he causes to the passenger.443 
The criterion of disproportionality has been incorporated in comparative 
legislation as a basis for measuring contractual unfairness. In this regard, two examples can 
be cited: (i) the French law of 10 January 1978 in its use of the notion of ‘avantage 
excessive’ and (ii) the notion of ‘significant imbalance’ used in Art. 3 of the Directive, 
which has been transposed into the national laws of most EU Member States. 
If the content of unfair terms used in adhesion contracts is analysed, it will 
become apparent that most of them would lead to the creation of disproportionality 
between the rights and obligations of the parties. Generally speaking, they can be classified 
into two large groups. The first group contains terms that have been prohibited and 
nullified explicitly by law. Terms of this kind are necessarily unfair and can be described 
as per se unfair (commonly referred to in other jurisdictions as ‘black-listed’ terms444). 
 
442 Such term is invalid under Law No. 68 of 1980 concerning the Commercial Code Art. 191 and under Law 
No. 28 of 1980 concerning the Maritime Trade Code Art. 207.  
443 It is also possible to qualify a term such as abusive either on the grounds of the illegitimate interest 
criterion because it allows the carrier to escape criminal and civil liability for his faults or on the grounds of 
the exceptional damage criterion due to the sanctity of the human body which should not be an object in 
contracts. 
444 See, for example, articles R. 132-1, 132-2 and 132-2-1 of the French Consumer Code. 
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Examples of this group are clauses that exclude or limit the liability of the carrier from 
liability for personal injury in the contract of carriage,445 clauses that exclude or limit the 
liability of the contractor in construction contracts,446 clauses that exclude or limit the 
liability of hotels for deposited items,447 and any unfair term in insurance contract which 
breach had no effect on the occurrence of the insured risk.448 In practice the declaration of 
the invalidity of such terms does not pose any problem for the court because of the explicit 
statutory prohibition against their inclusion in contracts. The reason behind the Kuwaiti 
legislator’s direct intervention to prohibit such terms, it seems, is because they constitute a 
stark violation of the principle of public order. 
The second group of terms are those that are presumed to be unfair (i.e., 
potentially unfair or grey-listed terms) but the presumption of unfairness is not absolute 
and could be rebutted by evidence to the contrary by the professional. An example of this 
type is if the penalty clause was exaggerated, since the main function of the penalty clause, 
despite its name, is not to punish the debtor, but to compensate the creditor in case the 
debtor fails to fulfil his obligation.449 One could venture to assume that most unfair terms 
in the market belong to this group because they give businesses enough room to 
manoeuvre compared to the first group which are destined to be nullified by the court. 
Therefore, if an inventory of unfair terms in the KCC were to be created, the task would be 
much easier with the first group because they have already been disallowed  statutorily. 
Whereas the task in the second group would be much harder since they are not specified 
and the code does not establish a criterion for their specification.  
Although both groups of terms upset the balance of the contract according to the 
criterion of disproportionality, they differ in two aspects. First, it appears that if the court 
 
445 Articles 191 and 207 of the Commercial Code and Commercial Maritime Code respectively cited above. 
446 Art. 697 KCC. The code provides this ‘special protection’ to the owner because he usually lacks technical 
knowledge that contractors possess. The code, therefore, prohibits any in advance exclusion or limitation of 
liability in construction contracts, p. 508 of the Explanatory Note to the Civil Code.  
447 Art. 735 KCC.  
448 Art. 784 KCC. 
449 Art. 303 KCC.  
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encounters a term of the first group, it must examine it at its own motion without the 
request of the consumer because the prohibition relates to public order. Second, the 
consumer is not required to prove the unfairness of the terms in the first group because of 
the explicit statutory prohibition, whereas in the second group the burden of proof lies with 
the consumer who has to show the unfair nature of the term.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
It is obvious that the absence of a clear definition of unfair terms in the KCC contributes, 
to a large extent, to the proliferation of such terms. It is unfortunate that neither the drafters 
of the code nor the courts have attempted to clarify their meaning. The position of the 
courts in particular towards the concept of unfairness is unsatisfactory and inexcusable. 
Despite the numerous cases involving unfair terms and adhesion contracts, there is not one 
case in which the courts have taken the initiative to analyse the meaning of unfair terms 
thoroughly and explain the elements on which they are based.  
The protection against contractual unfairness suffers from a further shortcoming 
relating to the objective scope of application of the rule where the protection is confined to 
cases where the contract has not been subject to negotiation between the parties. The 
underlying premise of this approach is the assumption that the adherent party in adhesion 
contracts requires judicial intervention because he is prevented from discussing the 
contract terms. Therefore, according to the principle of freedom of contract, the court 
should not intervene if the terms are the product of a meeting of two minds. However, it 
has been shown that this assumption is inaccurate and businesses can effectively 
circumvent them by offering the consumer, who usually lacks legal and technical 
knowledge, the opportunity to review and amend the terms or engage him in superficial 
negotiations. Owing to the inherent weaknesses in the position of the consumer, reference 
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to the absence of negotiation as a requirement for protection against unfair terms should be 
removed. 
In the light of the absence of a lucid meaning of the concept of contractual 
unfairness, an attempt has been made to bridge this gap with reference to the theory of 
abuse of rights. It has been proposed that the theory of abuse of rights can be used as a 
legal basis to explain the meaning and nature of unfair (‘abusive’, if translated literally) 
terms not only because of the terminological similarity between the two, but also because 
they both constitute a deviation from the normative conduct of the reasonable person and 
produce the same effects. An imposition of an unfair term represents an abusive exercise of 
the right to contract, and disregards the social function of rights and the institution of 
contract and the principle of social justice that the Kuwaiti legislator seeks to promote. The 
four criteria of abuse provided in Art. 30 can be applied to explain and sanction any unfair 
term. More specifically, the criterion of disproportionality between the derived interest and 
the inflicted injury, the researcher believes, is a suitable basis for the explanation of the 
most unfair terms. This corresponds with the modern legislative direction, especially in the 
EU, which associates the concept of contractual unfairness with the significant imbalance.  
However, despite the theoretical suitability of the theory of abuse in controlling 
unfair terms, there is still an urgent need to introduce new rules for the protection of 
consumers against unfair terms. The effective application of the abuse theory to unfair 
terms depends a great deal on the readiness of the courts to apply it. Given the courts’ 
present general attitude and sensitivity towards an expansive interpretation of the rules, the 
introduction of new rules not only seems desirable, but also imperative.  
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Chapter Four: Unfair Terms in the Court: Analysis and Assessment of 
the Courts Role in Unfair Terms Disputes 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
It was mentioned in the introduction to this study that the proliferation of unfair terms in 
the Kuwaiti market can partly be ascribed to the deficiency of the judicial mechanism of 
reviewing unfair terms and the remedies the code provides against them. This chapter will 
attempt to explain this hypothesis by critically appraising the present approach of judicial 
review of unfair terms as articulated in Art. 81 of the Kuwaiti Civil Code, and propose an 
alternative view that provides greater certainty and protection for adhering parties (i.e., 
consumers) against unfair terms. 
In the opinion of the researcher, the deficiency of the present approach of the 
judicial review of unfair terms appears in three main aspects: (i) the passivity of the court, 
in the sense that it is not empowered to review unfair terms on its own motion, (ii) judicial 
intervention to review the terms must be invoked by the adhering party and (iii) the burden 
of proof of unfairness lies with the weak party, the adhering party. 
In applying the principle of judicial neutrality, the code entrusts the court with 
discretionary power to review the terms without being obliged, however, to respond to the 
adhering party’s request to review unfair terms. 
The code, it seems, proceeds from the premise that since the adhesion contract is 
qualified as an ordinary contract, then the principle of pacta sunt servanda must be 
honoured even when the terms are dictated to the adhering party.450 This entails that if the 
adhering party believes that a certain contractual term is unfair, then it is incumbent on him 
expressly  to request the court to review it and justify his request. As it appears from the 
 
450 Art. 196 KCC provides: "Contracts have the force of law between the parties".  
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wording of Art. 81, the court may not raise the question of unfairness ex proprio motu as it 
has to respect the private autonomy of the parties and refrain from intervening in the 
contractual relationship. This also entails that the burden to prove the unfair nature of the 
term lies with the adhering party as the general principles of the civil procedures provide.  
However, this premise can be challenged on the same count that the code uses to 
afford the adhering party with special protection; the contractual weakness argument.451 
The adhering party is a weak party throughout all contractual stages who lacks meaningful 
means to protect his interests, even after the conclusion of the contract and during judicial 
proceedings. There is a strong probability that the adhering party weakness prevents him 
from becoming aware of his legal rights or being able to enforce them. In some disputes 
the adhering party may be deterred from procuring professional legal representation if the 
cost exceeds his financial ability. Therefore, there is a real risk that the adhering party, out 
of weakness, whether it is lack of knowledge or financial ability, fails to challenge the 
unfair terms pleaded against him. 
For these reasons, the approach for judicial review and the remedies for unfair 
terms as prescribed in the KCC should be reconsidered to provide better protection for 
consumers and enhance their position vis-à-vis the professional. 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse and assess the approach the code has laid 
down for judicial review of unfair terms and the remedies it offers. Reference will be made 
to the Directive and the decisions of the ECJ in order to offer a systematic solution to the 
problem under discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
451 See the discussion in chapter three.  
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4.2 The role of the court in contractual disputes in general  
 
Before considering the powers the code bestows on the court with respect to unfair terms, 
it is important to clarify the extent to which the court is permitted to intervene in 
contractual arrangements in general. 
Central to the contract theory in the KCC is the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
The natural consequence of any agreement is the creation of a legal bond between the 
contractors in which neither may alter the terms or back out of the bargain by unilateral 
will. This is affirmed in Art. 196 KCC which prescribes the principle of the obligatory 
force of the contract: "Contracts have the force of law between the parties. Neither may 
revoke nor alter its terms unilaterally, except to the extent permitted by the agreement, or 
as required by law". Equating contracts with laws should be perceived as no more than a 
rhetorical exaggeration. However, the use of the word ‘law’ is indicative of the state of 
sanctity the code attaches to private agreements, thus elevating rights and obligations 
arising out of a contract to the status of the law.452 This is due to the fact that the binding 
nature of the contract finds its primary source in the parties’ autonomy and their common 
contractual will. This does not mean, however, that party autonomy is the only justification 
for the binding force of the contract; rather, agreements must be honoured for moral and 
economic reasons too. On the one hand, once an individual gives his word, he has a moral 
responsibility to abide by it. On the other hand, agreements are binding because the 
existence of trust and confidence between individuals is indispensable for the stability of 
transactions and commercial certainty.453 Thus, in order to establish a secure transactional 
framework in the market, the sanctity of contract must be upheld. 
 
452 Solaiman Murkus, p. 507; Ibrahim Abu Allail, Contract and Unilateral Will, p. 273; , The Explanatory 
Notes to the Civil Code, p. 187.  
453 In the same vein, see Mohsen  Al-Baih, pp. 339–341; Donald  Harris and Denis Tallon, Contract Law 
Today: Anglo-French Comparisons (Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press 1989), pp. 385–386. 
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A corollary of the principle of obligatory force of the contract is the relativity of 
contracts. A contract may not be altered or revoked except by mutual agreement of both 
parties. The restriction extends to the court as well. A court, as a general rule, does not 
have competence to intervene in the contractual relationship by adjusting the contract 
terms, since the parties’ will is sovereign and its intervention would constitute an intrusion 
on individuals’ private autonomy. There are, however, some exceptions to the principle of 
the obligatory force of the contract in the KCC where the contract may be adjusted or 
terminated either by the unilateral will of one party454 – legislative intervention455 – or 
judicial decision. Because the present discussion is concerned with the judicial revision of 
contracts, the focus will be on the third exception only.  
The court’s principal role is to act as an umpire giving effect to the parties’ 
common contractual will that embodied the agreement. It is prohibited from reviewing and 
modifying the contract terms of its own accord. The underlying assumption in contract law 
is that the parties have equal bargaining power and they only consent to what reflects their 
interests.456 They are considered the best judges of their own welfare. Thus, it is not for the 
court to carry out ex proprio motu revision of the contract terms simply because it believes 
they are unfair or unreasonable. However, this prohibition does not extend to cases where 
the court finds that the contract (wholly or partially) is contrary to an express statutory 
provision.457 Since this is a matter of public policy, the court has a duty to raise the 
question of illegality and invalidate the contract on its own initiative, at any stage of the 
 
454 Such as in employment contracts of indeterminate duration (Art. 44 of Law No. 6/2010 concerning 
Employment in the Private Sector) and in agency contracts where the principal can dismiss the agent 
whenever he wishes (Art. 717 KCC). 
455 The state can issue legislations to regulate the rent prices or the interest rates. 
456 While this assumption is plausible in negotiated contracts, it is of doubtful validity in adhesion contracts 
since the adhering party consents to unfair terms against his true contractual will due to his lack of 
meaningful choice. 
457 Art. 148 KCC gives the court the power to declare a contract void: "A void contract does not produce any 
effect. Any person having an interest may invoke its voidness and the court has the power to so decide on its 
own motion". It should be noted that the void contract does not exist from a strict legal view and the court’s 
decision is of declaratory nature because it merely states what the reality is. The Explanatory Note to the 
Civil Code explains that in the case of void contracts the court is obliged to declare its voidness on its own 
motion because its enforcement would contravene with public policy, Explanatory Notes to the Civil Code, 
p. 173. 
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proceedings,458 and regardless of the position of the parties. Thus, the court has to 
pronounce a contract void if the contract, for example, lacks an essential condition for its 
validity, such as the existence of a licit cause for the obligation.459 Similarly, the contract 
as a whole may be valid but contains an illegal term that has been expressly prohibited by 
the law, such as usurious terms460 in loan contracts between individuals (Art. 547) and 
clauses that exclude or limit the liability of the carrier from liability for personal injury in 
the contract of carriage.461 Here, the court may intervene ex proprio motu to invalidate the 
illegal part only without touching the rest of the contract. 
In these examples the court has been vested with the power to intervene on its 
own initiative, even if neither party has raised the question of illegality because the 
conditions for the validity of contracts, prevention of usury between individuals and the 
integrity of the human body are intended to protect public interest and, therefore, they 
constitute public policy. 
Other than upholding public policy, there is no legitimate ground for the court to 
revise the contract terms, no matter how unbalanced the performances of the parties are 
without express request of the party concerned. The KCC contains several articles that 
explicitly grant the court the power to intervene to amend or exclude contractual terms in 
certain situations462 but not on its own motion. It appears that the reason for the prohibition 
of ex proprio motu judicial revision of contract terms is that such an exercise represents a 
restraint on party autonomy and the litigants’ private interests, which may only be invoked 
by the aggrieved party. Furthermore, from a procedural perspective, the court must remain 
 
458 Solaiman Murkus, p. 432; the Court of Cassation in Com. Cass. No. 179/99, 7/5/2000 ruled that: "The 
Court of Cassation is entitled raise on its own motion legal reasons relating to public policy even if not 
contained in the appeal". 
459 Art. 176 KCC provides that the contract shall be deemed null if the obligation has an illicit cause. Cause is 
the reason for contracting and is one of the essential conditions for the formation of a valid contract (with 
consent and object). Its absence entails the absolute nullity of the contract. 
460 This includes any kind of interest. 
461 Articles 191 and 207 of the Commercial Code and Commercial Maritime Code cited above.  
462 Such as if the amount of the penalty clause is manifestly excessive (Art. 303), extend the period for 
performance if the debtor has in good faith failed to fulfil his obligation (Art. 209.2), if the performance of 
the contractual obligation becomes excessively onerous burden on a party due to unperceived contingencies 
that could not have been foreseen at the time of contracting (Art. 198), and in unfair terms (Art. 81). 
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neutral and impartial to the parties and rule in accordance with the principle non ultra 
petita which determines the scope of the dispute and confines the court’s jurisdiction to 
only those claims that have been submitted to it by the parties.463 As such, the court has to 
examine the contract terms in accordance with the limits set by the law and as spelt out by 
the parties in their submissions. This entails that, first, the court may not ignore any request 
submitted to it by the parties and if it is willing to dismiss a request, it should simply 
declare so. Secondly, the court may not transcend the bounds of the parties’ request by 
modifying the requests or introducing new requests that have not been raised by the 
parties.464 To go beyond these limits and grant different or higher remedies on its own 
motion means that the court has exceeded its lawful jurisdiction and its judgment has erred 
in determining the scope of the dispute.465 In such a case it is liable to have its judgment 
quashed by the Appeal Court or the Court of Cassation on the grounds of being ultra 
vires.466 
 
4.3 The role of the court in unfair terms disputes 
 
The general rule applies to adhesion contracts as well and the court will continue to lack 
judicial competence to revise unfair terms until a request for review has been made by the 
party who has an interest in the action, that is, the adhering party. However, even with the 
satisfaction of this condition, the court, as the wording of the text suggests, retains full 
discretionary power to exercise its jurisdiction over the terms that the adhering party 
 
463 Wajdi  Ragheb and Azmi Abudlfattah, The Principles of the Kuwaiti Civil Proceedings According to the 
New Civil Procedue Law (2nd edn, Kuwait, Dar Alkutub 1994) (in Arabic), p. 368. 
464 Fathi  Waly, Compendium on Civil Procedure Law (Cairo, Dar Annahdha 1981), p. 524. 
465 Ibid, pp. 522–523. 
466 Wajdi  Ragheb and Azmi Abudlfattah, p. 368; also the principle set by the Court of Cassation in its 
decision Com. Cass. No. 33/1975, 29/6/1977. It is noteworthy that the judgment is subject to reversal even if 
it is final and acquired the force of res judicata. According to Art. 148(4) of the Civil and Commercial 
Procedure Code (Law No. 38/1980), the concerned party may file a petition for review if the court awarded 
something that has not or exceeds what has been requested by the parties in their claims. The Cassation Court 
has reaffirmed this in several cases; see, for example, Com. Cass. No. 55/96, 26/1/1997; Civ Cass No. 41/94, 
20/2/1995. 
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purports to amount to unfair terms. Since the exercise of the power to review unfair terms 
is elective, the court may take one of two actions. First, refuse the request to review the 
alleged unfair terms if it is convinced they are fair on their face. Second, it may find the 
adhering party’s claim to be valid and an assessment of the terms is merited. Naturally, the 
assessment process involves two processes: (i) qualification of the terms in question to 
ascertain whether or not they amount to unfair terms and (ii) determination of the 
appropriate action namely amendment or elimination of the terms.  
 
4.3.1 Qualification of terms 
 
The first step the court would take in the process of revising the qualification of the terms 
in question would be to ascertain whether or not they amounted to unfairness. As the code 
makes no reference to the definition of unfair terms or the criteria that can be taken into 
account in their assessment, this would leave the trial court with broad discretionary power 
as to what constitutes an unfair term.  
Additionally, it is not very clear from the context of Art. 81 whether the 
qualification of the trial court of a term as being unfair is a matter of law or fact. This 
question is of considerable importance because it determines whether the Court of 
Cassation has a supervisory jurisdiction over the inferior courts’ findings. Since the Court 
of Cassation is a court of law that is primarily concerned with the proper application of the 
law, it does not examine the facts of the case but rather ensures that the judgments of the 
inferior courts have been rendered in accordance with the law. 467 Therefore, if the 
qualification of unfair terms is regarded as a matter of fact, then this means that the Court 
of Cassation would have no jurisdiction over the decision of the trial court. This would 
 
467 Art. (152(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (Law No. 38/1980) provides that appealing the appeal court’s 
judgments before the Court of Cassation is permitted on three grounds: (i) violation of the law, (ii) error in 
the application of the law and (iii) error in the interpretation of the law. Hence, it is an extraordinary means of 
appeal whose main aim is guaranteeing the consistent application of the law by the inferior courts, ibid., p. 
373. 
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naturally weaken the position of the adhering party because the parties to the dispute are 
prevented from raising factual defences before the Court of Cassation.468 A survey of the 
legal literature reveals that there is a division of opinion among legal commentators as to 
whether the assessment of unfair terms is a matter of fact or law.  
Most commentators have opined that this is a matter of fact insofar as the code’s 
deliberate avoidance of providing a precise definition for unfair terms is indicative of the 
legislator’s will to grant the trial court exceptionally broad discretionary power to revise 
unfair terms.469 Furthermore, contractual terms are private arrangements between two 
parties. They are not rules of law and should not be treated as such. Thus, because the 
Court of Cassation is a court of law, its competence is confined to determining whether the 
impugned judgment is in conformity with the law, without reviewing the facts of the 
dispute. However, some advocates of this opinion argue that for the trial court to avert the 
supervision of the Court of Cassation, its conclusion must be consistent with the wording 
of the contract and is in accordance with the principle of justice.470  
Fewer commentators disagree with the above conclusion and maintain that the 
qualification of unfair terms is a matter of law.471 They argue that, while the general rule in 
contract law is that the interpretation and assessment of contract terms are matters of fact 
that are at the sole discretion of the trial court,472 the issue is different in contracts of ‘law-
like’ nature, such as adhesion contracts and standardized mass contracts.473 These dictated 
and one-sided contracts, by virtue of the absence of negotiations, create the law that 
governs the relationship between the parties but, at the same time, takes away from the 
 
468 Art. 152 of the Civil Procedure Code. 
469 To name a few: Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 300; Mohsen  Al-Baih, p. 153; Anwar Sultan, p. 68; 
Murkus, p. 185; Mohammad Bendary, ‘Towards a Broader Concept of Consumer Protection in Adhesion 
Contracts’ 1 Jour Sec L, p. 95. 
470 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 300. 
471 Abdulfattah Abdulbaqi, p. 188 nt. 1 supported by Bader Al-Yaqoub, Lesion in the Kuwaiti Civil Code 
(Kuwait University 1987) (in Arabic), p. 170 n 1. 
472 See Art. 193 KCC and its interpretation by the Court of Cassation such as in Com. Cass. No. 308/1996, 
22/2/1996; Com. Cass. No. 54/1994, 17/4/1994; Com. Cass. No. 37/1993, 1/2/1993. 
473 See Abdulfattah Abdulbaqi and Bader Al-Yaqoub cited above.  
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offeree his freedom of choice. Thus, such contracts should be treated as legal rules and the 
revision of their terms should be subjected to the supervision of the Court of Cassation. 
Both views have some appeal and each is supported by rational justification. The 
strength of the first view lies in its reliance on the literal interpretation of the code which 
generality and broadness imply exceptional power to the trial court that extends further 
than the mere effectuation of the will of the parties as compared to ordinary contracts. If 
the court is vested with such wide power, then this entails that it has the sole discretion to 
qualify, amend or exclude unfair terms, without being subjected to the supervision of the 
Court of Cassation. 
In contrast, the second view takes a more pragmatic approach to analysing the text 
by comparing adhesion contracts to statutory rules for the purpose of strengthening the 
adhering party’s position vis-à-vis large corporations to subject the findings of the trial 
court to the highest court in order to ensure the proper application of the law and the 
attainment of the legislative purposes of protecting the weak party. 
It is not easy to decide in favour of either view, especially with the silence of the 
code on this point, which throws a shadow of doubt on whether the qualification of unfair 
terms is a matter of fact or law. Even the judgments of the Court of Cassation, 
unfortunately, do not provide enough guidance. For example, the Court of Cassation has 
established that the qualification of an entire contract is a matter of law which the trial 
court exercises under the supervision of the Court of Cassation.474 However, it is not clear 
whether the same principle extends and applies to individual contract terms as well. 
In the researcher’s opinion, it is not impossible to reconcile these two opinions. In 
reality, the assessment of disputed terms by the trial court necessarily involves 
interpretation and application. The court will  first need to interpret the disputed terms to 
discern their actual meaning and then, based on that, it will seek to apply the rule of the 
law to those terms. The latter activity does not pose any significant problem as the Court of 
 
474 Com. Cass. No. 2/93, 25/10/1993. 
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Cassation in all cases has jurisdiction to consider whether or not the courts below have 
applied the law correctly. The interpretation activity, however, as it has been 
established,475 is at the sole discretion of the trial court and is exercised without the 
supervision of the Court of Cassation. Having said that, in order for the trial court to secure 
its interpretation and escape the supervision of the Court of Cassation, it must lay down 
acceptable reasons for its judgment and not depart from the apparent meaning of the 
contract. Therefore, the Court of Cassation may exercise its power to review the 
qualification of unfair terms by the trial court on the basis of whether it has arrived at its 
conclusion in accordance with the law and in consistence 
 
4.3.2 Determination of the appropriate remedy for unfair terms 
 
Art. 81 makes it possible to classify the characteristics of the control system of unfair terms 
as follows: (i) a request for intervention must be made by the adhering party as the court 
does not have the power to intervene ex proprio motu, (ii) the court has full discretionary 
power to revise the unfair terms, (iii) the court may either amend or eliminate the terms, 
and (iv) its discretion should be exercised in accordance with the principle of justice. These 
points will be discussed in turn below. 
 
4.3.2.1 The nature of the court’s power to revise unfair terms: Optional power 
 
One of the defining features of the Kuwaiti regime for the protection against unfair terms is 
that the code has vested the court with pure discretionary power to intervene in the 
adhesion contract. Before the court can intervene and exercise its power to amend or 
eliminate the unfair terms, a submission must first be made by the adhering party 
 
475 See, for example, Com. Cass. No. 25/96, 1/12/1992; see also, Ibrahim Abu Allail, Contract and Unilateral 
Will, p. 262; Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 803. Hence, if the parties describe the contract as a lease contract, 
whereas it is in fact a contract of sale, then the court may change its description under the supervision of the 
Court of Cassation. 
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requesting the court to revise the terms. Yet, the court is not obliged to answer the adhering 
party’s application to revise the terms, even if it concludes that the terms are indeed unfair. 
This appears from the wording of Art. 81 which reads: "If the contract is concluded by way 
of adhesion and includes unfair terms, the court may [emphasis added] . . . amend the terms 
to alleviate unfairness or relieve the adhering party from their application".  
From the viewpoint of the researcher, the present wording of this article is 
unsatisfactory because it does not impose an obligation on the court to revise terms, even 
when it ascertains the existence of the unfair aspect. Making the exercise of the judicial 
power to revise476 the terms discretionary rather than mandatory defeats the very purpose 
of the establishment of a remedial system against unfair terms. If the legal rationale behind 
granting the court the power to revise unfair terms is to restore the balance in favour of the 
weak party, then why make it discretionary? The weakness and vulnerability of the weak 
party throughout the contract stages and beyond, such as during legal proceedings, justify 
an intervention from an external power to enforce the law, especially if the party was 
unaware of his rights or faces difficulties in enforcing them.477 
Such judicial passivity in disputes involving unfair terms contributes to their 
proliferation in the market. Against the deficiency of this approach it might be appropriate 
to seek a solution in another context and learn how other jurisdictions addressed this issue. 
In the EU, the question of whether national courts are entitled under the Directive to assess 
the unfair nature of contractual terms on its own motion has been raised in the ECJ. The 
ECJ first addressed this question in Océano.478 Its judgment in this case is of considerable 
importance because the Directive does not elaborate on whether national courts have such 
power. However, the ECJ ruled that "The protection provided for consumers by the 
 
476 By ‘revise’ is meant the power to amend or eliminate the terms of the contract. The word ‘revise’ has been 
chosen to cover both powers. 
477 This view is consistent with the recent developments in European law where the European Court of 
Justice decreed that national courts in disputes involving unfair terms not only had a right to assess terms on 
their own motion, but also an obligation; see the Oceano and Cofidis cases below. 
478 ECJ Judgment of 27 June 2000, Joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció 
Murciano Quintero ECR I-04941. 
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Directive of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts entails the national court 
being able to determine on its own motion whether a term of a contract before it is unfair 
when making its preliminary assessment as to whether a claim should be allowed to 
proceed before the national courts". The court reasoned that the objective of the protection 
system would not be achieved if the consumer, out of his ignorance of the law, were 
himself required to raise the unfair nature of the terms: "The imbalance between the 
consumer and the seller or supplier may only be corrected by positive action unconnected 
with the actual parties to the contract".479 Thus, the effective protection of the consumer 
can be attained only if national courts are able to examine unfair terms of their own accord. 
480 Furthermore, this may act as a deterrent and contribute to the prevention of unfair terms 
in consumer contracts.481 
In later judgments, such as Cofidis482 and Mostaza Claro,483 the ECJ even went a 
step further and extended the national courts’ competence and declared that they were not 
only allowed to assess unfair terms ex officio, but had the obligation to do so. This dictum 
was confirmed in Pannon.484 However, the ECJ specified in this case that such an 
obligation existed "where it ha[d] available to it the legal and factual elements necessary 
for that task".485 Therefore, the court is required to examine the terms on its own motion 
only when it has the necessary factual and legal elements available to do so.486 
Furthermore, the ECJ ruled that where the national court considered a term to be unfair, it 
must not apply it, except if the consumer opposed the non-application.487 
 
479 Para 27. 
480 Para. 26.   
481 Para. 28. 
482 ECJ judgment of 21 November 2002, C-473/00, Cofidis v Fredout [2002] ECR I-10875. 
483 ECJ judgment of 26 October 2006, C-168/05, Elisa María Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL 
[2006] ECR I-10421. 
484 ECJ judgment of 4 June 2009, C‑243/08, Pannon GSM Zrt. v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi [2009] ECR I-
4713. 
485 Para 32. 
486 See also the Opinion of the Advocate General Trstenjak delivered on 6 July 2010 in C‑137/08, VB 
Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v Ferenc Schneider [2010] ECR I-0000. 
487 Para 35. 
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The ECJ’s interpretations of the role that national courts have to play in unfair 
terms disputes represent a significant development in the field of consumer protection. 
This development provides an opportunity for comparative lawyers to raise fundamental 
questions as to the role of the courts in civil litigations involving weak parties. In the view 
of the researcher, it is not sufficient in the context of unfair terms to leave the 
responsibility of raising the question of assessing such terms to the consumer because of 
his inferior position. The court should be empowered to play a more active role and raise 
this question of its own accord to deal with cases justly. To some, this proposition may 
seem radical because it departs from the traditional role of the courts in the civil process 
and calls for a more interventionist role in civil cases. Therefore, this shift of attitude may 
be opposed for reasons of party autonomy and judicial expansion. However, the 
intervention of the court to control unfair terms can hardly be regarded as an infringement 
of party autonomy as the court’s intervention in this context is to ensure that party 
autonomy does not transgress its natural limits and violate the rights of other individuals. 
Likewise, the positive role of the court in contractual relations can also be justified. 
Contract law, in addition to embracing autonomy values, seeks to promote social values. It 
is the court’s responsibility to ensure that the promotion of such social values is observed. 
Therefore, if a contract deviates from this goal by imposing unfair terms for pure 
individualistic reasons, then judicial discretion needs to step in. 
 
4.3.2.2 Amendment to terms 
 
The first remedy the court would consider in the course of its revision of unfair terms is 
their amendment. Amendment has been defined as the exclusion of the unfairness aspect 
while retaining the contract term itself.488 This remedy has been said to exceed the normal 
 
488 Abduhakam  Fodah, The Interpretation of Contracts in Egyptian and Comparative Law (Alexandria, 
Mosha’at Al-Ma’aref 1984) (in Arabic), p. 364.  
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power of the court and represents a serious departure from the prescribed role of the court 
in contract law.489 Such exceptional power has been recognized as being contrary to the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda due to the particularity of the adhesion contract in which 
one party is left at the mercy of the other.490  
Although the just sanction for unfair terms appears to be their nullity and 
elimination from the contract, the code has introduced this remedy because it bases the 
protection regime on the notion of "removal of the injury" caused by unfair terms.491 This 
notion defines the limits of the power of the court. It proceeds from the assumption that if 
the removal of the injury can be achieved without the elimination of the disputed term, 
then the term should be preserved by removing the unfairness aspect alone. By introducing 
the remedy of amendment, the code seeks to strike a balance between the need to promote 
contractual justice in favour of the adhering party and the stability of contracts in the 
market. It attempts to correct the contractual injustice arising from the misuse of party 
autonomy without undermining the institution of contract. This solution stems from a more 
general and fundamental objective in the code of saving the contract by keeping it alive as 
far as possible to avoid its dissolution. The court will exercise its power to terminate the 
contract only as a last resort. The objective of saving the contract extends to individual 
contract terms and the court will not attempt to eliminate unfair terms unless it is certain 
that the removal of the unfair part of the term is not feasible. However, not all contractual 
terms are capable of amendment, either due to their nature, such as if the obligation is 
indivisible, or when they represent the primary motive for the offeror to enter into the 
contract and their amendment would render his participation in the contract without a 
cause. 
 
489 Mohsen  Al-Baih, p. 154. 
490 Mohmoud J. Zaki, A Concise Commentary on the Obligation Theory (Cairo, Cairo University Press 1976) 
(in Arabic), p. 292 
491 Abdulfattah Abdulbaqi, p. 187. 
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The above discussion leads one to raise an important question: What is the extent 
of the courts’ power to amend unfair terms? What does this remedy entail? In fact, there is 
no one answer to this question, since the nature of the court’s exercise of its power to 
amend the unfair terms varies from one contract to another and according to the unfair 
term itself. The unfair aspect may relate to a monetary sum the adhering party is requested 
to pay in case of default, such as a penalty. An example of this sort of terms is liquidated 
damages and high disciplinary penalties in employment contracts. If the court finds the 
penalty to be excessive, it may bring it down to a proportionate level to the damage 
caused.492 The unfair term may also relate to a period of time, such as obliging the policy 
holder in insurance contracts to report the occurrence of the insured risk within a very short 
space of time, otherwise he would forfeit his right to compensation. In any case, the court 
may remove the unfair aspect by prolonging this short period to a reasonable period.493 
The power to amend the terms, however, does not mean that the court is 
empowered to rewrite the contract by creating new obligations for the offeror or cause 
radical changes to the term to the degree of changing its nature. The court has been 
conferred with such power as an exception to the general rule and its exercise should 
remain within the defined bounds. Thus, it is only entitled to make necessary changes to an 
existing obligation, but not add a new one under the excuse of re-balancing the obligations 
of the parties.  
It may be appropriate at this juncture to consider whether the inclusion of the 
amendment remedy is justified and achieves the desired objective. The ECJ addressed this 
issue in Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino,494 in which it was 
invited to answer whether the national courts were allowed to modify the content of unfair 
terms. It ruled that it followed from the wording of Art. 6(1) of the Directive that the 
 
492 Ibrahim Abu Allail, Contract and Unilateral Will, p. 262; Said Abdussalam, p. 15. 
493 The code in Art. 783 has gone as far as declaring forfeiture clauses in insurance contracts null if the policy 
holder shows that the failure to report the occurrence of the event on time was due to a valid excuse. 
494 ECJ judgment of 14 June 2012, C-618/10. 
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national courts were only permitted to exclude the application of unfair terms, without 
being authorized to modify their content. It reasoned that if the national court were 
permitted to modify unfair terms, then that would contribute to eliminating the dissuasive 
effect on businesses.495 Additionally, allowing national courts such power would 
compromise the attainment of the objective of Art. 7(1) of the Directive, which seeks to 
prevent the continued use of unfair terms in consumer contracts.496  
The same can be said about the remedy of amendment provided in the Kuwaiti 
Civil Code. Although it has been introduced to save the contract as concluded between the 
parties, it is likely, nevertheless, to have adverse effects on the interests of the adhering 
party. Allowing the court to preserve the term after excluding its unfair aspect would tempt 
businesses to continue to incorporate them in their contracts because they know that even if 
they were found unfair, the original term could be amended by the court but nevertheless 
be preserved. Accordingly, it might be in the best interest of the adhering party to provide 
elimination as the only remedy against unfair terms.   
 
4.3.2.3 Elimination of terms 
 
If the injury caused by the unfair terms cannot be removed by amendment, then the trial 
court will attempt to eliminate them altogether from the contract. Elimination simply 
means relieving the adhering party from the application of unfair terms.  
The power to eliminate unfair terms has been described by some authors as a 
"dangerous weapon in the hands of the judge"497 because it enables the court to render 
ineffective a contractual term, contrary to the general rules in contract law that promote 
and protect party autonomy. Some authors have even attacked the introduction of the 
contra proferentem rule in adhesion contracts, and described it as an unwarranted and 
 
495 Para.s 65–69. 
496 See also the Opinion of the Advocate General Trstenjak delivered on 14 February 2012, paras 86–88.  
497 Said Abdussalam, p. 15. 
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unwise step for it grants the courts arbitrary power that might disturb the contractual 
balance and lead to uncertainty in commercial relations.498 This argument, however, has 
the weakness of presupposing that the adhesion contract is balanced where it is, in fact, 
unbalanced from the outset and before the intervention of the court. The role of the court is 
to restore the balance of the contract by alleviating unfairness in the adhesion contact to 
achieve contractual justice and stabilize transactions in the market. Furthermore, the 
arbitrary exercise of discretionary power, if it existed, can always be repressed and 
corrected by the Court of Cassation whose role it is to ensure uniformity of judgments. 
The code uses a rather confusing phrase to describe the act of elimination by 
referring to ‘relieve’ instead of ‘invalidate’ or ‘annul’. This is probably to assert the nature 
of unfair terms and emphasise the fact that they are not illegal on their face. However, at 
the same time, the phrase is problematic because it does not really explain the legal effect 
of unfair terms, especially if one takes into account that the code in other provisions has 
expressly declared some of them null.499 So, why has this phrase been chosen specifically? 
It seems to the researcher that the drafters, for lack of a better term, sought to use a phrase 
that is neutral and broad enough to cover the appropriate remedy for terms whether they 
are per se unfair or presumably unfair and have the potential effect of causing serious 
imbalance in the contract.500  
Another uncertainty caused by the wording of the text is that it provides no 
answer to the question of whether the requirement of submitting a request for the revision 
of unfair terms applies to statutorily prohibited terms as well. If such terms have been 
statutorily declared null on the basis of their violation of the public policy, should not the 
court eliminate them on its own motion without application by the adhering party? It is 
 
498 Abdulmonem Faraj Assada, pp. 407–408. 
499 A clear example is Art. 784(b) which provides: "Any of the following terms appearing in a policy of 
insurance shall be null . . . (b) any unfair term, the breach of which appears to have no effect on the 
occurrence of the insured risk". 
500 This is the writer’s personal understanding and it is unfortunate that no studies could be found to back up 
this opinion. For further details, see the discussion on the taxonomy of contractual terms in the KCC and the 
legal effect of unfair terms in chapter four. 
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unfortunate that the code does not provide a clear answer to this question. However, one 
could say that there are two possible courses of action the court may take. First, it could 
adhere to the literal meaning of Art. 81 and abstain from assessing the terms on its own 
motion because it cannot exercise its power without an application by the adhering party. 
The second possible course is that the court raises the question of nullity of the terms of its 
own account and eliminates them from the contract on the basis that the code grants it 
jurisdiction to review absolutely null terms without the need for an application by the 
adhering party. It is difficult to determine which course of action a court might prefer to 
follow. However, if one takes into account the narrow interpretive approach to which the 
courts currently adhere, especially with regard to adhesion contracts, then one should not 
be too optimistic about their intervention to annul unfair terms on their own motion. 
A further point that merits consideration is whether the court is entitled to exercise 
its power to eliminate the terms before attempting to amend them. There is nothing in the 
text that suggests that the court is obliged to attempt to amend the terms before eliminating 
them; rather, the contrary is the case. It appears from the wording of Art. 81 that the court 
is empowered to eliminate the terms  directly as the text uses the conjunction ‘or’ to 
indicate a choice between two alternatives.501 Thus, the court may decide to eliminate 
unfair terms if it finds it to be fairer and a more equitable remedy than amendment. 
Moreover, some contractual clauses cannot be amended due to their indivisible nature, 
which makes their elimination the only possible means to alleviate unfairness.  
So, if the court determines that a term is unfair and null, and decides to eliminate 
it from the contract, what effect would this have on the remainder of the contract? The 
answer to this question can be found in Art. 190 KCC. It provides that "(i) if part of the 
contract is null or annullable, then that part alone would be null without the remainder of 
the contract. (ii) However, if one of the parties shows that he would not have entered into 
 
501 "The court may amend the terms to alleviate unfairness or relieve the adhering party from their 
application". 
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the contract without the null or the annullable part, then the entire contract becomes null". 
Thus, elimination of unfair terms does not entail annulment of the entire contract, unless it 
appears from the will of the parties that they would not have contracted with each other 
without the excluded tainted part. 
It is worthwhile noting in this context that the court’s jurisdiction is restricted to 
the exclusion of the unfair term only and does not extend to the annulment of the entire 
contract under the pretext of protecting the adhering party. The code confers the power to 
revise the contract as an exception to the general rules, and exceptions should be 
interpreted restrictively. However, if it appears to the court that the excluded term 
constitutes an essential part of the bargain in the sense that the contract cannot continue to 
exist without it, then it may annul the whole contract.502 
 
4.3.3 Guarantees the code provides for the proper application of the protection system 
 
In order to ensure effective application of the protection system, the code contains two 
important rules that aim at preventing the offeror from evading the protection afforded the 
adhering party. 
First, the code extends protection regardless of whether or not the adhering party 
was aware of the unfair terms. This means that the protection applies even if the offeror 
brought those terms to the direct attention of the adhering party. Therefore, the latter’s 
knowledge or ignorance of the terms is irrelevant for the application of protection. His 
awareness of the inclusion of the unfair terms does not alter the fact that he still lacks 
meaningful choice.503 It is hard to envisage the existence of such a choice, hence, genuine 
consent, in contracts between grossly unequal parties if there has not been real negotiation. 
 
502 Cf. Mohammad Bendary, pp. 98–99.  
503 Hassan Gemei, The Effect of Inequality between Contractors on the Contract Terms, p. 243. 
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The extension of protection of the terms the adhering party was aware of 
represents a significant improvement in the protection system against unfair terms which 
used to, until the second half of the twentieth century, equate knowledge to consent and 
restricted the protection to terms that the adhering party did not know or could not have 
known about.504 Moreover, it has an advantage from a procedural perspective. It relieves 
the parties from the burden of proving knowledge or implied acceptance, and spares the 
courts’ time by allowing them to concentrate on the substance of the dispute.505 
Although the simple meaning of the word awareness denotes knowledge or 
realization, its actual meaning, in the researcher’s opinion and as implied by the text, 
should not be confined to this limited sense. Rather, it should be interpreted broadly to 
include even those terms to which the adhering party has expressly consented. It is not 
uncommon in practice for the offeror to demand that the consumer signs on each page of 
the contract document to indicate that he has read and understood its content thoroughly 
for the purpose of evidencing that he had choice. Thus, the inclusion of this rule provides 
an extra layer of protection against abusive exercises of the strong party.506 It is laudable 
that the drafters have included this important rule to prevent any possible dispute on the 
question of whether the protection applies to unfair terms of which the adhering party was 
aware. Confining the protection to only the terms that the adhering party knew about 
would allow the rules to be easily circumvented by professionals, consequently, 
emasculating the purpose of the protection offered.  
The second guarantee the code provides for the proper application of the 
protection system is the mandatory nature of the court’s power. The rules that vest in the 
 
504 For an overview of this development, see Abdulmonem Faraj Assada, p. 285 et seq.; Atef Abdulhamid 
Hasan, pp. 113–114. 
505 The courts sought to broaden the protection in favour of the adhering party by introducing the notion of 
‘sufficient knowledge’ as a requirement for the admittance of unfair terms. The offeror was, therefore, 
required to make the unfair terms visible in order to be enforceable, Abdulmonem Faraj Assada, pp. 288–
290. 
506 It has been argued by some that the adhering party should not be qualified for protection if the unfair 
terms were hand-written while the rest of the contract was typed, seemingly because he had the freedom not 
to contract, and in addition this would provide more stability to transactions. However, this argument has 
been rejected and did not find support, Atef Abdulhamid Hasan, p. 113. 
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court the jurisdiction to revise unfair terms are of mandatory character and cannot be 
ousted by agreement because they are of public policy. Every agreement to the contrary of 
this rule is void. If such an agreement were to have legal effect, it would subject the 
application of the law to the will of the parties. Consequently, it would render the 
protection conferred on the adhering party inoperative because it allows professionals to 
include such term in every adhesion contract.507 
 
4.3.4 Effect of unfair terms on the entire contract 
 
If the court were to find that a certain clause was indeed unfair and decided to exclude it 
from the contract, what effect would this have on the remainder of the contract? In order to 
answer this question, the court’s power to revise unfair terms must first be qualified and an 
attempt must be made to find a basis for it in the Civil Code.  
Abu Allail508 has argued that the court’s power to revise unfair terms whether by 
elimination or amendment is a direct application of the notion of ‘reduction’ (i.e., partial 
nullity) as regulated in Art. 190 KCC. Art. 190 provides: "(i) If part of the contract is void 
or voidable then the effect shall be limited to that part alone without the remainder of the 
contract. (ii) However, if one of the parties proves that he would not have entered into the 
contract without the affected part then the entire contract becomes void". Apparently, the 
principal rationale for including this provision in the code is to conserve the contract and 
increase the certainty of transactions by limiting the effect of nullity to the invalid parts, 
instead of extending it to the whole transaction. 
 
507 Abd-Alrazzaq Al-Sanhuri, p. 300. 
508 Ibrahim  Abu Allail, 'The Scope and Conditions for the Reduction of Juridical Acts' (n 307) p. 82. 
Frequent referral will be made to this study throughout this section because it is the only study that has 
thoroughly discussed the notion of reduction in the KCC and in comparative law.  
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Reduction has been defined as a judicial means of correcting a partly defective 
contract by excluding the defective part to avoid the nullity of the entire contract;509 in 
other words, it is a mechanism that seeks to limit the effects of a null part of a contract by 
preventing it from being extended to the valid remainder whenever possible. Therefore, 
reduction can be seen as a consequence of partial nullity; they are not synonyms. This is 
because partial nullity is a legal state, while reduction is a judicial act that seeks to correct 
a partially null contract.510 
In order for the court to exercise its power to reduce the contract, it must satisfy 
requirements. The first requirement is the partial nullity of the contract. This is when 
certain parts or individual clauses of the contract become void or voidable. Such as when a 
contract involves two transactions but one of them is void, or when it includes a null 
clause. Nullity, however, as some scholars have argued,511 should be given a broad 
meaning to cover any defect that infects the contract. Therefore, the application of 
reduction to adhesion contracts cannot be challenged on the grounds that the theory only 
applies to void or voidable contracts, but rather the theory is sufficiently broad to be 
applied to any partially defective contract even if not void or voidable. 
Secondly, the contract must be divisible in the sense that the valid remainder of 
the contract is capable of continuing to exist independently from the invalid part and 
remain in full force to produce legal effects; in other words, the divisibility must be 
possible from a technical perspective. This is an axiomatic requirement as the exclusion of 
the defective part can only be made if the contract can be separated into defective and valid 
parts.512 Thus, before the court amends or excludes the defective part, it will first have to 
 
509 Ibrahim Abu Allail, ‘The Legal Meaning of Reducing Juridical Acts’ (1987) 11(3) JouroL 61, p. 115. 
510 In support of this view, see ibid., p. 119. 
511 Ibrahim  Abu Allail, ' The Scope and Conditions for the Reduction of Juridical Acts' (n 307), p. 83. 
512 Ibid, p. 90. Abu Allail pointed out that one of the characteristics of the notion of reduction is that it does 
not alter the legal nature of the contract and its effect is limited to the elimination of the invalid part without 
affecting the essence of the transaction, p. 355. This is in contrast to the notion of conversion of void contract 
which allows the replacement of a void contract by a different and valid contract if elements of a valid 
contract can be derived from the void contract, (Art. 191 of the Kuwaiti Civil Code). Needless to say, the 
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assess whether the contract can be divided and that the remaining part of the contract is 
capable of taking a life of its own, independently of the defective pArt.  
This is only conceivable, and this is the third requirement, if the defective part is 
not the determining factor in the contract. If it appears to the court that this part was the 
inducement to enter into the contract, even for the sake of one party only,513 then the 
reduction cannot be achieved, which would lead to the collapse of the contract as a 
whole.514 This means that the criterion for reduction is primarily subjective and is 
determined on the basis of the intention of the parties. Therefore, the contract will continue 
to exist after the exclusion of the unfair terms, unless one of the parties (naturally the 
professional in adhesion consumer contracts) proves that he would not have concluded the 
contract without such terms. It is incumbent on the party who seeks avoidance of the 
contract to show that the defective part was the determining factor in the conclusion of the 
contract.515 However, the submission of such defence should be made in accordance with 
the principle of good faith516 and should not be used by the professional as a bridge to 
escape the fulfilment of his obligations. The trial court has full discretionary power to 
accept or refuse the professional’s application without being subject to the supervision of 
the Court of Cassation because such defence is a matter of fact.  
 
court cannot proceed to reduce or convert the contact against the will of the contracting parties. As a general 
rule, their acceptance is central to the practice of both mechanisms. 
513 Ibid., p. 115. 
514 , The Explanatory Notes to the Civil Code explain that the entire contract in this case becomes invalid due 
to the invalidity of the cause of the contract. In the view of the drafters, if the invalid part is the determining 
factor of contracting, then it is actually the main cause of contracting which illegality or absence renders the 
contract null, p. 179. Abu Allail, however, disagrees with this generalisation and argues that while the two 
ideas coincide and overlap in meaning, the absolute equation between the notion of cause and the notion of 
the determining factor is not completely accurate; see Ibrahim  Abu Allail, ' The Scope and Conditions for 
the Reduction of Juridical Acts' (n. 307), pp. 113–115 of his article cited above. In his view, while both 
notions derive from the will and intention of the parties, the determining factor of contracting may not always 
be the cause of the contract. While the cause is an essential requirement for the formation of the contract and 
is relevant to its validity, the determining factor can some cases be more no more than a physiological 
element that induced the party to enter into the contract. In such cases it is less important than the cause of 
the contract. A simple example would be a consumer who opts to purchase a car for his personal use (this 
would be the cause) from a particular car dealer because the dealers offers a more flexible payment scheme 
(flexibility of payment being the determining factor). 
515 Art. 190(2) KCC. See also, Com. Cass. No. 190/1993, 8/3/1994 and, Ibrahim  Abu Allail, p. 118. 
516 Ibid. 
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The above does not mean that the criterion for the reduction of the contract is 
always subjective as the court may in certain cases impose the reduction against the 
parties’ intention and even if the invalid part was the determining factor in contracting. 
This is when the application of reduction is required by an express statutory provision.517 
A good example is Art. 547 KCC pertaining to Contracts of Loan. This article declares 
void any contractual stipulation that provides an interest in a contract of loan between 
individuals, but without prejudice to the contract itself which will continue to exist and 
bind the parties. In this example the code expressly invalidates usurious clauses but, at the 
same time, asserts that the invalidity shall have no effect on the remainder of the contract. 
Thus, as the text suggests, if such a clause is brought before the court then it would confine 
the invalidity ruling to the clause alone without extending the invalidity to the entire 
contract, even if usury was the determining factor in contracting for the lender. Here, the 
will of the legislator replaces the will of the parties, and the intention or the will of the 
lender is insignificant inasmuch as the interest the code seeks to protect the interest of the 
borrower, is greater than the interest pursued by the lender who seeks invalidation of the 
contract due to the invalidity of his usurious clause.518 
Can the notion of reduction (or partial nullity) be regarded as the theoretical and 
statutory basis of the court’s exercise of its discretionary power with regard to unfair 
terms? In the opinion of the researcher the answer is yes, but requires an explanation. 
A careful reading of articles 175.2 and 190.1519 KCC reveals that the general rule 
is that the invalidity of a certain part of the contract does not entail the invalidity of the 
entire contact, unless it is expressly stated otherwise in the code. So, against the silence of 
 
517 Abu Allail has dubbed this type of reduction ‘obligatory reduction’; ibid, p. 122 . 
518 It is worthwhile mentioning that the code considers a loan between individuals as an act of benevolence 
and a means of alleviating the hardship of the needy. The charging of money lent to others conflicts with the 
spirit of sympathy and co-operation that should prevail in society. The prohibition of usurious loans in the 
Civil Code finds its basis in the Holy Qur’ān chapter 2 verse 275: "Allah has permitted trade and forbidden 
usury". See also, The Explanatory Notes to the Civil Code, p. 408. 
519 Art. 175(2) provides that if the contract contains an unlawful stipulation, then the stipulation alone shall 
be void and the contract shall remain valid. However, if one of the parties shows that he would have not 
consented to the contract without such stipulation, in this case the entire contract shall be void. Similarly, Art. 
109(1) establishes a similar rule and confines the scope invalidity to the tainted part of the contract only. 
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article 81 KCC on the effect of the invalidity of unfair terms on the rest of the contract it 
seems to the researcher that the general rule applies and the invalidity of unfair terms does 
not import the nullity of the entire contract. The judicial pronouncement of an unfair term 
as null should have no effect on the remainder of the contract, even if the unfair term was a 
determining factor in the offeror’s conclusion of the contract. Thus, if the court finds that 
the contract is severable, then it would naturally invalidate the unfair terms alone without 
extending the invalidity to the rest of the contract. This interpretation is not only consistent 
with the apparent meaning of articles 175.2 and 190.1 KCC, but also benefits the adhering 
party and strengthens his position vis-à-vis the offeror. It prevents and sanctions the offeror 
who in bad faith seeks to invalidate the entire contract on the grounds of the notion of 
determining factor if the court decides to invalidate the unfair terms he inserted into the 
contract. This conclusion may be readily accepted with regard to statutorily prohibited 
unfair terms (i.e., blacklisted terms)520 because they are void in all circumstances and the 
court must, as it appears from the wording of the article, invalidate them of its own motion 
on the grounds of being statutorily proscribed.521 However, does the notion of reduction 
apply to potentially unfair terms too despite the fact that they are not invalid on their face? 
The researcher is inclined to adopt the view advanced by some scholars that the broadness 
of the notion of reduction allows its application to any defective juridical act, even if the 
defect does not amount to being void or voidable.522 Although Art. 175(1) provides that 
the parties are generally free to determine the content of their agreement and include any 
term they desire, this freedom is not absolute and the code explicitly prohibits the inclusion 
of contractual terms that breach the law or are contrary to public policy or good morals.523 
Therefore, the general rule is the lawfulness of the contractual terms. However, some terms 
have the potential to be unfair and their unfairness aspect does not appear at the time of the 
 
520 Such as clauses that exclude or limit the liability of the carrier from liability for personal injury in the 
contract of carriage; for further examples, see the previous chapter. 
521 See the discussion in chapter three on the taxonomy of contract terms in general and types of unfair terms. 
522 Ibrahim  Abu Allail, ' The Scope and Conditions for the Reduction of Juridical Acts' (n 307), p. 13 et seq. 
523 Art. 175(1) KCC. 
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formation of the contract, but rather upon their execution.524 While such terms are 
generally permissible, the manner in which they are executed turn them into unfair terms 
that upset the equilibrium of the contract and violate the spirit of the contract for the 
detriment they cause to the interests of the other contractor. Such contractual practice 
breaches the notion of social justice the KCC seeks to promote and the proliferation of 
unfair terms in the market is certainly against the public policy. 
Accordingly, it seems that the court’s exercise of its discretion to revise unfair 
terms is a direct application of the notion of reduction whether the exercise is in relation to 
elimination by exclusion or attenuation by amending them to alleviate the unfairness 
aspect. 
 
4.3.5 The burden of proving unfairness 
 
Although the KCC is silent as to who bears the burden of proving the unfair character of a 
clause, the common rule in evidence law is that the burden of proof rests on the party who 
makes a claim in his interest that affects the other party, whether this is the plaintiff or the 
defendant (actori incumbit probatio).525 Thus, this general rule implies that the burden of 
proof lies with the party who claims that the term is indeed unfair, that is, the adhering 
party. It is his duty under the risk of losing the dispute to establish facts that support his 
claim and characterize them in legal terms. However, in the light of the absence of a 
statutory definition of unfairness on which the adhering party can rely, his chance of 
persuading the court of his claim seems slim. 
The basis for the allocation of the burden of proof in civil and commercial 
disputes is provided in Art. 1 of the law of evidence526 that "the creditor has to prove the 
existence of the obligation and the debtor has to prove that he is free from the obligation". 
 
524 See chapter three. 
525 Fathi  Waly, p. 572; Abdulrasol Abudlredha and Jamal Al-Nakkas, p. 360. 
526 Law No. 39/1980 on the issuance of the Evidence Law in Civil and Commercial Matters. 
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This article establishes a very important principle in evidence that the burden of proving 
the legal incident is on the claimant. The claimant does not necessarily mean the party who 
initiates the proceedings, but any party who disputes to the contrary of an existing 
situation.527 The rationale behind placing the burden of proof on the claimant, as the Court 
of Cassation puts it, is that individuals are presumed to be free from liability and whoever 
argues the contrary has to prove his allegation.528 If the claimant succeeds in his allegation 
and establishes the liability of the respondent, then the burden of proof shifts to the latter.  
The allocation of the burden of proof on the claimant is justifiable in disputes 
between equal parties. However, there are instances where the contract manifests gross 
inequality between the parties due to the superiority of the party that prepares the contract. 
This is especially right in the case of adhesion contracts. The presumed equality does not 
exist in such contracts due to the inherent weakness of the adhering party throughout the 
contract stages and beyond. It is unlikely that an average adhering party will be able to 
show the unfairness of the term as in legal proceedings as this normally requires legal and 
factual knowledge, which most consumers do not possess. Additionally, the length of the 
legal proceedings and the high cost of legal representation discourage consumers from 
seeking legal assistance, especially if the dispute involves a small claim. Therefore, placing 
the burden of proving the unfairness of the terms on the adhering party who lacks 
sufficient legal and technical knowledge seems unduly burdensome and renders the 
protection system largely ineffective. 
In order to make the protection system more efficient in eliminating unfair terms, 
it would be appropriate to revisit the burden of proof rule and attempt to remedy the weak 
position of the adhering party. One way of achieving this is by reversing the burden of 
proof by introducing a threshold test of unfairness and categorizing unfair terms into two 
lists. The first is a black list that comprises terms that are considered unfair and void in all 
 
527 Explanatory Notes to the Law of Evidence. 
528 Com. Cass. No. 69/1992, 6/12/1992. 
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circumstances, and the second is a grey list that includes terms that are potentially unfair 
depending on the circumstances. If the disputed term corresponds to a term on the black 
list, then this would create an irrefutable presumption that the term is unfair because the 
prohibition of such terms is a matter of public policy. In contrast, if the term corresponds to 
a term on the grey list, then this does not mean that the term is necessarily unfair, but rather 
is presumed to be unfair and the burden of proving its fairness shall be incumbent on the 
offeror who has to show the fairness of the term is he wishes to rely on it. 
However, this does not mean that if a term does not fall within either list that it is 
automatically fair, since it is impossible to draft a comprehensive list that includes every 
unfair term in the market. Rather, if the unlisted term is suspected of being unfair and has 
the effect of creating a significant imbalance between the rights and obligations of the 
parties, then it should be examined in the light of the general unfairness test. In all cases, if 
the offeror inserts an onerous term into the contract, he shall bear the burden of proving its 
fairness. 
The rationale behind reversing the burden of proof is that the offeror in adhesion 
contract is normally a business that possesses greater resources and has better access to 
information than its consumers, and when an unfair term is inserted into the contract, then 
the business should justify why such a term was included. It must be borne in mind that 
unfair terms represent a departure from the normal rules in contract law as they alter the 
rights and obligations of the adhering party in favour of the business. If the offeror wishes 
to rely on an unfair term, then it is for him to justify the deviation from the normal rules, 
especially when one takes into the account his refusal to discuss his terms before the 
formation of the contact. 
The reversal of the burden of proof seems a just and practical solution for both 
parties. It would also contribute to the stability of transactions in the market as it enhances 
legal certainty and contractual predictability in so far as it obliges the offeror who prepares 
the terms unilaterally to reconsider the insertion of unfair terms or risk their elimination 
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from the contract. However, this could only be achieved if a general test of unfairness is 
established, backed up by black and grey lists of unfair terms. 
 
4.3.6 Restrictions on the court’s exercise of its power to revise unfair terms 
 
The code provides in Art. 81 that the court shall exercise its discretionary power to revise 
unfair terms in accordance with the principle of justice. Apparently, this criterion has been 
incorporated into the text to serve a dual purpose. First, as a signpost to guide the court in 
deciding the appropriate action to be taken against an unfair term and, secondly, as a 
restriction on the court’s exercise of its power. Therefore, the court must reach a just result 
and provide grounds for its decision, otherwise it would be susceptible to reversal on 
appeal. 
One of the advantages of this criterion is that it gives the court ample room to 
correct contractual unfairness and reach equitable results, whether by elimination or 
attenuation by virtue of its flexibility and elasticity. Some have described this criterion as 
an ethical principle aimed at creating equality between individuals ultimately to establish 
balance in the legal relationship.529 Thus, it is perceived as the only influence on the 
court’s decision to achieve fairness.530  
However, as with other open-ended norms, the flexibility and broadness of the 
principle of justice may give rise to conflicting interpretations by the courts due to its 
obscurity and lack of definitive meaning.531 In addition, its application might prove 
problematic as the understanding of what is just differs from one individual judge to 
another and from time to time.532 Therefore, what is needed instead of such an open-ended 
norm that may give rise to arbitrary results is a more specific formula that the court should 
 
529 Abduhakam  Fodah, p. 363. 
530 Ibid. The principle of justice resonates in several articles in the code, especially in the context of 
rebalancing the obligations of the parties; see articles 50, 51, 160, 195, 306. 
531 Ibid, 363; Said Abdussalam, p. 17. 
532 Ibid. 
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take into account when assessing a term to mitigate the effect of any possible uncertainty 
about the meaning of unfairness. 
A look at the matter from a comparative perspective reveals that the modern trend 
is the inclusion of complementary criteria that the court should take into consideration 
besides the general test of unfairness in the process of assessing an unfair term. In this 
regard, the Directive provides a more logical and practical approach. It combines an 
abstract assessment that focuses on the substantive content of a term533 with a procedural 
assessment that takes into account the way in which the contract was concluded. In the 
procedural assessment Art. 4 of the Directive identifies supplementary criteria that the 
courts should take into account in the assessment process. These criteria are: (i) the nature 
of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded, (ii) the circumstances 
attending the conclusion of the contract, and (iii) the interdependence of the term in 
question to other terms of the contract or of another related contract. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The analysis carried out above shows that the prescribed role of the Kuwaiti court in unfair 
terms disputes needs to be reconsidered in several aspects. Although the code entrusts the 
court with wide discretionary power to revise unfair terms, whether by elimination or 
attenuation, the lack of ex proprio motu control of unfair terms renders the protection 
system ineffective to a great extent. The adhering party as an inferior party may not be able 
to defend his rights during the proceedings; therefore, the imposition of a duty on the court 
to examine unfair terms on its own motion would compensate for the imbalance in the 
relationship between the adhering party and the professional. The enhancement of the 
weak position of the adhering party also requires shifting the burden of proving the fairness 
 
533 Art. 3 of the Directive provides: "a contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be 
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer".  
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of the term to the professional. If he wishes to rely on a term he inserted in the contract, 
then it should be incumbent on him to prove the fairness of the term. The effective 
operation of the control system requires revisiting the remedies provided against unfair 
terms, too, and allow for the elimination of the unfair terms as the only remedy for the 
inclusion of unfair terms. If the law acknowledges judicial modification of the terms, then 
this would encourage professionals to insert unfair terms, knowing that the court will only 
remove the unfair aspect but not the terms all together. Furthermore, this would diminish 
the preventative role of the rules. Lastly, the code should introduce supplementary factors 
to assist the court in the process of its assessment of unfair terms instead of the excessively 
broad principle of justice that does not have any specific meaning. 
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Chapter Five: Clearing Up the Market: A Proposal for the Establishment 
of Positive Enforcement Procedures 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
One of the major drawbacks of the present regulatory system of unfair terms in the Kuwaiti 
law is that it is a private litigation-based control system because it solely relies on private 
enforcement; in other words, the adhering party will not be able to avail himself of 
protection unless he resorts to the court and requests the revision of the allegedly unfair 
term(s). The scarcity of court decisions on adhesion contracts and the absence of any case 
in which unfair terms have been eliminated raise serious doubts as to whether private 
enforcement is a real solution to the problem and indicates that the courts alone are unable 
to provide efficient protection against unfair terms. This is naturally due to the reactive 
nature of private enforcement and the relativity of the res judicata in courts’ judgments 
under the Kuwaiti law of civil procedure. This suggests that a simultaneous means of 
redress should be established to provide effective protection for consumers. Therefore, it is 
perhaps necessary to introduce a public law preventative mechanism that actively seeks to 
rid the market of unfair terms prior to their imposition on consumers without the need to 
resort to private enforcement by entrusting the task of clearing the market to an 
administrative body that regulates unfair terms in advance.  
The aim of this chapter is to consider whether an administrative control 
mechanism of unfair terms should be established in Kuwait. Although public law 
enforcement is not the within the researcher’s area of speciality, an attempt will, 
nonetheless, be made to propose a general framework for an administrative model for the 
advance regulation and enforcement of unfair terms in the Kuwaiti market. The discussion 
will involve a look into the administrative regulation of unfair terms from a comparative 
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perspective to understand the regulatory approach in other jurisdictions and determine 
whether their adopted solutions can be implemented in the Kuwaiti context. 
 
5.2 Rationale for seeking a parallel enforcement mechanism  
 
For any protection system to be sound and effective, it not only requires the existence of 
well-conceived and strong substantive rules, but also an effective enforcement mechanism 
that can achieve a high level of compliance and respect for these rules. The enforcement 
mechanism as provided by the Kuwaiti law depends on individual litigation in which the 
adhering party must initiate a legal action against the offeror in order to challenge the 
unfairness of the terms.  
Basing the enforcement mechanism on individual litigation alone is insufficient 
and contributes to the failure of the protection system as a whole. The reasons for this are 
manifold and can be classified into two broad categories.  
The first category relates to the attitude of the adhering party himself and 
comprises reasons ranging from financial factors and psychological barriers to lack of 
sufficient legal knowledge.534 First of all, the cost of litigation and legal representation 
may serve to deter adhering parties from taking legal action against unfair terms. An 
ordinary individual may rationally decide not to initiate legal action against a large 
corporation on the grounds of unfairness for fear of losing or if the potential gains from 
bringing the dispute before the court are not significantly higher than the incurred costs. 
Ordinary individuals are unlike businesses and other well-funded organisations that usually 
have deep pockets to afford court litigation and face the financial risks involved. Secondly, 
naturally most individuals are not accustomed to lengthy commercial disputes that might 
stretch over a lengthy period. Indeed, a trial can turn out to be quite a mentally stressful 
 
534 Stefan Wrbka, Steven Van Uytsel and Mathias M. Siems, Collective Actions: Enhancing Access to Justice 
and Reconciling Multilayer Interests? (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012), p. 32; Ewoud 
Hondius, ‘Unfair Contract Terms - New Control Systems’ 26 AmJCompL 525, pp. 525–549; p. 528 n. 25. 
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experience for an individual due to the considerable amount of time and effort he needs to 
invest in court proceedings. Therefore, the fear of judicial proceedings is likely to make 
consumers psychologically less inclined to take legal action, especially against 
sophisticated businesses.535 Thirdly, an ordinary consumer would find it very difficult to 
argue for the unfairness of the term because of his insufficient knowledge of the 
substantive and procedural aspects of the law. 
The second category of reasons concerns the shortcomings associated with the 
institution of enforcement of the law on individual litigation alone, mainly because in 
practice such a mechanism has a limited effect and does not fulfil a preventative function. 
Rather, it leads to uncertain results, inadequate remedies and does not guarantee the 
uniformity of courts’ decisions.  
Since the professional typically has a much larger interest in the unfair term he 
inserts in the standard contract than the interest of the consumer, he will attempt to 
preserve the currency of the unfair terms and minimize his losses by convincing the 
consumer to settle the dispute out of court so that the judgment would not set a precedent. 
However, even if the matter reaches the court, it is as a matter of procedural law536 that a 
court’s decision pronouncing a term to be unfair creates a res judicata effect whose 
binding force is strictly limited to the parties to the case (inter partes) and to the particular 
dispute it determines. It does not prevent the same business from relying on the same 
clause in other standard contracts and even less that other businesses will cease using them 
in their standard contracts. Equally, the res judicata of the court’s decision enjoining the 
elimination of an unfair clause applies to the actual wording of the disputed term but not to 
the legal effects it produces.537 A resourceful professional can always rephrase the same 
 
535 Hondius ascribes the dislike of individuals to traditional courts to, inter alia, psychological causes such as 
"austere court buildings and antiquated rules of procedure", Ewoud Hondius, ‘Unfair Contract Terms - New 
Control Systems’p. 528. 
536 According to Art. (53) of Law 39/1980 concerning Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters, a court 
decision acquires res judicata to the dispute it resolves and its effect binds the parties to the dispute only. 
537 The European Commission has described the res judicata problem as a deficiency in the private 
enforcement mechanism which frustrates the proper implementation of the Directive in some Member States: 
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clause or simply replace it with another harsh clause to circumvent the court’s decision, 
which means that the consumer needs to challenge the clause again in order to eliminate it. 
For these reasons, the individual litigation mechanism for the enforcement of 
unfair terms is bound to fail to free the market of unfair terms. It has been argued by some 
that in the field of consumer protection regulation repeated lawsuits against inventive 
wrongdoers is an expensive and frustrating course: "One does not cure any serious 
breakdown in a theoretically competitive market system by case-to-case sniping, but one 
does not do much harm either".538 Indeed, consumer transactions in the modern 
marketplace are characterized by the prevalence of standardized contracts as a contracting 
paradigm where a large volume of agreements is concluded but each of which is relatively 
small in value. Only a handful of disputes would reach the courtroom and even if the court 
eliminates the unfair terms, a single and isolated case would not deter a professional and 
others like him from further breaches.539  
The above argument shows that effective consumer protection against unfair 
terms should be aimed at restricting the contents of the standard contract by a mandatory 
authority. Power can only be checked by another power. Therefore, what seems to be 
needed is the intervention from an external power that is able to remedy the significant 
imbalance caused by the professional’s abuse of power in favour of the consumer.540 A 
public enforcement mechanism offers many advantages. Unlike individual litigation, 
 
"There is a contradiction between the goal of the legislation on unfair terms and the result of its enforcement . 
. . the rules designed to protect consumers do not achieve their stated goal", Report from the Commission on 
the implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
COM (2000) 248 final , pp. 22–23. 
538 Arthur A Leff, ‘Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law Tradition’ 31 
UPittLRev 349, pp. 356–357; see also Larry Bates, ‘Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: 
A Comparative Analysis of Consumer Protection’ 16 Emory Int'l LRev 1, p. 105. 
539 David Slawson, ‘Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California’ 48 S Calif L Rev 1, p. 47. Bergh and 
Visscher also argue that private actions cannot achieve an adequate level of enforcement in consumer law 
due to what he calls the ‘free-rider’ problem where every victim prefers other victims to sue the professional 
so that they incur the cost and risk of the action, Roger Van den Bergh and Louis Visscher, ‘The Preventive 
Function of Collective Actions for Damages in Consumer Law’ 1 ELER 5, p. 16.  
540 In Océano Grupo (C-240/98) the ECJ at para 27 commented: "The system of protection laid down by the 
Directive is based on the notion that the imbalance between the consumer and the seller or supplier may only 
be corrected by positive action unconnected with the actual parties to the contract". The ECJ suggested that 
this positive action could come from a public arm of the government or ex officio intervention by the court. 
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public enforcement does not require individual initiative but rather the public body may 
initiate a legal action of its own accord whenever it believes that a certain term threatens 
the interests of consumers. A public body would naturally be equipped with qualified staff 
and adequate resources than an individual consumer would have at his disposal, which 
would enable it to see the broader picture, and assess the economic and social implications 
of a term. Besides that, public enforcement contributes to the promotion of uniformity of 
rules and guarantees legal certainty, since the results are considerably predictable.541 An 
action brought by the public body would have an erga omnes effect that benefits all 
consumers concerned as opposed to the inter partes effect produced in individual 
litigation. As precedents build up, professionals will be forced to take heed and scrutinize 
their standard contracts before offering them to the public.  
In the EU context the drawbacks posed by individual litigation have been offset 
by the Directive. By virtue of Art. 7, Member States are required to introduce adequate and 
effective means to prevent the continued use of unfair terms, including giving public 
authorities and organisations that represent consumers’ interests the right to take action on 
behalf of consumers. 
In the researcher’s view the ideal solution to the present deficient procedural 
enforcement of unfair terms under the Kuwaiti law is the introduction of public 
enforcement mechanism whereby an independent public body is authorized to monitor the 
market and actively seeks to prohibit the continued use of unfair terms. Additionally, if 
lessons are to be drawn from the European experience, it is evident that it is necessary to 
give consumer organisations standing to represent consumers and initiate proceedings on 
their behalf against unfair standard terms. 
The discussion that follows will attempt to address this point by proposing an 
alternative enforcement mechanism and will attempt to delineate the features of a public 
 
541 This, of course, depends on the existence of a clear concept of contractual unfairness that consists of a 
definition of unfairness and the provision of lists that contain unfair and potentially unfair terms.  
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enforcement model. However, before proceeding to the discussion it is beneficial to shed 
some light on the benefits of public enforcement and explore the different regulatory 
models that are implemented in other jurisdictions. 
 
5.3 Three levels of control 
 
The phenomenon of unfair contract terms is by no means restricted to a certain jurisdiction, 
but rather is a universal problem. Several countries, especially in Europe, have enacted 
legislation against the use of unfair terms and introduced mechanisms for their control.542 
Comparative research reveals that a diversity of enforcement mechanisms to counter unfair 
terms exists within Europe and each mechanism has its own distinctive characteristics that 
reflect the objectives the national legislator pursues within the philosophy of the legal 
system.543 Even with the enactment of the Directive, which has been primarily enacted to 
harmonize and approximate the member states’ national fairness rules in consumer 
contracts, there are still significant institutional and substantive differences between the 
existing enforcement mechanisms across Europe. This variety of experiences provides the 
comparative lawyer with a rich source of information that can be relied upon when 
researching how law reform should be implemented effectively. It seems, therefore, that 
the study of the various existing enforcement models in Europe could offer a useful 
perspective to approach an enforcement model for Kuwait.544 However, the reader should 
be reminded that the discussion will not delve into the differences between these 
mechanisms, but merely attempt to distill from them the essential ingredients for an 
effective enforcement mechanism. 
 
542 Martin Ebers, pp. 197–260. 
543 Ibid. 
544 Many writers view comparative law as an instrument for the development and promotion of law reform; 
to name a few: W. J. Kamba, ‘Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework’ 23 ICLQ 485.; Peter De Cruz, 
chapter one. 
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As has been noted by Calais-Auloy545 the existing enforcement mechanisms can generally 
becategorized into three distinct groups depending on the time when the control 
mechanism is implemented: (i) remedial mechanism (i.e., after the conclusion of the 
contract), (ii) preventative mechanism (i.e., between the drafting and conclusion of the 
contract), and (iii) ultra-preventative mechanism (i.e., during the drafting of the contract 
and prior to its conclusion). 
In the remedial control mechanism a legal action either by the consumer himself 
or a group of consumers (through group action) against the professional for an already 
concluded contract is required in order to eliminate the term. The elimination of the unfair 
terms can be vested in an ordinary or specialist court that has competence to review the 
dispute and determine whether or not the term is fair. Accordingly, all European member 
states are obliged by virtue of Art. 6(1) of the Directive to recognize this mechanism and 
deem unfair terms at least not to be binding on the consumer.546 The drafters of the 
Directive adopted the notion of non-bindingness as a neutral way of expressing the remedy 
of unfair terms547 due to the diversity of legal traditions. Consequently, the requirement of 
non-bindingness has been transposed to the Member States in different ways, such as non-
existence, nullity, voidability and enforceability, according to the legal order of each 
state.548 
Clearly, the remedial mechanism is not designed to fulfil a preventative function 
because its effect is limited to the parties to the dispute and is mainly aimed at excluding 
the unfair term from the scope of a particular contract only.  
 
545 M. J. Calais-Auloy, ‘Clearing of the Market: The Mechanism for Controlling Unfair Terms (Article 7)’ 
(The Directive on `Unfair Terms', Five Years Later- Evaluation and Future Perspectives Conference, 
Brussels, 1-3 July 1999); p. 173–182. 
546 Art. 6(1) provides: "Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a 
consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, not be binding on the 
consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of 
continuing in existence without the unfair terms". 
547 Joseph  Chitty and Hugh Beale, p. 1203.   
548 , Report from the Commission on the implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on 
unfair terms in consumer contracts COM (2000) 248 final, p. 19. 
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However, the preventative mechanism, in turn, pursues a more radical objective 
beyond the mere nullification and exclusion of unfair terms of the contract. Rather, it 
focuses on the elimination of unfair terms of all existing contracts in the market.549 
Therefore, it seeks to create a collective effect that extends beyond the parties of the 
contract to protect all prospective consumers. The Directive takes the prevention to an even 
higher level by requiring Member States to ensure that adequate and effective measures 
exist "to prevent the continued use of unfair terms" whether they are used or not.550 In 
Commission v Italian Republic551 the ECJ explained that the meaning of the phrase 
"continued use" should not be restricted to the prevention of terms that are already actually 
being used, but also future terms that have been drawn up for general use but have not yet 
been put into use, such as recommended terms by a trade association.552 
The ultra-preventative control mechanism is the most stringent mechanism of the 
three because the unfair terms are prohibited before the standard contract is proposed to 
consumers. Its main aim is to ensure that the contract does not contain terms that are 
prejudicial to the consumer or confer on the professional an unfair advantage that is likely 
to prejudice the consumer. The control can be exercised in one of two ways. The first is for 
the professional to submit the standard contract to a public agency or tribunal that is vested 
with the power to approve or reject the standard contract prior to its offering to consumers. 
If the proposed contract is rejected, then the professional may not be able to use it. 
In the second way, the contract is drafted by means of informal bilateral 
negotiations between professionals (or a professional association) and an organisation that 
represents the interests of the consumer, such as a consumer association553 or an 
 
549 M. J. Calais-Auloy, p. 174.  
550 Art. 7(1). 
551 Case C-372/99, 24 January 2002. 
552 The ECJ commented at para 15 that the measures could have deterrent and dissuasive impact only if 
"actions may be brought even though the terms which it is sought to have prohibited have not been used in 
specific contracts, but have only been recommended by suppliers and sellers or their associations". 
553 This technique has been implemented in the Netherlands where negotiations are held between the 
Committee for Consumer Affairs (Commissie voor Consumentenaangelegenheden) and professional 
associations under the auspices of the Social and Economic Council to draft standard contracts, for more 
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ombudsman.554 The basic advantage of this way is that the consumer organisation can 
negotiate unfair terms out of the standard contract and ensure from the outset that the terms 
are balanced and fair. 
Some commentators have suggested that the application of prior approval as a 
regulatory instrument across the market on all consumer contracts is almost impossible 
because it requires vast resources that are well beyond the government’s means, such as an 
adequate budget and a large number of qualified personnel.555 This view was also stressed 
by the European Economic and Social Committee in its opinion on the proposed Directive. 
The committee was less receptive to the idea of subjecting every standard contract to prior 
control as it would be "extremely bureaucratic" and does not guarantee the disappearance 
of unfair terms.556 However, despite the disadvantages of this mechanism, its application in 
specific sectors where the protection is mostly needed is by all means necessary, such as in 
banking and insurance contracts.557 
So, which model of the three is relevant to the Kuwaiti case? The researcher 
believes that all three should be recognized but in varying degrees. In order to provide an 
adequate level of protection for consumers against unfair terms, a sound regulatory system 
should be created that consists of both substantive and procedural rules that allow control 
 
information; see http://www.ser.nl/en. This technique resulted in fully-fledged standard contracts in certain 
sectors like gas, electricity and water; see Ewoud Hondius, ‘The Legal Control of Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts: Some Comparative Observations’, p. 55. 
554 In the Nordic countries the Consumer Ombudsman plays a central role in supervising consumer contracts, 
see Thomas Wilhelmsson, ‘Administrative Procedures for the Control of Marketing Practices- Theoretical 
Rationale and Perspectives’ 15 JCP 159. 
555 Sinai Deutch, ‘Control of Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts in Israel: Law and Practice’ 13 JCP 181, 
p. 196. 
556 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the “Report from the Commission on the 
Implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts”, 
2001/C 116/25 at para 8.2.1. From a business perspective, prior approval has been regarded by insurance 
companies as a major problem of the insurance business because the process of approval is time-consuming, 
Spencer L.  Kimball and Werner  Pfennigstorf, ‘Administrative Control of the Terms of Insurance Contracts: 
A Comparative Study’ 40 IndLJ 143, p. 228. 
557 , Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the “Report from the Commission on the 
Implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts”, 
2001/C 116/25 , para 8.2.1; Colin Scott, Julia  Black and Ross Cranston, Cranston's Consumers and the Law 
(Butterworths 2000), p. 102; Sinai Deutch, p. 196. It should be noted, however, that pre-vetting on standard 
contracts by public bodies in certain sectors is often required for considerations other than consumer 
protection, such as solvency of the insurer. 
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prior to the drafting of the contract, before it is offered to consumers and after it has been 
concluded. 
The current control system in Kuwait is essentially of a remedial judicial nature 
where the prohibition of the terms comes at a later stage, after the contract has been 
concluded through individual litigation. Earlier in this chapter it was explained why 
reliance on individual litigation alone as a mechanism for controlling unfair terms is bound 
to fail.558 Furthermore, it has emerged rather clearly from the previous chapter that the 
weaknesses of the judicial control procedure of unfair terms in Kuwait lies in the fact that 
it requires the weaker party to raise the unfairness question by himself and does not 
empower the court to examine unfair terms ex proprio motu. However, even if the courts 
are granted the power to examine unfair terms ex proprio motu, it is not enough as this 
would only allow individual consumer protection, but does not ensure collective 
prevention. In view of this, the search for a more effective control mechanism becomes a 
necessary task.  
Therefore, what seems to be missing is a pre-emptive control mechanism that is 
able to addresses the drawbacks associated with the individual litigation-based mechanism. 
This can be achieved by introducing two additional layers of control. The first layer is the 
requirement of obtaining prior approval for standard contracts in specific sectors, such as 
banking and insurance, from a public body before the contract can be proposed to 
consumers. The second layer is granting a public body the powers, inter alia, to monitor 
the market and seek the prohibition of the use of unfair terms by means of injunctions, as 
well as acknowledging consumer organisations’ right to represent consumers in courts, and 
before competent authorities and courts. Therefore, how a preventative mechanism can be 
implemented in Kuwait will be discussed in the following pages. However, owing to the 
limitations of the study, the first layer will not be considered as the main objective of this 
chapter is to propose general solutions that are able to govern the control of unfair terms 
 
558 See section 6.2 above. 
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across the market and are not confined to a specific sector. The following discussion will 
focus on the second layer only and an attempt will be made to delineate its main features.  
 
5.4 A perspective on an effective control model in Kuwait 
 
5.4.1 Basis and scope of control 
 
In designing a control mechanism it is necessary to identify precisely what is to be 
controlled. It is only after this question has been answered that an appropriate mechanism 
can be proposed; in other words, any enforcement mechanism should be based on a clear 
conceptualisation of the problem to be controlled. An important question then becomes: 
What is the problem that a public enforcement mechanism in Kuwait should seek to 
control? 
It has been shown in the previous chapters that the present regulatory approach in 
Kuwait is largely based on classical contract theory where the problem of unfair contract 
terms is perceived as a problem that concerns one party only; the adhering party. The Civil 
Code, despite admitting that such terms are a byproduct of an exceptional contracting 
paradigm that affects a multitude of individuals, does not recognize any measures that are 
aimed at protecting the collective interests of adhering parties. Rather, the remedies that 
the code makes available, namely content revision and contra proferentem, are constructed 
to balance the interests of an individual party against the interests of the professional.559 
The researcher is of the opinion that basing the control on classical contract theory 
alone is both wrong and ineffectual. For the control mechanism to be effective, the 
problem of unfair terms should be viewed in a wider context that has socio-economic 
 
559 It seems that the act of adhesion to a contract is perceived by the draftsmen of the KCC as a consent issue 
arising from the absence of negotiation, hence the protection rules should aim to ensure consent which would 
eventually results in fairness. Although this preliminary conclusion cannot be supported by reference to other 
studies, the very regulation of the contract of adhesion in the Civil Code under the heading of consent is 
indicative of classic contract theory thinking expressed in the aphorism ‘qui dit contractuel, dit juste’ (if it is 
contractual, it is fair). 
195 
 
                                                           
implications on a large number of individuals, and that the interests of the professional 
should be balanced not against the interests of an individual consumer, but rather against 
the collective interests of consumers. 
Another similarly important point that merits consideration in putting forward a 
proposal for an enforcement mechanism against unfair terms is the determination of the 
scope of control. Should public control be extended to all unfair terms or limited to specific 
types of terms? In chapter three of this thesis, it was pointed out that the vagueness of the 
meaning of unfair terms is a fundamental problem in the KCC and there is an urgent need 
to introduce a clear concept for unfair terms. The concept should consist of a general 
criterion of unfairness supplemented by two lists: black containing per se unfair terms and 
grey containing potentially unfair terms. It has also been proposed that the legislative 
protection should not apply to negotiated terms provided that the consumer was given a 
real opportunity to influence the terms.  
In view of this, the scope of control should be limited to standardized non-
individually negotiated terms only. This means that the control should be directed to pre-
formulated terms that have been drawn up for a large number of contracts which the 
professional imposes on adhering parties without negotiation.560 The main objective of the 
public control of unfair terms should focus on the protection of the collective interests of 
consumers; therefore, the public body should not be overburdened with responsibility to 
resolve individual cases. However, this is not to say that the protection against unfair terms 
should not be applied to individual cases, but simply the aggrieved party in such cases 
should himself initiate the court proceedings. Additionally, public control should not be 
concerned with individually negotiated terms, even if they were pre-formulated for an 
indefinite number of individuals, provided that the consumer accepted them freely and 
after he had been given a genuine opportunity to change them.561 Lastly, the control should 
 
560 This is also the chosen scope in the UK by the UTCCR; see Regulation 12(1). 
561 See chapter three. 
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be concerned with business-to-consumer adhesion contracts only; business-to-business 
standard form contracts should not be covered in the ambit of control. The problem of 
inequality of bargaining position and the weakness of the adhering party is not manifested 
in contracts between commercial parties. Businesses are, generally, in a position that 
enables them to appreciate the implications of the standard terms and do not usually need 
the kind of protection consumers need in consumer adhesion contracts.562 
 
5.4.2 General features of a public control design 
 
Having identified the basis and scope of the control mechanism, it now becomes necessary 
to outline the main characteristics of the structure that should be established to realise this 
control. It would be beneficial to the discussion to look into the comparative experience of 
other countries where best practices have been developed and attempt to derive workable 
solutions for an effective means to control unfair terms.  
 
5.4.2.1 Who should bring challenges against the general use of unfair terms? 
 
In order for the control mechanism to yield the best results in practice, this role should be 
assigned to an entity that has the resources necessary to monitor the market and enforce the 
law. It is submitted that in order for a public control mechanism to yield the best results in 
practice, it should consist of two-level control.563 At the first level, consumers’ interests 
are represented by a consumer organisation or a public body (or both) that engages in 
 
562 There are different reactions in Europe to the question of whether the protection against unfair terms 
should be extended to businesses. In France, on the one hand, Art. e L132-1 of the Consumer Code does not 
restrict notion of consumer, hence protection, to natural persons but also include legal persons (or non-
professionals) such as businesses that conclude contracts that are not directly related with their profession. In 
the UK, on the other hand, there have been suggestions to extend the scope of protection to small businesses 
as well; see Law Commissions (joint report), Unfair Terms in Contracts, (Law Com No. 292 Cm 6464, Scot 
Law Com No. 199, 2005). 
563 E. H. Hondius, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, p. 224; Mario Tenreiro, ‘Conclusion’ (The 
Directive on `Unfair Terms', Five Years Later- Evaluation and Future Perspectives Conference, Brussels, 1-3 
July 1999), p. 217.  
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negotiations with professionals for the removal of unfair terms from their standard 
contracts. At the second level, a court or a board is empowered to issue injunctions against 
the use of unfair terms. 
When one looks at the European scene, one finds that the task of enforcing unfair 
terms is entrusted to different bodies. Article 7 of the Directive requires member states to 
adopt: 
 
" adequate and effective means . . . to prevent the continued use of unfair terms 
and such means should include provisions whereby persons or organizations, 
having a legitimate interest under national law in protecting consumers, may take 
action according to the national law concerned before the courts or before 
competent administrative bodies for a decision as to whether contractual terms 
drawn up for general use are unfair" 
 
It is up to the Member States to decide on which means should be put in place. 
In most member states this task has been undertaken by an administrative body 
established for consumer protection purpose.564 The UK model in particular has been 
highly successful as evidenced by the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) bulletins.565 The 
OFT is the chief enforcement authority of the UTCCR.566 Regulations 10–15 give the OFT 
a wide range of powers that allow it to carry out its responsibility. This includes a duty to 
consider any complaints made to it against any unfair term drawn up for general use567 
apply for injunctions against existing or recommended unfair terms drawn up for general 
 
564 Martin Ebers, p. 252. 
565 The OFT unfair contract terms bulletins are available at http://www.oft.gov.uk; see also Christian Twigg-
Flesner, ‘The Implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive in the United Kingdom’, p. 258. 
566 The UTCCR extend the enforcement powers to other public and private qualifying bodies listed in 
Schedule (1) to the regulations.  
567 Regulation 10. This is unless the complaint appears to be frivolous or vexatious or a qualifying body has 
notified the OFT that it agrees to consider the complaint, Regulation 10(a) and (b).  
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use to prevent their continued use,568 power to obtain documents and information,569 and 
the publication of the details of any undertaking given to it or to a court and allow it to 
arrange for the dissemination of information and advice concerning the operation of the 
UTCCR.570 
However, the experience in other Member States shows that assigning the 
responsibility of enforcing unfair terms to a private organisation representing the collective 
interests of consumers could produce equally effective results. In Germany, for example, 
consumer protection organisations are entitled to bring injunction proceedings against the 
use of unfair terms on behalf of consumers.571 
Which approach of the two approaches is likely to be more effective in Kuwait? It 
seems to the researcher that the application of the first model in Kuwait is preferable 
through the establishment of an independent public consumer protection authority that has 
direct enforcement powers. This is because the second model presupposes the existence of 
active private consumer organisations that are able to effectively bear and carry out such 
heavy responsibility. It is unfortunate that no such organisation yet exists in Kuwait. 
Furthermore, a public body would have more authority than private organisations to coerce 
businesses to abide by the law. However, this does not imply that private organisations 
should not have a role in enforcing unfair terms in the future. On the contrary, they could 
play a complementary role and contribute to ensuring an adequate enforcement level as 
public enforcement cannot take legal action against every infringement in the market. 
In the meantime, the role of the public body should be clearly envisaged and it 
should be equipped with powers that enable it to achieve its objectives. This discussion 
will not consider the institutional structure of the public body, but rather will focus on the 
main issues that the public body has to tackle. 
 
568 Regulation 12(1). 
569 Regulation 13. 
570 Regulation 15. 
571Hans-W Micklitz, ‘Report on the Practical Implementation of Directive 93/13/EEC in the Federal Republic 
of Germany’ (The Directive on `Unfair Terms', Five Years Later- Evaluation and Future Perspectives 
Conference, Brussels, 1-3 July 1999), p. 221. 
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5.4.2.2 Powers that should be given to the public body 
 
In order for the public body to carry out its responsibilities effectively, the researcher 
suggests that it should be granted some powers. These powers should include the power to 
consider complaints, conduct investigations and negotiate fair contracts with professionals, 
and standing to initiate legal action. 
This researcher is of the opinion that a free public redress mechanism should be 
made available to those with a complaint. Identifying a public defender that will take 
action on behalf of consumers without cost would encourage public confidence in the 
system. Therefore, the duty to consider complaints about unfair terms that have been 
drafted for general use should be recognized as one of the basic responsibilities of the 
public body. If the public body finds the complaint to be well founded, then it should 
launch an investigation to determine whether or not the terms are unfair. To facilitate the 
investigation, the public body should be given the power to require the professional to 
submit to it any document or any other relevant information that the body needs to deal 
with the complaint. If the public body believes that the terms in question are unfair, then it 
should be entitled to negotiate with the professional within a reasonable amount of time for 
their withdrawal from the standard contract before initiating formal legal actions. If the 
professional accepts the withdrawal of the unfair terms from the standard contract, then he 
must give an undertaking in writing that the unfair terms in question would no longer be 
used in existing and future contracts. If the professional refuses to provide such an 
undertaking, then the public body should be given the power to initiate court proceedings 
against the professional.  
However, the above should not mean that the public body cannot carry out its 
investigatory powers on its own initiative. On the contrary, it should constantly monitor the 
market by examining businesses’ standard contracts for any potential unfair terms and not 
wait until injury occurs.  
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 The experience, especially in the UK, suggests that the use of complaints and 
negotiations proved to be very effective extra-judicial instruments for the elimination of 
unfair terms. The statistics of the OFT show that despite the fact that the office had to deal 
with a large volume of complaints about unfair terms in consumer contracts, it nevertheless 
succeeded in resolving the complaints entirely without the need to commence court 
proceedings.572 The office has even adopted an active approach in dealing with complaints; 
not only does it consider the particular term complained about, but also investigates all the 
terms of the contract. The OFT outlines its approach as follows: 
 
"Whenever a consumer contract is brought to our notice by a complainant who 
believes that it contains a standard term that is unfair, we examine the contract as 
a whole and look at all the circumstances in which it is likely to be used. We will 
question every term that we think is potentially unfair to consumers or possibly 
harmful to their interests in some way".573 
 
The OFT effort does not stop at taking preventative action against an individual 
professional, but often investigates the standard terms across all sectors of the industry so 
that the terms used by similar professionals can be examined together. For example, in 
1997 the OFT approached seven mobile phone companies regarding the length of the 
termination notice, following the negotiations all approached companies agreed with the 
OFT requests to revise their terms and reduced the notice period to a maximum of one 
month.574 Similar success in other sectors has also been reported.575 This practice, apart 
from being an effective instrument for consumer protection, can also contribute to fair 
 
572 Unfair Contract Terms Bulletin, The Office of Fair Trading, Issue No 4 December 1997 , p. 5. The work 
of the OFT is published regularly in bulletins that record its efforts. Theses bulletins are available at the 
OFT’s website http://www.oft.gov.uk.  
573 Ibid., pp. 14–15. 
574 John Vickers, ‘Contracts and European Consumer Law: An OFT Perspective’ in Stefan Vogenauer and 
Stephen  Weatherill (eds), Harmonisation of European contract law: Implications for European Private 
Laws, Business and Legal Practice (Hart 2006), p. 175. 
575 Susan Bright, ‘Winning the Battle Against Unfair Contract Terms’ 20 LS 331, 20(3), 334. 
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competition between businesses operating in the same line of trade as no business will 
have a competitive advantage over another through the use of the eliminated term. 
The primary regulatory mechanism the OFT relies on is negotiation as an 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism. If the OFT believes that a contract term is unfair, 
then it will try to persuade the professional to amend or exclude the term under the threat 
of taking legal action. Negotiating-out terms with professionals has achieved similar 
success in Sweden and the Netherlands, and a significant decrease in the number of court 
decisions in disputes involving unfair terms has been recorded.576 However, negotiations 
did not have a similar positive impact in other countries such as France.577 This is probably 
largely due to the fact that the model in France is essentially non-compulsory and the 
Commission des Clauses Abusives does not possess any enforcement powers but merely 
the issuance of non-binding recommendations on unfair terms. Hondius argued that in 
order to get professionals around the negotiation table, a ‘stick-and-carrot’ approach must 
be devised.578 The stick is provided by a court that may order the professional to cease the 
use of the unfair terms. The enforcement body may not need to resort to the court but the 
threat that it will use it is sufficient to induce the professional to co-operate and revise the 
terms. Indeed, it is argued that this course of action has been so productive because of 
professionals’ fear of bad publicity. Also, agreeing on fair terms with the enforcement 
body would allow professionals to secure the protection needed for their standard contracts 
instead of making the unfair terms vulnerable to nullity by the court. Most importantly, 
settling the dispute by way of negotiation is by far less costly for the business than going to 
court.579 
 
576 , Report from the Commission on the implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on 
unfair terms in consumer contracts COM (2000) 248 final, p. 25. 
577 Ruth Sefton-Green, ‘A Comparison of the Institutional Implications of the Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts in France and the UK’ in Jacobien  Rutgers (ed), European contract law and the welfare 
state (Europa Law Publishing 2012), p. 124. 
578 E. H. Hondius, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Towards a European Directive’ EuropConsumer LJ 
180, p. 183. 
579 Susan Bright, p. 335. 
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In the light of this, the public body in Kuwait should be given the power to initiate 
legal action against professionals who refuse to amend their terms. As a representative of 
consumers’ interests it should be allowed to issue warnings against offending professionals 
for the removal of unfair terms from their standard contracts and standing to bring court 
proceedings in case of non-compliance. The warnings entail that the enforcement body 
writing a letter to the offending professional ordering him to stop using the unfair terms. If 
the professional disputes the warning, then the enforcement body can initiate court 
proceedings against him, requesting the removal of the terms. The typical judicial remedy 
would be the nullification and elimination of the unfair terms from the standard contract. 
However, it might be appropriate to consider the introduction of more deterrent remedies 
against continuing offenders, such as financial penalties and publication of the judgment in 
daily newspapers at the expense of the professional.  
Apart from the enforcement role, the public body should attempt to establish 
information transparency by assisting businesses in understanding the law and raise public 
awareness of consumers’ rights. This could be done through the regular publication of 
guidance notices outlining the law and the procedure for challenging unfair terms, as well 
as recommendations on terms that it considers to be unfair. The OFT in particular has been 
very active in this field and its website contains a myriad of leaflets, reports, and 
consultations for businesses and consumers on unfair terms in addition to routine bulletins 
that give details of cases where the OFT has secured amendments in contract terms.580 
Some countries, such as Poland and Spain, have created a register of unfair contract terms 
which includes all terms that have been pronounced unfair in court judgments.581 Similar 
information transparency and register should be developed in Kuwait so that businesses 
and consumers can know whether or not the terms conform to the law. 
 
580 http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/publications/publication-categories/guidance/unfair-terms-
consumer/#.UoQqVXBUHNp  
581 , Report from the Commission on the implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on 
unfair terms in consumer contracts COM (2000) 248 final, p. 23. Poland have made the register publicly 
available online at http://www.oukik.gov.pl. 
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 The last point in this chapter that merits short discussion concerns the role that 
consumer organisations should have in the enforcement procedure. Any law reform in the 
consumer protection field should consider granting consumer organisations the right to 
initiate legal action on behalf of consumers who suffered similar harm and intervene in 
court proceedings initiated by the public body in their collective interest. While it is has 
been argued above that the public body should be the main player in the enforcement 
mechanism, this role should not be concentrated in the hands of the public body alone as it 
naturally will not be able to take action against every standardized unfair term. The 
participation of consumer organisations in the enforcement procedure seems necessary and 
may well contribute to the prevention of the use of unfair terms. This is especially true in 
lawsuits where a multitude of consumers are affected by the same unfair term and provides 
a means for redress to individual consumers who are unable to start court proceedings.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
The proposed enforcement model contemplates the creation of a novel independent public 
body that represents the interests of consumers and is equipped with powers that allow it to 
enforce the law  effectively. Among the powers are the power to consider complaints, 
launch investigations on its own motion, introduce negotiation as an alternative dispute 
mechanism and the right to bring court proceedings against professionals to order the 
removal of unfair terms. It is also recommended that any law reform effort should envisage 
the introduction of criminal sanctions, such as fines, against continued infringements and 
in more serious cases. Rendering the unfair terms null or ineffective might not be enough 
in some cases. 
For some this proposal might seem radical for it introduces a public law-based 
solution to a private law problem, which could be said to represent an incursion of public 
law into private law. However, the above discussion suggests that the problem of unfair 
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terms is not a problem of traditional contract law and its implications go far beyond an 
individual consumer. The classical remedies provided by the KCC through individual 
litigation only do not suffice to remedy the situation and guarantee the prevention of unfair 
terms in the market. What is needed therefore is an active approach towards a preventative 
control model enforced by a governmental arm. Whether the proposed enforcement model 
will have a preventative effect will obviously depend a great deal on the commitment and 
determination of the enforcement authority. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has attempted to identify the key problems associated with the Kuwaiti 
protection regime against unfair terms and sought to propose solutions for its overhaul. It 
started from the hypothesis that the protection model as prescribed in articles 80 and 81 
KCC has failed considerably in providing the weaker party in adhesion contracts with an 
adequate level of protection against unfair terms. The discussion throughout the chapters 
sought to confirm this hypothesis and uncover the various aspects of the problem. The 
analysis has shown that the problem of the Kuwaiti control model of unfair terms can be 
reduced to three basic issues: (i) narrow scope of protection, (ii) absence of a standard of 
contractual unfairness and (iii) ineffective enforcement procedure.  
In the researcher’s view, the failure of the Kuwaiti protection model of unfair 
contract terms has five main aspects:  
 
i. The design of the protection model does not take into account the weakness of the 
adhering party and his need for protection prior to the formation of the contract. 
The law allows intervention only after the conclusion of a binding contract. 
ii. The judicial restrictive interpretation of the concept of adhesion contracts has 
considerably limited the scope of protection to cover few contracts only. 
iii. The code does not provide a definition or standard of unfair terms, thus leaving 
the notion obscure and surrounded with ambiguity.  
iv. The enforcement procedure relies solely on the weaker party and does not require, 
or at least allow, the court to raise unfairness issues on its own motion. 
v. The protection model lacks a preventative framework for addressing unfair terms 
that prevents their continued use at a market level. 
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These issues have been discussed in five chapters: 
Chapter one explored whether, in the light of the statutory deficiency and since 
the phenomenon of unfair terms is a pure contract law problem, these issues can be tackled 
through recourse to the general principles of contract law. It was shown, in two sections, 
that it is possible, at least theoretically, to control unfair terms by using the general 
principles of contract law, such as the theory of defects of consent and the principle of 
good faith. It has been argued that since unfair terms are imposed on the weaker party 
against his contractual will, then it is reasonable to suspect that his consent to the unfair 
terms was not obtained in an appropriate manner. If this assumption is right, then the 
problem of unfair terms appears to be a consent-related problem and their validity can be 
challenged on several grounds. First, given the fact that modern standard contracts are 
often drafted in a complex and sophisticated legal, and sometimes technical, language, 
many individuals may fail to understand the meaning of the contract terms or appreciate 
their implications. In this case it can be argued that the validity of unfair terms can be 
contested on the grounds of error. Similarly, unfair terms can be challenged on the grounds 
of fraud. It is not uncommon that professionals misrepresent the terms of the contract, 
either by hiding some important facts or burying the terms in small print so that the 
consumer fails to notice them. Lastly, the rules on exploitation may be applicable. The 
professional, by virtue of his superior bargaining position, may exploit the inherent 
weaknesses of the consumer and induce him into entering a contract that contains unfair 
terms. 
The argument that the theory of defects of consent may play a role in countering 
unfair terms seems valid and uses a plausible premise. However, this role will always be 
limited as the effect of its application would necessarily bring the contractual relationship 
to an end rather than restore the upset balance of the contract. Furthermore, given the rigid 
and inflexible attitude of the Kuwaiti courts towards a progressive interpretation of the 
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rules, it is doubtful whether the courts would show the desire to accept the application of 
the theory of defects of consent to control unfair terms in practice.  
In section two of this chapter an attempt was made to ascertain whether the 
principle of good faith could be used to control unfair terms. It was shown that the KCC 
establishes a relationship between good faith and contractual fairness in the sense that 
unfair terms cannot be imposed without violating the duty of good faith. It was also 
pointed out that other jurisdictions, such as Germany, and Portugal, have been very 
successful in controlling unfair terms in standard contracts on the grounds of good faith. 
However, as for Kuwait, the analysis concluded that it was doubtful, at least for the time 
being, whether that application of the principle of good faith on unfair terms would 
produce similar effects, mainly because it remained an underdeveloped criterion that could 
not be used autonomously to control contract content. Therefore, the failure of the general 
principles of contract law in controlling unfair terms shows that an immediate legislative 
intervention is required to address the deficiency of the rules. 
Chapter two reviewed the scope of protection against unfair terms and focused 
on adhesion contracts as the protection was recognized in their context. Therefore, the 
chapter was divided into three sections dedicated to discussion of the historical 
development of the adhesion contract, its regulation in the KCC and its interpretation by 
the Kuwaiti courts.  
The purpose of the historical review was to analyse the evolution of the concept of 
the adhesion contract and the impact it had on contract law. This was a necessary step to 
help understand the reason for the Kuwaiti courts’ preference of a narrow interpretive 
approach of the concept of adhesion contracts and to set a perspective for the criticism of 
such approach.  
As for the regulation of the adhesion contract, it was made clear that the main 
objective for its regulation in the Kuwaiti code was to acknowledge its contractual nature 
and to confirm that absence of negotiations does not preclude the formation of a binding 
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contract. However, the analysis revealed that while it was essential to stress the contractual 
nature of such contracts, the regulation had failed to take into consideration the weakness 
of the adhering party and his need for the protection of his consent prior to the formation of 
the contract. Likewise, the analysis has also found that the traditional concept of adhesion 
contracts still dominates the legal thinking of the courts. The courts prefer the adoption of a 
narrow interpretation of adhesion contracts by linking it to the notions of monopoly and 
essentiality of the object of the contract. This view was deserted long ago in many 
jurisdictions, especially in the Western world in which adhesion contracts have evolved. 
Consequently, the position of the Kuwaiti courts not only seems outdated, but is also 
unfounded and inconsistent with the wording of the KCC itself which requires absence of 
negotiations and the advance formulation of the terms as the only two features. This 
finding shows that the problem of the scope of protection is not with the wording of the 
law, but rather with the judicial preference of a traditional definition over a modern one. 
Chapter three concentrated on the notion of contractual unfairness in the KCC 
and attempted to clarify areas of ambiguity surrounding it. The discussion investigated two 
problems associated with the wording of the law: (i) the vagueness of the notion of 
unfairness and (ii) the objective scope of protection. First, the KCC was criticized for not 
including a definition or standard to determine what might qualify a contractual term as 
being unfair. Although such omission was not unintentional in order to give the court some 
flexibility when interpreting unfair terms, case law has shown that the courts have never 
attempted to clarify its connotation. This has resulted in legal uncertainty and constituted a 
flagrant disregard of the spirit of the law. The interpretation of such a complex technical 
term should not be left to the courts alone, especially if they have shown a proclivity to 
adopt narrow interpretations. The second problem associated with the notion of unfairness 
is related to the objective scope of protection. The law bases the protection against unfair 
terms in adhesion contracts on the pre-formulation of the terms by the offeror and the 
inability of the adhering party to negotiate the terms of the contract. However, it is not too 
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difficult for businesses to circumvent these two requirements by using a model contract 
prepared by a third party, such as another business or a trade association, or by engaging in 
superficial negotiations with the adhering party. This research suggested the need for the 
reconsideration of the existing objective scope of protection against unfair terms by, first, 
removing reference to pre-formulation of terms by the offeror and, secondly, substituting 
the requirement of negotiation with the notion of inability to influence the terms. 
In the light of the ambiguity of the notion of contractual unfairness, the chapter 
sought to determine its meaning in the context of the KCC. It was emphasized that the 
absence of a statutory definition of unfairness did not necessarily mean that its meaning 
could not be discerned. Therefore, the analysis demonstrated that the meaning of 
contractual unfairness could be ascertained with reference to the theory of abuse of rights 
as articulated in Art. 30 KCC. Because the end result of unfair terms is the creation of a 
significant imbalance between the parties, it was suggested that the test of 
disproportionality, above the other tests of abuse, was the most suitable to determine when 
a certain contractual term was unfair. However, although the discussion showed that the 
abuse theory could be used to determine and control unfair terms, legislative intervention 
remained necessary to provide legal certainty and predictability. 
Any future reform of the law should add clarity to the concept of unfairness to 
assist the court in assessing the fairness of the terms. This can be achieved by: 
(i) introducing a general test of unfairness based on the notion of flagrant disproportion 
between the interest the professional gains and the harm the unfair terms cause to the 
consumer, and (ii) providing two lists of unfair terms; one containing terms that are 
automatically ineffective, and the other containing terms that are presumed to be unfair.  
Chapter four assessed the judicial procedure for enforcing the protection rules 
against unfair terms. Having studied and reviewed Art. 81 KCC, it is clear that the law is 
also deficient in this area. Despite the fact that Art. 81 gives the court wide discretionary 
power to sanction unfair terms, this is still insufficient to ensure that the adhering party 
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receives adequate protection. First, the law expects the adhering party to play an active role 
in the enforcement process, even with his lack of legal knowledge. A trial court is 
prohibited from considering the unfairness on its own motion because the law requires that 
in order for the court to assess the terms, a request for review should first be submitted by 
the adhering party. This approach should be reconsidered and at least allow the court to 
examine unfair terms on its own motion to compensate for the inferiority in the adhering 
party’s contractual position. Secondly, the exercise of the court’s discretionary power to 
review unfair terms is completely optional. The law allows the court to disregard any 
application to review unfair terms even if it is founded on valid legal grounds. It is 
suggested that the Kuwaiti legislator reviews the voluntary exercise of the court’s power 
and compels the court to review the adhering party application if it is founded in law, as 
well as empowering the court to raise unfairness on its own motion.  
Moreover, the inclusion of amendment as a remedy for unfair terms should be 
revisited because it does not produce a deterrent effect. A professional would prefer to risk 
inserting unfair terms into his contract in the hope that the court may preserve the term 
itself. The purpose of the remedy should not only be aimed at alleviating the unfairness 
aspect of the term, but also serve the long-term purpose of continued use of unfair terms in 
standard contracts. Therefore, it is recommended that the law does not allow the court to 
modify the content of the terms and make elimination the only remedy for unfair terms. 
Another matter that merits consideration is the burden of proof. The law places 
the burden of proving the unfairness of the terms on the adhering party. Given the ordinary 
adhering party’s lack of legal knowledge, it is unlikely that he will be able to articulate 
such a legal defence. It is, therefore, recommended that the law reverses the burden of 
proof by requiring the professional who wishes to rely on an unfair term to prove its 
fairness. However, reversal of the burden of proof requires the introduction of a lucid 
concept of contractual unfairness based on a general standard of unfairness, and two lists 
containing black and grey terms. 
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Chapter five extended the enforcement discussion initiated in the previous 
chapter and investigated how to achieve positive enforcement of unfair terms. It was noted 
that since the existing enforcement procedure was based on individual litigation, the effect 
of the courts’ decisions in disputes involving unfair terms would remain limited to each 
particular case. Such a negative enforcement approach is insufficient. On the one hand, 
consumers are less inclined to initiate legal proceedings due to psychological and financial 
factors. On the other, it does not prevent the same business, let alone other businesses, 
from continuing to use the same term found to be unfair in their standard contracts. The 
EU Commission rightly observed that "unfair terms are like the Hydra: cut off one head 
and others grow in"582 and that the traditional approach to eliminating unfair terms based 
on individual litigation lacks the dissuasive effect. Therefore, it was proposed that the ideal 
solution would be the establishment of a public enforcement mechanism whereby an 
administrative body assumed responsibility for controlling unfair terms in the market on 
behalf of consumers. This body should be equipped with necessary powers that enable it to 
carry out its activities effectively, including the power to consider complaints, initiate 
investigations and commence legal proceedings. Additionally, any law reform of the 
enforcement mechanism should also consider granting consumer associations the right to 
represent consumers and intervene in legal proceedings. The practice in other jurisdictions, 
such as the UK, has shown that a combination of the two approaches is expected to yield 
the best results. 
 
582 Ibid., p. 24. 
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